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ABSTRACT 
For Aristotle, the art of rhetoric—an ability to see what is persuasive in any given case—is a 
matter both of speaking and of listening, of persuading and of judging persuasive speeches. 
Rhetorical artists may exercise their theoretical powers for the sake of productive activity, 
discovering persuasive arguments to deploy in the courtroom and the assembly, or they may use 
those same powers to judge the validity or political utility of other speakers’ arguments, “seeing” 
the difference between the persuasive and the “apparently persuasive.” This conception of 
rhetorical artistry is consistent with Aristotle’s teaching about arts generally. In the Physics and 
the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes between technē, which is a rational and theoretical 
capacity, and poiēsis, which is a productive activity. In the Politics, he advises free people to 
study the arts, not so that they may please audiences or clients with their artifacts (which is a 
vulgar pursuit), but so that they may become better judges of others’ works (a liberal one). 
Consistent with this conception of receptive and evaluative artistry, the Rhetoric analyzes topics, 
proofs, enthymeme, and metaphor from both the speaker and the audience’s perspectives, 
showing how one may be rhetorically artistic both as a speaker and as a judge. The dialectical 
arrangement of the Rhetoric trains Aristotle’s students and readers in this art of rhetorical 
listening, teaching them to see not only the available “means” of persuasion, but also 
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My mother taught me to read and write; my father, to inquire, deduce, and discuss. 
Grandma Harthan taught me that kindness and good will are as persuasive as a well-reasoned 
argument. Grandpa Harthan taught me that clarity, the chief virtue of rhetorical style, comes as 
much from common sense as from art or training. Grandma Schmidt taught me to study 
inductively: Observe, outline, obtain! Grandpa Schmidt taught me to parse and exegete. 
Somewhere there is a picture of him and me sitting at the old Pine Street house with lexicons and 
commentaries strewn about the dining room table, wondering about Paul’s syntax in the first 
chapter of Ephesians. 
Growing up in Gulf Coast Bible Church meant learning to read and listen carefully and to 
recite one’s lessons with confidence and precision. Grandpa Schmidt’s hour-long sermons, 
during which I was always expected to take copious notes, inculcated the habits of careful 
listening that I hope to have discerned in Aristotle; and I can remember a number of times when 
Grandma, Mom, or Dad would insist that I articulate some fine distinction that Grandpa had 
drawn, always correcting my wording when I remembered poorly.  
These technical skills are not the chief end for which my parents, grandparents, and 
neighbors labored. I often wonder if, despite their efforts, I learned a bit too much dicendi peritus 
and not nearly enough vir bonus. But this is a matter for prayer, not for academic study.  
At the University of North Texas, Richard Ruderman, Martin Yaffe, and Joe Barnhart 
taught me to read political philosophy. Eugene Wright, a professor of Shakespeare, insisted that I 
study Aristotle’s Ethics, and J. Baird Callicott helped me to situate Aristotle in the history of 
ethical thought. Professor Bruner in the Communication Studies Department and Ulrike Jaeckel 
in the English Department brought me to the Rhetoric. By chance or by providence, I happened 
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upon Scott Crider’s The Office of Assertion, which brought me to the University of Dallas. 
There, Scott Crider, John Alvis, Gerard Wegemer, David O. Davies, and the rest of the IPS 
faculty carefully honed my exegetical skills over five years of first-rate lectures and seminars. 
Scott’s new book, The Art of Persuasion: Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” for Everyone, should become 
the standard guide for young rhetors.  
My wife Laura was the first to suggest that I apply for graduate school. She encouraged 
and supported my studies, patiently doing more than her share to run our household and to bring 
up our children “beautifully by means of habits,” while also working as a marketer and copy 
writer.  
One neither expects nor merits such kindness, nor does one hope ever to repay it 




The species of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number 
to which the hearers of speeches belong. A speech consists of three 
things: a speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone 
addressed, and the objective of the speech relates to the last (I 
mean the hearer). 
–Rhetoric 1.3.11  
 
To theorize about rhetoric is not only to explain how speakers use the means of 
persuasion; it is also to wonder about how audiences listen and why they judge as they do. As a 
power or capacity (dunamis), rhetoric is bi- (and often multi-) directional. To treat it as a 
unidirectional exertion, in which an active speaker transmits a message to a passive audience, is 
to ignore or minimize most of the political circumstances, ethical considerations, and 
psychological conditions that inhere in the reciprocal act of speaking and listening. Such 
treatments are not only theoretically inaccurate but also practically deficient. As Aristotle 
observes, persuasion is always directed at someone.2 To practice the craft of speaking rationally 
and artistically, a speaker must, to whatever degree is possible, know her audience—just as she 
knows her subject and the canons of rhetoric.  
But understanding an audience means treating its constituent members as human beings 
who are by nature rational, ethical, emotive, and political—and who are therefore capable of 
active participation, not only of passive reception, in persuasive discourse. Ultimately, this 
realization demands that a study of rhetoric treat the rhetorical exchange not only from the 
perspective of the speaker or writer, whose persuasive goals the speech must instrumentally 
achieve, but also from the perspective of the reader or listener, whose purposes in hearing the 
speech, whether acknowledged or not, are broadly political and ethical. A speaker may want to 
convict a defendant or to see a motion passed; an audience, composed of citizens who may or 
may not rise to speak, will render a judgment with broad implications and long-lasting 
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consequences for the administration of justice or the pursuit of common advantage. As a matter 
of theory, then, rhetoric must explain not only the workings of the speaker’s language, logic, and 
vocal performance, but also the workings of reason, emotions, and moral convictions in listeners’ 
souls—all of which serve political and ethical ends that constitute the public good. While cities 
come into being for the sake of living, they exist for the sake of living well; and, while the art of 
rhetoric does not in itself discover or determine what constitutes the just or the good, it 
nevertheless studies and provides arguments about those ends. According to Aristotle, it is part 
of the same capacity to see what is persuasive about such matters and what is only apparently so. 
Insofar as the discipline of rhetoric explains how a speaker can best achieve his or her 
instrumental goals, it should also explain how audiences can best judge the relationship between 
those instrumental goals and the ends of politics and human life. 
That rhetoric should study audiences as well as speakers or patterns of speech is a 
foundational assumption of rhetorical theory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. To be 
sure, the ongoing preoccupation with describing and defining all of the contingent elements in 
the rhetorical situation has had its drawbacks for the usefulness and intelligibility of rhetorical 
study. The current study of rhetoric involves such related fields as critical theory, semiotics, 
hermeneutics, and philosophy of language, which seek to explicate or problematize the ever-
changing relationships among speaker, audience, medium, and overlapping contexts in an 
irreducibly complex and fluid process of culture-bound sign-making and interpretation.3 
Rhetorical study has also come to involve both the practical and the critical study of marketing, 
propaganda, and political messaging—including the ever more divisive and deterministic 
demographic models provided by the field of data analytics. Moreover, thanks to the efforts of a 
devoted contingency of sophistic revivalists, the study of rhetoric and communication is seeking 
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once again to subsume and subjugate the study of politics, as if there were no more to politics 
and psychology than knowing which buttons to push to inflame the passions of a given segment 
of the public. In our time no less than in Aristotle’s, there are more than a few sophists who 
claim divine status for peithō; but our post-Christian era, unlike Aristotle’s pagan Athens, has a 
lingering hunger for an omnipresent and omnipotent god. For the Neosophists, logos is all in all.4 
Rhetors and theorists in ancient Athens, whatever their sophistic tendencies or political 
leanings, assumed a more limited rhetorical situation with fewer possibilities for how to construe 
the interactions between speaker, audience, and speech. Despite significant differences of 
opinion as to rhetoric’s scope, means, and ends, anyone using the term “rhetoric” in Aristotle's 
day would at least provisionally assume that it dealt with a time- and space-bound event in which 
a limited number of speakers gave public orations on a defined topic, hoping to persuade a finite 
and physically present audience to think, emote, vote, or act (that is, to judge) in a particular 
way.5 Aristotle’s efforts to “discipline” rhetoric (to borrow a pun from Edward Schiappa) took 
advantage of what seemed at the time to be natural limits to the exercise of persuasion.6 Such 
boundaries, he thought, are the necessary conditions for knowledge of any subject. “The 
unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable” and only “leads astray.”7 To speak of rhetoric at all is 
to limit the elements that constitute it as an object of inquiry. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle takes an important place in the history of rhetorical theory as one 
who widened that field of inquiry for rhetorical theorists and speakers—not by suggesting that 
rhetoric subsume other disciplines, but by insisting that persuasion amounts to more than 
manipulation, deception, or the raw exercise of power. He seems to be the first of the ancient 
Greeks to develop a psychologically subtle and ethically comprehensive account of audience 
participation in rhetorical exchanges. That Aristotle surpasses previous treatments of rhetoric in 
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this regard, doing greater justice to the place of the audience in the rhetorical situation than 
Gorgias or Isocrates or even Plato, is perhaps not a controversial claim.8  Nevertheless, 
commentators on his Rhetoric tend to analyze the treatise as though it develops an 
unambiguously speaker-centered art, in which questions about audience participation are either 
peripheral or subordinate to questions about how speakers achieve their persuasive goals.9  
Eugene Garver, for example, devotes ample space in Aristotle's “Rhetoric”: An Art of Character 
to a theory of formal identity between the audience’s state of persuasion or trust and the 
speaker's ethical enthymeme—a theory without which, he says, Aristotelian rhetoric is not 
intelligible as technē, nor proof as energeia.10  This reading admittedly places the audience’s 
state of mind at the center of an Aristotelian speaker’s field of concern. Yet even Garver insists 
that rhetoric itself is exclusively a speaker’s art, not a listener’s:  
We make judgments about speakers, and are persuaded by them, by chance and habit, but 
there is no suggestion in the Rhetoric that there is not only an art for the speaker, but for 
the audience as well. Later theorists who will make rhetoric into an art of judgment or of 
hermeneutics will see an art which judges whose advice is best and which meanings to 
impute to a text, but Aristotle's art of finding available resources for persuasion does not 
have a role in helping the audience to judge rhetorical appeals. There is no art of political 
judgment. Good audiences are not made through studying a technē; good audiences are 
good citizens. But somehow, on the production side, as opposed to the reception side, 
there is more to be said.11 
 
Garver later admits that there is more to be said on the “reception side” as well, but stops short of 
saying that Aristotle develops an art of listening. He claims, instead, that listening to artistic and 
ethically serious rhetors might, under the right conditions, help to develop the virtue of 
prudence—a claim that seems consistent with Aristotle’s treatment of good listening in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.12  
Yet Aristotle clearly teaches that some audiences are more fit than others to judge 
speeches and arguments. As Bryan Garsten observes, much of Aristotle’s argument in the 
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Rhetoric depends on a distinction between nominal judges, who are legally empowered to render 
decisions in court or in the assembly, and people who “act as judges” in the true sense: those 
who make substantive decisions about the validity of a speaker’s argument and the health of the 
city. It is possible, apparently, to learn to be a better listener or judge; and it would seem that the 
study of listening, like the study of speaking, might be undertaken with artistic (though perhaps 
not scientific) rigor. “If something is possible without art or preparation,” Aristotle says, “all the 
more is it possible with art and care.” Some audiences simply do judge rhetorical argument well; 
others judge poorly. This fact may imply that an art of rhetorical listening and judging exists, 
either actually or potentially.13 
Readers of the Rhetoric may be excused for passing over this incipient art of rhetorical 
judgment. The standard English translation of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric—an ability, in 
each case, to see the available means of persuasion—implies that his extensive lists of topics, 
proofs, and stylistic variations are like tools in a toolbox, and that his treatise is a storehouse of 
instruments or devices useful for achieving persuasion, the given end of rhetorical artistry. I will 
argue, first, that this translation is partly mistaken—the word “means” is a necessary but 
unfortunate addition to Aristotle’s phrase to endechomenon pithanōn—and, second, that the 
topics, proofs, and elements of style, far from being “means” (that is, efficient causes) of 
persuasion, are rather persuasion’s constitutive elements. They are the material and formal 
causes that speakers and audiences provide in their collaborative activity of making. Anyone 
who can “see” (that is, theorize about) these causes is a rhetorical artist. Consequently, we are 
rhetorically artistic not only when speaking persuasively, but also when judging a persuasive 
speech or even when thinking about persuasion in the abstract.  
To be sure, the Rhetoric offers good advice for orators. The elderly and the wise can use 
xiv 
 
maxims credibly, Aristotle says, but an aphoristic speech from a young man seems ridiculous. 
Paradigms or rhetorical inductions are less persuasive than enthymemes, but excite a more 
favorable reaction; hence, it is best to offer an enthymeme first and then call a paradigmatic 
example as a supportive “witness” of its truth.14 No speaker in Aristotle’s time or in ours should 
neglect such advice. Yet Aristotle almost never addresses his own readers or auditors as though 
they were speakers in training. He reserves the first-person plural form of verbs for an audience’s 
activities: we trust, we believe, we judge. The speaker, by contrast, is almost always named in 
third person: the adviser, the accuser, the defendant, the one praising or blaming. Speakers and 
speeches are phenomena to be studied. “We”—the listeners—hear such speakers and judge their 
persuasiveness. This grammatical choice seems to reflect a fact of democratic political life: the 
student of rhetoric will hear and judge far more speeches than she will compose or deliver. It 
would be strange if the reader of Aristotle’s treatise, a student of the rhetorical art, could become 
an artistic or skillful speaker but could not make use of those same skills when listening and 
judging.15  
It is true that the phrases “art of listening” and “art of judging” occur nowhere in the 
Rhetoric. Neither, for that matter, does the phrase “art of speaking,” except in reference to the 
sophistic handbooks, which Aristotle judges to be inartistic.16 Both artistic speaking and artistic 
listening are everywhere implicit in the Rhetoric, which concerns itself much more with 
“seeing”—observing, defining, cataloguing, categorizing—than with production or reception. 
The defining characteristic of the artist, then, is theorizing, not producing. It is possible to 
produce without being an artist, and to be an artist without producing—a taxonomical distinction 
that Aristotle makes in the Physics, the Metaphysics, and the Politics. What, then, is Aristotle’s 
posture toward artistic speaking and listening in the Rhetoric? 
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To use a metaphor drawn from Aristotle’s own treatise, it is as though the Rhetoric lays 
the groundwork for a technē of listening and judging, leaving the rest of the work for his students 
and readers to complete. This foundation-building figure occurs in another seemingly offhand 
remark from Aristotle’s treatment of the common topics. Speaking of the topos of probable facts, 
Aristotle says, “If something has been done for the sake of something else, it is probable that the 
latter has resulted; for example, if a foundation [has been laid], a house [has probably been 
built].”17  In context, this argument is offered as an example of how to argue about present or 
future probability. One might praise a man’s industry and foresight, or condemn his ambition and 
acquisitiveness, by pointing to a foundation and inferring all of the good or bad plans he has 
made for a future building. In an epideictic speech, such an inference would amplify the praise or 
blame leveled at some prominent citizen; in a judicial or deliberative speech, it would be used to 
attack a rhetorical opponent’s character. The “foundation” is a synecdoche for any kind of 
preparation: One who has withdrawn funds is likely to have made a purchase; one who has 
hidden weapons is likely to have plotted violence. But I want to suggest that this image, like so 
many of Aristotle’s terse examples, provides some useful reflexive commentary on the Rhetoric 
itself. It serves as an analogy for Aristotle’s pedagogical method, especially regarding his 
treatment of rhetorical audience. Just as his remarks on “art and care” open up the possibility of 
incipient arts—arts not yet fully developed, but nevertheless implicit in inartistic knacks gained 
through experience—so his own standard of judgment for probable fact (the inference of a future 
house from a present foundation) opens up the possibility of an incipient rhetorical art of 
judgment. Seeing a foundation, we infer that the artifact is likely to be forthcoming. We need not 
find the art of rhetorical listening fully developed in the Rhetoric; we need only find the 
foundation to infer the shape of the art as a whole.  
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Robin Smith makes a similar point about the Organon, which, for all its deficiencies, 
demonstrates Aristotle’s awareness that his project (as regards logic) is unfinished and will 
perhaps take many generations to complete. Smith’s inference holds true for every line of inquiry 
undertaken by Aristotle, who seems always aware of the emergent quality of such inquiries and 
of the need for more investigation by future generations of artists, scientists, and philosophers. 
[Aristotle’s] syllogistic is history’s first serious attempt at a comprehensive theory of 
inference; in developing it, […] Aristotle gives us the first essays at metalogic. […] To 
work all these ingredients [i.e. scientific demonstration, dialectical argument, rhetorical 
persuasion] into a harmonious whole, an all-encompassing and all-purpose theory of 
argumentation, would have been a truly gigantic task (one might say that logicians are 
still at work on it today, and still in piecemeal fashion). Aristotle himself probably took 
such a comprehensive theory as an ideal—perhaps yet another point in which he sets the 
model for his successors—and he thought he had some ideas about the direction in which 
it should be developed, but his logical works give more the impression of research in 
progress (often with notes that certain points need further study) than of a finished 
system. 
 
Smith then quotes the end of the Sophistical Refutations, which demonstrates Aristotle’s 
awareness of this incipient quality: 
And if it should seem to you after reflection that our study, arising out of these things as 
from its beginning, compares well with our other inquiries which have been developed 
out of material handed down, then it remains incumbent on all of you our hearers to 
pardon its shortcomings and give much thanks for its discoveries.18 
  
If, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle begins to show how audiences may judge rhetorical arguments by 
rhetorically artistic standards, then it is incumbent on his readers—particularly those who work 
in his tradition—to “give much thanks” for that beginning and to continue the inquiry in 
Aristotle’s own terms. To do so will require reading the Rhetoric not as a systematic statement of 
Aristotle’s final position on all matters rhetorical (or, what would be worse, merely on how to 
speak persuasively), but rather as a gradual and dialectical unfolding of Aristotle’s observations 
about persuasion. 
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This dialectical method is well known. In any Aristotelian treatise, terms and concepts 
gain precision and depth as he gradually moves from common opinion to an always-provisional, 
always-contextual philosophic knowledge. I am aware of several excellent explications of 
Aristotle’s dialectical pedagogy, most of which treat either the Nicomachean Ethics or the 
Politics. Yet I would argue that this mode of reading is all the more important for interpreters of 
the Rhetoric.19 For one thing, the Rhetoric is consciously and explicitly an attempt to subsume 
and supersede previous treatises that, in Aristotle’s estimation, are theoretically deficient and 
politically deleterious. The sophistical Arts of Speech ignore audiences’ already at-work 
deliberations about ethical and political matters, treating rhetorical devices as instruments of 
control rather than as constitutive elements of justified persuasion. In doing so, they reduce 
language to the status of a tool, human beings to objects of manipulation, and politics to a 
calculative and zero-sum game. The sophists claim that rhetoric gives them political expertise 
because they see nothing in politics other than force and fraud. By contrast, Aristotle places the 
ethically motivated and politically situated audience at the center of the rhetorician’s concern. By 
doing so, he initiates a line of inquiry in which new discoveries constantly require the revision of 
old claims, as he transcends or refutes not only his sophistic competitors but also his Socratic 
forbearers and even his own formulations.  
I will explore this dialectical method in some detail in what follows; for now, the status 
of the rhetorical proof is an instructive example. Aristotle begins his treatise by elevating logical 
proof over emotional appeal, claiming that the former is artistic and serious, whereas the latter is 
inartistic and mere flattery. In the second chapter, he then revises this claim to show that there 
are three proofs—the logical, the ethical, and the pathetic, each associated with a different 
element of the rhetorical situation (speech, speaker, and audience). In the third chapter, he claims 
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that the end of all persuasive speech is to be found in the audience, and that rhetorical 
argumentation happens through enthymeme—a kind of syllogism that engages the audience in 
active consideration of its premises, which are composed of the audience’s own opinions and 
deliberations. Thus, an original move away from audience and toward the logic of the speech 
turns out to have been an attempt to account for logical argumentation’s validity by locating it, 
not in the speech as originally claimed, but in the audience’s judgment. The ethical appeal, 
likewise, turns out to be audience-centered, inasmuch as the speaker’s ethical credibility depends 
on her engagement with the audience’s ethical habits and dispositions. By the end of book 2, 
Aristotle is giving an account, not of how a speaker may seem ethical to any audience whatever, 
but of the ethical dispositions of particular kinds of audiences to whom the artistic speaker must 
defer.  
Other Aristotelian innovations display a similar movement away from consideration of 
speaker and speech, and toward consideration of audience. The three speech genres—
deliberative, epideictic, and judicial—are not defined according to existing rhetorical institutions 
(such as the courtroom or the assembly), nor yet according to the ways that they may serve the 
interests of the speaker (say, defending oneself, convicting an enemy, securing a beneficial 
policy decision, or celebrating one’s allies). They are defined, instead, according to three kinds 
of judgment and three ends of political life. Regarding rhetorical invention, Aristotle’s reliance 
on topics, rather than on imitation of extant speeches, assumes that audiences’ knowledge, 
opinions, and expectations are the sources (that is, the material causes) of their own persuasion; 
and his treatment of enthymeme, as I will show, suggests that the audience is active in bringing 
form to bear on that material cause as well. It is the audience—especially the artistic audience—
that discerns and affirms the formal validity of the speaker’s reasoning; and an artistic audience 
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may also recognize logical fallacy, thus preventing persuasion from coming to be. The audience 
is not only the central concern of the artistic orator; it is also potentially an active contributor to 
the persuasive enterprise. Rhetorically skillful listeners are artists in their own right.  
The ethical corruptibility and intellectual incapacity of a common audience are, of course, 
matters of some concern to Aristotle. He laments “the defects of hearers,” and he spends ample 
time explaining how various imperfect regimes corrupt the people living in them, making them 
unfit for ethical deliberation. An artistic speaker must sometimes adapt his persuasive tactics to 
his listeners’ base desires, scant knowledge of logic, inability to follow scientific demonstrations, 
and unreflective acceptance of their home cities’ imperfect constitutions.20  Aristotle claims early 
in the treatise that people “for the most part hit on truth,” but this hopeful assessment remains 
always in tension with his palpable annoyance at the ease with which audiences are sometimes 
led astray. Aristotle even suggests that this logical and ethical weakness on the part of audiences 
is the raison d’être for the art of rhetoric. Good audiences would seek instruction, not bend to 
persuasion. Garver takes this lament a step further: In the best city, where the ends of human life 
and the requirements of citizenship are in harmony, there would be no need for persuasion.21 
But it would be a mistake to suggest that these weaknesses and corruptions create an 
ethically or technically lax situation for rhetorical invention and delivery. An audience’s 
imperfections actually increase the ethical responsibility and the rhetorical burden of an artistic 
and ethically good speaker. Precisely because all audiences are to some extent corrupt or 
imperfect, no two audiences are the same—and an artistic speaker must choose the best (most 
effective and most ethical) arguments for the audience she is given. She cannot rely, as the 
sophists would perhaps teach her to do, on mimicked turns of phrase, syntactic flourishes, or 
appeals to base passion; she must adapt her arguments to the potentially good but always 
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corruptible characters of her listeners. Because she knows them to be malleable, she is 
responsible to ennoble them (and not to corrupt them further) through persuasion. At strategic 
moments throughout the Rhetoric, Aristotle reminds his speakers of this ethical responsibility.22   
Some critics maintain that Aristotle treats rhetoric as an ethically neutral or amoral 
capacity, avoiding the dilemmas posed by Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias by maintaining a sharp 
division between ethical deliberation and rhetorical artistry.23 I hope to dispute this claim. Like 
Plato’s Socrates, Aristotle thinks that rhetorical choices are ethically praise- or blameworthy, and 
that there are at least some cases in which a speech’s ethical goodness depends on its artistic 
goodness. In other words, some arguments may be judged ethically bad precisely because of 
their artistic failure, or ethically good because of their artistic excellence. It is of course possible 
for a clever turn of phrase to be both artistic and unjust, but it is also possible for an argument to 
be unjust or politically deleterious because it is graceless or logically invalid. Aristotle is not 
content merely to distinguish artistic excellence from ethical goodness, as though one had 
nothing to do with the other.  
For Aristotle, human language is one of the necessary conditions of politics, since 
language discloses the advantageous and the harmful (and, therefore, the just and the unjust). 
The city, strangely, is both natural and artificial: It comes about by the political art, which 
requires language for legislation and deliberation, but it is also the natural end of all human 
associations, and it is the site of human flourishing. 
In one way, Aristotle says, the family is more natural than the city. Families come about 
by nature, almost spontaneously, for the sake of reproduction. Human beings, like all other living 
things, have a natural impulse to make more creatures like themselves. Yet nature also endows 
human beings with reason, which operates by the use of language. Language makes the city 
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possible by enabling us to reason together about shared ends like utility, justice, and beauty, 
which transcend mere survival—and to develop the arts and sciences, by which we achieve these 
ends. The city comes into being for the sake of living (a natural impulse), but it exists for the 
sake of living well (which requires rational, and therefore supra-natural, exertions); and, while it 
is the last stage of development in human associations—furthest from the spontaneously natural 
development of human families—it is nevertheless also natural in that it achieves the conditions 
necessary for the ends that human nature discerns and properly desires. That we may reason well 
or poorly about such matters is beside the point: The interesting and significant fact about human 
language is that our human nature is perfected in part by artificial—that is, by unnatural—
means.24  
It should come as no surprise, then, that in the Rhetoric, Aristotle weaves ethical 
considerations so closely with rhetorical ones that neither can escape the other. To speak 
persuasively is to assume moral premises, to argue for moral conclusions, and to take a particular 
ethical posture toward both the subject and the audience of one’s speech. To evaluate a speech is 
always to consider its effectiveness in light of ethical standards that inhere in the use of 
language. There is no such thing as public deliberation without at least an implicit conception of 
the good, which provides the speech’s telos whether the speaker acknowledges it or not. 
Teleology—and with it, ethics—is inherent in human life, and therefore in the rhetorical 
situation. A good speaker not only persuades imperfect citizens to make ethically sound 
judgments within the demands of a particular political occasion; she also invites them to reason 
logically and to orient themselves toward noble ends. But even an ethically bad speaker must 
convince his audience that he is ethically good, and that his persuasive goal is consistent with the 
shared ends at which his audience must assume that he is aiming, if they are to judge in his favor. 
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He can succeed only by seeming prudent and benevolent and by seeming to demonstrate 
something. If rhetoric is to be artistic, in Aristotle’s sense, its teachers must be able to account 
for an indissoluble integrity of good argument and good judgment with the natural ends of 
language—which also turn out to be the ends of political life.25 
Garver points out that there are at least two kinds of ends that speakers pursue, and that 
for any given rhetorical situation, the two ends are likely to be in conflict. The “given end” of a 
speech, he says, is the speech’s persuasive goal, which the orator accomplishes by securing a 
favorable judgment from the audience. The “guiding ends,” by contrast, are internal standards of 
excellence, which are perhaps recognizable only to other artists: standards such as logical 
validity and stylistic grace. Because regimes are imperfect and audiences corrupt, valid 
argumentation sometimes cannot secure rhetorical victory. The worse speech wins. Aristotle’s 
discovery of internal, guiding ends of rhetorical artistry makes it possible to praise a speech as 
rhetorically good, even if it fails to achieve its given, external end, and to condemn a speech as 
rhetorically bad no matter how successful the speaker. This distinction imposes a difficult burden 
on the rhetorical artist who sees the available means of persuasion, which Garver takes to mean 
the few and often imperfect ways of persuading a particular audience. The orator may sometimes 
need to construct an imperfect argument to achieve her external end, or to accept defeat as a 
direct consequence of her artistic excellence.  
Nevertheless, I will argue, both the given and guiding ends are, for Aristotle, proximate 
and incomplete. Persuasion is an artifact of rhetorical speech, and every artifact aims at ends 
outside itself. The ultimate ends of persuasive speech are the just, the noble, or the advantageous, 
which turn out to be the ends of all language and even of politics. This congruence of ultimate 
ends may provide some hope for the theoretical reconciliation of artistic excellence with, let us 
xxiii 
say, ultimate rhetorical victory—what Crider, paraphrasing Cicero, calls an art of “gathering 
scattered humanity.” I hope to show that this art is incipient in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and that its 
successful practice includes both speaking and listening. 
To make this case, I will first need to address the problem of the treatise’s supposed 
disunity. Some philologists have claimed that complexities and subtleties like I explicate above 
are really only indications that the treatise is incoherent: that it was composed, perhaps, over the 
course of many years, and was never revised for internal consistency. My first chapter will 
suggest a solution to this problem by identifying the audience for Aristotle’s Rhetoric and by 
wondering about his pedagogical task. I will argue that his dialectical method requires the 
introduction of imperfect opinions about rhetoric, which he revises methodically over the course 
of the treatise. 
Chapter 2 will try to chart and define this dialectical method by carefully parsing 
Rhetoric 1.1. As I will show, this opening argument arranged cyclically, leading Aristotle’s 
students through three successive examinations of sophistic and Socratic teachings about 
rhetoric, and demonstrating that a resolution to their dispute must arise from a more careful 
examination of the ethical, rational, and emotive characteristics of rhetorical audiences. This 
opening chapter prepares Aristotle’s students for the theoretical treatment of audiences and 
arguments that he will undertake in book 2. 
Chapter 3 will defend my claim that artistic judgment or evaluation of artifacts is an 
Aristotelian concept. By examining select passages from the Physics, the Metaphysics, the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and the Politics, I will distinguish between art (technē) and making 
(poiēsis), showing that it is possible both to be an inartistic maker and to be an unproductive 
artist. The artist is one who understands and can explain the fourfold etiology of an artifact. Arts 
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can therefore be receptive and evaluative as well as productive. 
Chapter 4 will examine Aristotle’s earliest definitions and taxonomies of the rhetorical 
art. The so-called rhetorical triangle, offered in 1.2, with its three attendant proofs, is a 
dialectically provisional and ultimately inadequate description of the rhetorical situation, since—
as Aristotle will claim in 1.3—the end of persuasive speech relates to the audience. The 
rhetorical art turns out to be a theoretical power of distinguishing what is persuasive from what is 
only apparently persuasive.  
In chapter 5, I will examine the material causes of persuasion: special topics, ethical 
dispositions, and emotions. These are the sources, so to speak, of persuasive propositions, which 
one needs to understand both to speak well and to listen well. The dialectical arrangement of 
these chapters invites Aristotle’s students to imagine themselves in a variety of rhetorical 
situations—sometimes as audiences, sometimes as speakers—and to judge what kinds of 
knowledge, expertise, ethical dispositions, and emotional appeals they would find credible, 
persuasive, or useful. This imaginative exercise is also empathic, since the student must wonder 
about her neighbors’ likely judgments as well as her own.26 
Chapter 6 addresses enthymemes, which Aristotle presents agonistically to mimic the 
reciprocity of persuasive speaking and rhetorical listening, and rhetorical style, which is artistic 
only insofar as it can be judged by artistic standards. It is a matter of rhetorical artistry, and not 
only of good character, to know when a speaker’s reasoning is faulty, when his choice of words 
is equivocal, indecorous, vague, or inaccurate, or to judge when a metaphor is inept, crass, or 
misleading. Book 3 of the rhetoric, no less than book 2, enables the rhetorical artist to distinguish 
language that serves the legitimate purposes of valid persuasion from language that seeks to 
obfuscate or deceive. 
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I am not arguing that Aristotle’s Rhetoric teaches listening and judging to the exclusion 
of effective speaking. Clearly, the treatise describes effective rhetorical techniques. Yet I will 
argue that such descriptions are not only meant to make speakers more effective. Aristotle offers 
a theoretical account of persuasion so that his readers can understand its causes and can begin to 
see its place in civic life. He seems to want to disarm aspiring rhetors and scornful dialecticians 
alike by turning the evaluative powers of rhetoric on their unquestioned opinions. The endoxa of 
one trained in dialectic or in rhetoric are likely to be just as vulnerable to exploitation as are the 
received nostrums of the city at large. If students of rhetoric and dialectic neglect the art of 
listening and judging, they abandon themselves to the ever-present danger of lawsuit and 
defamation, and their neighbors to the ever-present danger of tyranny.27  
Under good governments, citizens submit to law and persuasion, which limit the power 
of force and fraud. To fail to participate in the persuasive arena is to abandon the polis that 
sustains life, implying a preference for tyranny over political cooperation. It is true, as Garver 
maintains, that our cities do not enjoy a perfect correspondence between the demands of 
citizenship and the ultimate goods of human life, or between the de facto requirements of any 
rhetorical situation and the internal goods of rhetorical practice. Better laws and better citizens 
would close the gap between given and guiding ends, and between the virtues of the citizen and 
those of the human being. The city we pray for would require a perfect constitution that only 
perfect citizens could create or preserve. While we are praying that such a place and such people 
may one day come to be, we will need to use persuasion to deliberate together about our best 
approximations of the useful and the good. Skillful, active listening has a great part to play in 
this stochastic art. Better listeners enable speakers to unite the internal goods of rhetoric—valid, 
ethical, and responsibly affective argumentation—with the given end of rhetorical victory; and 
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the more often those two coincide, the more likely that persuasive speech can achieve its ultimate 
ends of justice, beauty, and the common advantage.
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CHAPTER 1  
THE UNITY OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC 
The first three chapters of the Rhetoric announce Aristotle’s intention to transcend or 
supersede all previous treatments of the topic. Explicit allusions to the sophistic Arts of Speech 
and implicit allusions to Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus suggest that the Rhetoric’s theoretical 
innovations are meant to be fundamental and far-reaching. Handbook writers have been content 
to describe what they take to be effective rhetorical technique; and while Plato succeeded in 
critiquing their theoretical incoherence and their failure to reflect on ethical questions, his 
dialogues only begin to sketch the ethically and artistically rigorous rhetoric that his critique 
demands. Unlike these predecessors, Aristotle will define the scope of the rhetorical art and 
identify its constitutive elements, providing a theoretical framework for rhetorical practice.  
The Rhetoric is also replete with references to Aristotle’s own works—explicitly, the 
Topics, Poetics, and Politics—but implicitly, as I will show, the Nicomachean Ethics and 
perhaps even the Physics and Metaphysics. Such allusions suggest that there are prerequisites to 
Aristotelian rhetorical study. To learn this discipline, one must also study language, logic, human 
nature, and the necessary and sufficient conditions of a workable politics, including the ways that 
virtue and art contribute to human happiness. Of course, such studies have their own 
prerequisites: namely, the formation of good character by means of wise rearing and habituation 
to virtue. Young people who study politics and rhetoric often do so without profit; their 
characters are still being formed, as are their powers of language.  
Of all the theoretical innovations in this treatise—and there are many—the most 
philosophically significant, both for Aristotle’s thought and for the history of rhetorical theory, is 
his understanding of rhetorical audience. Aristotle’s students, I will argue, expect a treatise on 
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rhetoric to show them how better to write and deliver public speeches. Instead, he gives them a 
treatise that is as much about listening as it is about speaking. Every new term he introduces, 
every new distinction he draws—between kinds of rhetorical proof, for example, or between a 
political context and a rhetorical genre—effectively moves or expands his students’ field of 
vision to make rhetorical audience central and determinative, both to his own emerging theory of 
rhetoric and to his students’ future deliberations about particular speeches. Readers of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric have sometimes pointed out that its discussions of ethics, politics, art, and even 
language are intentionally less precise or thorough than parallel discussions in other Aristotelian 
treatises—since, as Aristotle insists, rhetoric is not “identifiable with knowledge of any subject” 
and “does not include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus.”1 The one exception 
to this rule, as I will show, is the study of how human beings listen and deliberate. A 
philosophically serious study of rhetoric must explain what is persuasive to human beings, and 
why. 
Aristotle’s Dialectical Pedagogy and the Unity of the Rhetoric 
I will presume, against two centuries of philological criticism, that the Rhetoric is a 
unified, coherent, and purposeful treatise. Kennedy, summarizing a common view, discerns no 
organizing principle that would reconcile the ethical severity and philosophical aloofness of book 
1, chapter 1 with the flexible pragmatism of books 2 and 3.2 In the first chapter, Aristotle 
unambiguously “identifies rhetoric with logical argument,” denigrating arrangement and style as 
merely supplemental matters; and he “seems firmly to reject” the notion that the rhetor should 
ever appeal to his audience’s emotions. Book 2, however, treats emotional appeal at length, and 
book 3 offers a detailed study of style and arrangement. Perhaps most striking,  
In section 6 [of chapter 1] he even seems to say that the importance and the justice of a 
case are not appropriate issues for a speaker to discuss; they should be left for the 
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audience to judge. But the justice of a speaker’s case, its importance, and its 
amplification subsequently will be given extended treatment. 
Efforts to explain or reconcile these contradictions, Kennedy argues, seem to be motivated by a 
desire to save Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency, and are not justified by careful 
exegesis. The best solution is to admit that the first chapter is inconsistent with what follows, and 
to accept that Aristotle wrote an incoherent treatise—possibly drafting different parts of the 
Rhetoric at different times and for different audiences. Early in the Rhetoric, he treats this 
emerging art as an unfortunate necessity in corrupt cities, and he observes most of rhetoric’s 
techniques from a safe and objective distance, as though they were morally suspect, 
philosophically unserious, and vaguely distasteful. He hopes for a strong legislator to rein in 
orators’ bad behavior and curb the fickleness of crowds, or—unaccountably—for speakers of 
strict moral character who would never argue what is debased. Later in the treatise (and perhaps 
later in his life), he admits that rhetorical tricks can be politically expedient, though he evinces a 
lingering distaste for an art that aims at persuasion rather than knowledge. 
If we assume that the coherence of a treatise depends on the internal consistency of its 
observations and arguments, then of course the Rhetoric will seem to be a patchwork, and 
Kennedy’s agnosticism is probably justified. Yet I would argue that all of Aristotle’s treatises 
make use of a dialectically strategic tentativeness in early chapters. His opening arguments are 
carefully worded and foundational to his later claims; but they are never to be taken as the final 
word on any matter. Rather, they initiate a line of inquiry that often leads to unexpected revisions 
of previous assumptions. To take one obvious example, the opening lines of the Nicomachean 
Ethics posit that “every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim 
at some good”; and, further, that the highest good would be what all such enterprises aim to 
achieve.3 Since everyone agrees that the highest human good is happiness, it follows that each 
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human activity aims at some kind of happiness. These uncontroversial statements would hardly 
seem, especially on a first reading, to imply the teaching of book 10—that, in a certain way, the 
happiest human life is the life of contemplation, since that life is the most complete, the most 
powerful, the most self-sufficient, and the most characteristic of a human being.4 
Such unpredictable conclusions are characteristic of all dialectical inquiry, since dialectic 
treats subjects that are by their nature indeterminate—or, at least for the moment, unknown. In 
Aristotelian thought, it is theoretically possible to discover the necessary and immutable first 
principles of a science (epistēmē), and then to reason deductively from those principles to 
logically necessary conclusions. To discover such premises, though, one must first catalogue the 
best available opinions on the subject, weigh them against known facts, and test them by a kind 
of logical inquisition. In other words, the dialectician always begins with what is known to his or 
her own discursive community, and then seeks to derive or discover what may be known simply 
and without question. In the study of ethics and politics, it is not clear that any such immutable or 
necessary first principles are available. Like epistemic inquiries, then, ethical inquiries must 
begin with commonly held opinions (endoxa), which are mostly reliable as starting-places for 
argument; but unlike epistemic inquiries, ethical ones may never discover premises that can be 
stated with mathematical precision or perfect logical rigor. Dialectical reasoning is therefore 
often an unpredictable amalgam of syllogistic purity and inductive messiness. Observations and 
refutations often lead the dialectician to revise not only a syllogistic conclusion, but also the 
premises on which it was founded, positing a new definition or other premise as a better endoxon 
from which to begin inquiry again. As a result, the very terms of the discussion often change in 
scope or meaning as the dialectician moves ever closer to a contextually situated wisdom about 
human flourishing.  
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Though many have attempted to explain the Rhetoric’s coherence (or incoherence), no 
one has fully explicated its dialectical structure; and few have explored the pedagogical or 
psychagogical purposes of its arrangement.5 Yet once the treatise is recognized as a work of 
dialectical instruction, it is possible to identify moments at which Aristotle is addressing his 
students’ prior opinions about rhetoric, and then to track the method by which he introduces 
contrary evidence, points out logical inconsistencies, or otherwise seeks to move them toward a 
new understanding. 
The Audience for Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
This method of reading the Rhetoric raises an important question of fact: Just whose 
opinions does Aristotle adopt as premises for his discourse? Who, in other words, does he 
presume will read or hear this treatise, and what do those people find credible?  
According to the opening paragraph of the Topics, there is no single identifiable system 
of endoxa that a student of dialectic or rhetoric can simply compile and memorize. Rather, it is a 
matter of artistic skill for a speaker or writer to discern the character of her listeners or readers, 
and to draw conclusions about what premises they are most likely to judge as credible. The artful 
rhetor or dialectician, who knows what her audience thinks, “is best able to see from what 
materials, and how, a syllogism arises,” and is therefore able best to frame a true or persuasive 
argument; but it makes no small difference which “materials”—that is, which endoxa—she 
appropriates as raw material.6  
In some discourses, the relevant endoxa are opinions held by everyone, or nearly 
everyone, in a city. Presumably, if Aristotle were writing for the general public, then he would 
need to address the majority opinion about rhetoric, as Socrates seems to do in his conversations 
with Polus and Gorgias and in his first speech in the Phaedrus, where he takes both love and 
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rhetoric to be mostly venal matters. In other discourses, says Aristotle, it is the opinions of the 
illustrious or the powerful that matter. These opinions, let us say, may include the cutthroat 
ambition of Callicles in the Gorgias, but are more likely to approximate the respectable and 
vaguely civic-minded complacency of Cephalus in the Republic. 
Finally, Aristotle says, there are times when it is the opinions of “the wise” that matter 
most: times, I conclude, when those hearing or reading one’s discourse are wise themselves, or 
have been “brought up beautifully by means of habits” so that they can distinguish wise opinions 
from foolish ones.7 Such opinions may have been formed by reading the myths, allegories, and 
dialectical investigations of love and justice from Socrates’ closing speeches in both the Gorgias 
and the Phaedrus, or they may have been formed by living among virtuous and thoughtful 
people whose opinions are both efficacious in the city and beneficial to themselves and their 
families. Among the wise, then, the endoxa consist not only of the widespread traditional notions 
that found and sustain a city’s common culture, but also of the best available arguments about 
those traditional notions—arguments that have affirmed and reinforced what is true in the 
opinions held by the many or the illustrious, but that have also refuted what is false in them and 
pointed toward better ways of thinking. These, I take it, are the endoxa that Aristotle addresses in 
the Rhetoric: assumptions about language and persuasion that have been gleaned, not only from 
experience in the courtroom and the assembly, nor even from a sampling of the extant Arts of 
Speech, but also from close reading and dialectical engagement with the Gorgias and the 
Phaedrus. Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric for the heirs of this Socratic tradition—who, like 
Chaerephon in the Gorgias and Theaetetus in the Sophist, have practiced and are in the process 
of perfecting the dialectical art, and have learned to be skeptical of sophistic rhetors. 
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That the Rhetoric is meant primarily for Aristotle’s own students has been demonstrated 
at some length by Edward W. Clayton.8 Clayton considers and rejects two other prominent 
theories: that Aristotle wrote the treatise for the edification of a real or imagined legislator, 
explaining how rhetoric operates in a city so that the legislator could write effective laws to curb 
its influence; and that he wrote it as a series of so-called “exoteric” evening lectures, which were 
open to anyone in the Athenian aristocracy. I am not convinced that Clayton is justified in fully 
rejecting the first possibility. For one thing, having tutored Alexander the Great, Aristotle would 
rightly have expected some of his students to go on to wield political power. Both Plato and 
Aristotle entertained the hope that they might nudge such students in a salutary direction for 
Greek politics—or that, by attracting and training future legislators and judges, they might at 
least mitigate the worst democratic excesses of their home cities. Treating the Rhetoric as a 
discourse for the benefit of students at the Lyceum or the Academy is certainly compatible with 
treating it as a discourse for future legislators.  
Clayton is right, though, to reject the notion that the Rhetoric is intended for a general 
audience. As I have already mentioned, the treatise assumes familiarity with a wide variety of 
philosophic and rhetorical discourses, including Plato and Aristotle’s own works. A general 
audience—as Aristotle emphasizes—cannot follow the kind of lengthy and intricate argument 
that these works offer.9 It also assumes familiarity with the technical terminology of dialectic. 
Consider Aristotle’s offhand claim that the extant Arts of Speech are inadequate because they do 
not theorize about logical structures like enthymeme and syllogism. Such references suggest not 
only that readers already know the sophistic treatises and understand their import, but also that 
they are inclined to be skeptical of those treatises’ seriousness or usefulness, and that they are 
ready to accept an argument that assumes the primacy of logic in any discussion of persuasive 
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speech. Aristotle’s readers are wondering, as all thoughtful people wonder, whose opinions about 
rhetoric they should deem “wise.” It is one thing to discover what Athenians in general consider 
to be wise, and to draw on these putatively wise opinions to persuade them more effectively. It is 
something quite different to gain wisdom about persuasion itself: to understand its formal and 
final causes with the conscious thoroughness of a master craftsman. This, I take it, is the 
pedagogical task of the Rhetoric. 
Chapters 1-3 of the Rhetoric are organized as a dialectical investigation of rhetoric’s 
definition and scope, preparing Aristotle’s dialectically trained students to approach the study of 
rhetoric as thoughtful listeners who theorize about persuasion. As I have already argued, we 
should not expect such an investigation to develop a single, internally consistent argument. 
Instead, we should seek to identify the prior opinions of Aristotle’s readers or listeners, and then 
to track the means by which he refines or refutes those opinions to prepare his readers for a new 
and unexpected theory. This opening chapter of the Rhetoric engages students’ prior opinions, 
outlines the relationships between speaker, audience, and subject, and creates a dialectical need 
for the new definition and taxonomy of rhetoric that Aristotle will offer in chapters 2 and 3. 
Cyclical Organization of Rhetoric 1.1 
Chapter 1 of the Rhetoric is divided into five clearly demarcated parts: an introduction to 
the discipline for students of dialectic, followed by a three-stage investigation of the practical 
and political problems caused by imperfect audiences, followed by a conclusion that 
recapitulates the argument of the introduction and prepares Aristotle’s students to begin the 
inquiry anew in chapter 2. Figure 1 outlines this five-part structure. 
What I am calling part 1, the chapter’s introduction (1.1.1-2), provides a provisional 
definition of the relationship of rhetoric to dialectic, followed by a dubious but tentative  
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Figure 1. The five-part structure of Rhetoric 1.1. 
Part 1. Introduction to rhetoric for students of dialectic (1.1.1-2) 
Part 2. The problem of the warped audience (1.1.3-8) 
Part 3. The audience’s “natural disposition for the true” (1.1.9-11) 
Part 4. Better arguments are “by nature...more persuasive” (1.1.12) 
Part 5. Conclusion: Rhetoric, dialectic, and sophistry (1.13-14) 
 
explanation of why rhetoric should be called an art. Part 2 (1.1.3-8) blames rhetoric’s bad 
reputation on the fact that previous handbooks explain only how to warp one’s audience rather 
than how to speak about a given subject. Here, Aristotle wonders whether or not the audiences of 
persuasive speeches can be trusted to render responsible judgments. He considers legal, ethical, 
and political consequences of treating audiences as though they were passive and unreliable. Part 
3 (1.1.9-11) moderates this view by reminding Aristotle’s students of their commitment (as 
students of dialectic) to the principle that common opinions contain the seeds of truth, and by 
considering some salutary effects of audience partiality. Part 4 (1.1.12) achieves a new and more 
comprehensive conception of the place of audience in rhetorical theory, and begins to outline the 
circumstances under which rhetorical audiences can render good judgments. Finally, part 5 
(1.1.13-14) returns to the provisional and tentative claims made in parts 1 and 2, redefining the 
relationship between rhetoric, dialectic, and sophistry according to this new and more hopeful 
assessment of rhetorical audiences’ capacity for judgment.  
Aristotle punctuates this opening chapter with references to the sophistic Arts of Speech, 
which he claims his treatise will render obsolete. These references occur at the beginning of 
1.1.3, the beginning of 1.1.9, and the end of 1.1.11, dividing the chapter into the parts that I 
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identify above. These references mark off a regular, cyclical arrangement that unifies the chapter 
as a whole—a systematic and well-ordered method of setting out observations and propositions, 
and then returning to them to make matters clearer. The word “clear” (phaneron), in fact, occurs 
repeatedly in the chapter, not only marking off the parts I have named, but also creating 
transitions between sub-arguments within each part.  
The cycle proceeds as follows (see Figure 2). First, a reference to the limitations of the 
Arts of Speech marks the beginning of a new dialectical cycle. Second, Aristotle claims that the 
chief limitation of the Arts is their ignorance of logical argument or enthymeme, which in some 
way is more directly related to the matter at hand (the pragma of a speech) than are the 
techniques discussed by the handbook writers. This focus on argument and truth is Aristotle’s 
nod to the Socratic critique of sophistic assumptions about rhetoric. Third, Aristotle laments the 
problems caused by unfit audiences, or by unscrupulous speakers who try to warp them through 
off-topic remarks and appeals to emotion. This claim emphasizes the classic dilemma of the 
philosophically curious but politically ambitious Athenian youth: Socratic inquiry may lead to 
the truth, but the truth is not efficacious in the city. This dilemma—the choice between a life of 
philosophic contemplation and a life of political action—animates the Rhetoric. It is a kind of 
summary of the unstated endoxa that Aristotle must address if his dialectical inquiry is to be 
useful to his students. 
In the fourth step of each cycle, Aristotle returns to the question of pragma or logical 
argument, insisting that if rhetoric were regulated properly or practiced artistically, then speakers 
and audiences alike would wonder only about what is true, and would not be susceptible to the 
temptations of sophistry (which are focused on audience manipulation apart from the substance 
of the speech). Fifth and finally, Aristotle engages in a lengthy enthymematic discourse that tries 
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Figure 2. Five-step dialectical argument repeated three times in Rhetoric 1.1. 
1. The limitations of the Arts of Speech. 
2. Enthymeme and the speech’s pragma. 
3. The problem of audience. 
4. Reminder that speeches should aim at truth. 
5. Provisional solution to the problem of audience. 
 
to resolve the tensions created by steps 1-4. In each of the three dialectical cycles, this fifth step 
of the argument offers a provisional solution to the problem of the warped audience and an 
extended discussion of how rhetoric might be practiced to unite the search for truth with the 
immediate political demands of the rhetorical situation. 
Putting these two outlines together, we see how the opening chapter of the Rhetoric 
addresses and progressively refines its readers’ assumptions about the scope, the ends, and the 
usefulness of rhetoric (see Figure 3). In particular, Aristotle is inviting his students to make 
inductive inferences and generalizations about the rhetorical situation—about the practical, 
ethical, and political circumstances that bring speaker, audience, and subject together—which he 
will define more explicitly and systematically in chapters 2 and 3. Each cycle adds a new 
observation or consideration that helps to clarify these relationships. Over the course of the 
chapter, a new theory of audience participation emerges—a theory that justifies, indeed requires, 
logical rigor in rhetorical study and practice. 
What I have called part 2 of chapter 1 (1.1.3-8) simply posits enthymeme as “the body of 
persuasion”—a claim that at this point offers logocentric conception of rhetoric, and a Platonic 
endoxon—and treats rhetorical audiences as unfortunate features of imperfect regimes, where the 
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Figure 3. Detailed chart of the cyclical, dialectical structure of 1.1.3-12. 
Part 2: Warped 
Audiences (1.1.3-8) 
1. Arts are too narrow. 
 
 
2. Only pisteis are artistic; 




3. Appeals to the juryman 
are not artistic, so laws 
ought to forbid 
speaking outside the 
subject. 
 
4. Opponents should 
focus only on truth, and 







5. Legislators are more 
prudent and less 
limited than audiences. 
Therefore, the solution 
to audience fickleness 
is to restrict the realm 
of rhetorical judmment 
as far as practicable. 
Part 3: Natural Disposition for 
the True (1.1.9-11) 
1. Arts focus on extraneous things.  
 
 
2. Only matters internal to the 
subject are artistic.  An artistic 
rhetoric would help one become 
“enthymematic.” 
 
3. Arrangement of speech is 
inartistic because it is oriented 




4. In deliberative speeches, the 
judges resist off-topic remarks 
and fallacious arguments. 
Speakers focus on what is true. 
But the circumstances of 
judicial rhetoric warp the jury 
and require the speaker to 
appeal to their base self-interest.  
 
5. Nevertheless, humans are 
naturally disposed toward what 
is true, and so persuasiveness is 
achieved by logical 
demonstration. Artistic 
rhetorical theory and practice 
solve the problem of audience 
fickleness by explicating how 
enthymeme makes use of 
people’s disposition toward the 
true. 
Part 4: Stronger and 
More Persuasive (1.1.12) 
1. Arts focus on judicial 
speech. 
 
2. The true and the just 
are by nature stronger, 
and should prevail; but 
 
 
3. It is impossible to teach 
audiences that cannot 




4. It is necessary to learn 
to see both sides of a 
case in order to discern 
the truth about it. The 
study of rhetoric is 
therefore inherently 
oriented toward the 
true. 
 
5. Truer and better 
arguments are more 
persuasive. 
 
people who make legislative and judicial decisions usually obstruct or at best ignore productive 
deliberation. This severity toward “the many” creates a dialectical tension with Aristotle’s earlier 
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claim that “all people” participate in dialectic and rhetoric by virtue of living in a polis and using 
language. Parts 3 and 4 resolve this tension by treating human beings as more trustworthy and 
ethically serious than perhaps the Platonic endoxon had admitted, and by claiming that better 
arguments tend to be more persuasive, even among people who are not trained in dialectic or 
well-suited to philosophic inquiry. Along the way, Aristotle subtly introduces new disciplinary 
distinctions and other lexical innovations so that, by the time chapter 1 ends, his students are 
ready to understand and accept the theoretical innovations of chapters 2 and 3:  
1. A definition of rhetoric as “an ability, in each case, to see to endechomenon 
pithanon [the available persuasive things],” by which definition both speakers and 
audiences are rhetorical artists; 
2. An extended treatment of enthymemes, or rhetorical syllogisms, which are 
persuasive not merely because they are logically valid, but also because they engage 
audience members’ already at-work deliberations; and 
3. An outline of rhetorical genres and purposes, along with a claim that the telos of a 
speech “relates to...the hearer [akroatēs]” and not to the speaker or the subject.10 
These conceptual innovations treat rhetoric, not as a culturally particular practice of mere 
instrumental utility, but as a universally human practice aiming at universal human goods. The 
art of rhetoric does not enable up-and-coming professional orators more effectively to move 
audiences. Indeed, inartistic speakers often move audiences more effectively than artistic 
speakers do, attaining the status and reputation of a Gorgias or a Demosthenes without ever 
understanding the causes of their effectiveness. Rhetoric enables speakers and audiences to 
deliberate together about the common good, and to evaluate one another’s arguments and 
opinions according to shared principles and a mutual commitment to rational uses of speech. 
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Because of the nature of human language and politics, the true rhetorical art is always morally 
substantive and logically rigorous. 
Introduction to Rhetoric for Students of Dialectic (1.1.1-2) 
It is a common Socratic dictum that when you realize an inquiry has gone wrong, you 
must return to the place of the original error—or else, having chosen one wrong path, you will 
never again find the right one. The Rhetoric’s opening paragraph provides just such a correction. 
Socrates spends almost half of the Gorgias seeking a clear answer to the question, what is 
Gorgias’ art? Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles cannot define it; and, as Socrates later reveals, this 
confusion about rhetoric is a symptom of a more fundamental set of misunderstandings about 
language, politics, justice, and the ends of human life. Their narrow focus on the immediately 
instrumental effects of oratory renders them impotent to resist or correct Socrates’ taxonomy of 
arts, which memorably and provocatively labels rhetoric a species of flattery. Because of the 
sophists’ ineptitude, the subject of rhetoric is all but forgotten during the extended discussion of 
justice that forms the second half of the dialogue, though Socrates later says that it would be 
possible and salutary to develop a new art of public speaking oriented toward the health of the 
city and the soul.11  
Aristotle’s treatise begins by returning to the first question of the Gorgias, giving a three-
sentence answer to Socrates’ question. This answer, if offered by Gorgias or Callicles, would 
have required the subsequent discussion to account more systematically for the practices of 
speaking and listening by which cities determine how best to define and enact justice. The most 
memorable and provocative of Socrates’ claims—that rhetoric is “a counterfeit of a part of 
politics” and an antistrophos to pastry baking—is addressed in an equally provocative 
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counterclaim: that rhetoric is a counterpart of dialektikē, the art that Socrates had called 
dialegesthai (conversation).  
Rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to 
a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined 
science. A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, to some extent, try 
both to test and maintain an argument [kai exetazein kai hupechein logon] and to defend 
themselves and attack [kai apologeisthai kai katēgorein]. Now among the general public, 
some do these things randomly and others through an ability acquired by habit 
[synētheian apo hexeōs], but since both ways are possible, it is clear that it would also be 
possible to do the same by a path; for it is possible to observe [theorein] the cause 
[aitian] why some succeed by habit and others accidentally, and all would at once agree 
that such observation is the activity [ergon] of an art [technē]. (1.1.1-2) 
 
In the Gorgias, Socrates made much of the distinction between dialegesthai, an activity in which 
two or more interlocutors cooperate in the search for truthful answers to questions, and “that 
which is called rhetoric” (ten kaloumenen rhetoriken), which makes long speeches for the sake 
of stylistic and histrionic display. This distinction later collapses when Callicles demands that 
Socrates develop his thesis about political justice in greater detail. To do so, Socrates must 
invent, arrange, and deliver a long speech of his own—and he admits, in the end, that an art of 
speech-making might be politically salutary, though he judges his audience ill-prepared either to 
develop or to receive such technical instruction. Aristotle’s abrupt and brazen reversal of the 
Socratic analogy must be as memorable and provocative for Aristotle’s audience of Socratic 
dialecticians as Socrates’ claim was for his audience of sophists in training. This conceptual 
reorientation prepares Aristotle’s students to begin a new dialectical interrogation of the sophistic 
Arts of Speech, this time in an effort to build the new art that Socrates had foreseen.  
Though the Arts of Speech have not survived, we can discern their character from 
Aristotle’s own treatise and from the accounts of other ancient historians of rhetoric.12 For 
practical reasons, these treatises focused almost exclusively on judicial rhetoric. Epideictic 
display pieces were used mostly to demonstrate a teacher’s facility with useful techniques of 
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attack or defense, or to attract students through sheer verbal dexterity. (Gorgias’ Encomium of 
Helen and Defense of Palamedes are representative of the genre.) The Arts of Speech 
commended patterns of arrangement and style that would help an incompetent speaker to win his 
audience’s trust or approbation. To the extent that they addressed the theoretical or ethical 
dimensions of rhetorical artistry, they tended to assume that public speaking was a way of 
gaining or keeping power in the city, and that its primary utility was to be found in protecting 
one’s friends, assets, and life from attack, or in launching successful attacks on one’s enemies. 
Some of these assumptions about rhetoric would no doubt have seemed dubious to 
Aristotle’s students, if for no other reason than that those students were already familiar with the 
Socratic interrogations of prominent sophists and orators. Yet these Socratic critiques often 
proceed by accepting the sophists’ background assumptions; and even when they question those 
assumptions, they often posit a different endoxon that Aristotle must address. The original 
readers of the Rhetoric would have shared the sophists’ endoxa about this emergent art, or would 
at most have been familiar with the corresponding Socratic replies to those endoxa (see Figure 
4). In other words, for all their resistance to sophistic argument about politics and ethics, the best 
students in the Platonic tradition would have been one short step away from sophistic 
presuppositions about rhetoric and persuasion. Hereafter, I will refer to these opinions by the 
relevant numbers below (e1, e2, etc.). 
Plato’s Gorgias states [e1] as though it were obvious, and Socrates builds his dialectical 
inquiry on this premise. Yet it is this opinion that is most fatal to Gorgias’ position, since he 
cannot name what kinds of speeches that this art of rhetoric makes him competent to write. This 
assumption that the artifact of rhetoric is a speech, and its corollary assumption that the end of 
such a speech is persuasion, leads Socrates eventually to call rhetoric an antistrophos of flattery.  
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Figure 4. Endoxa taught by the sophistic Arts of Speech, with corresponding Socratic 
replies from the Gorgias and Phaedrus. 
 
Sophistic endoxa Socratic replies 
e1. Rhetoric is an art of writing and 
delivering persuasive speeches. Like all 
arts, it is productive and practical, not 
theoretical. The artifact is the speech 
itself, whether written or spoken. 
e2. The archetypal rhetorical act is the 
attack or defense speech in judicial court. 
Rhetoric is also practiced in the assembly 
(ekklēsia) and in public displays 
(epideixeis) of various sorts, but these 
public speeches are rarer and less useful 
for the student of rhetoric, whose first 
priority should be protecting his life and 
property.  
e3. If the speech is rhetoric’s artifact, then 
the “end” of that artifact is persuasion. 
Thus, the skill or artistry of a speaker is to 
be measured by his instrumental 
effectiveness in manipulating a judge’s 
state of mind to achieve victory over an 
opponent or to gain power in the city.  
 
e4. Such manipulation can be achieved 
through the arrangement (taxis) of a 
speech, through the speaker’s choice of 
apt words and phrases (lexis), and through 
performative histrionics (hypocrisis). 
s1. Each art supplies speeches about its 
own subject matter, so it is not clear why 
there should be a separate art of speaking 
as such, unless that art is deceptive or 
vacuous. 
s2. Rhetorical situations, especially 
courtrooms, are not conducive to 
discovery of truth or pursuit of justice. 
They tend to reward unscrupulous 
persuasive tactics, and should be severely 
restrained by the city’s laws. Friendly 
conversations are better: both sides 
assume good will and engage in 
productive question and answer. 
s3. If there were a true art of rhetoric, then 
the skilled speaker would know how to 
move his audience’s soul lovingly from 
error into truth or justly from vice into 
virtue. Truth and the good, not persuasion, 
would be the ends of that art, which may 
require one-on-one discourse between a 
philosopher and a willing learner.  
s4. Taxis and lexis are important tools of 
language; but in a true art, they would be 
subordinate to (and determined by) logical 
argument (that is, the truth of the matter) 
and the good of the audience. 
 
He suggests that it would be better to find an art that speaks truly about justice than to practice 
Gorgias’ so-called art of rhetoric. In the end, he is able to give two examples— one mythopoetic, 
and another didactic—of the kinds of speeches he has in mind; but, perhaps because of the 
weakness of his audience, he does not describe or define the art that he is practicing. Ironically, 
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then, Socrates finds himself doing what he originally chided Gorgias for doing: giving example 
speeches for the ostensible edification of a passive audience without giving an account of how 
those speeches are composed or what makes them good. Unlike Gorgias, he has a coherent or at 
least defensible theory of justice and virtue; but like Gorgias, he seems to lack a coherent theory 
of persuasive speaking. The difference, of course, is that he ends the conversation by wondering 
if it would be possible to develop an art of speech that served the just and the true, rather than 
one that served the short-term interests of self-appointed political strongmen. 
Socrates achieves several helpful clarifications along the way, including (as Terrence 
Irwin points out13) the inseparability of persuasion from ethical deliberation; the profound moral 
burden assumed by anyone presuming to persuade an audience; the ontological primacy of 
referents, and the dependence of words on the existence of such referents, for the intelligibility 
and utility of language—even when the referent is an abstraction like justice; and finally, the 
importance of theory, pedagogy, and tradition to any true art, which will always look forward in 
time toward its own preservation and development in a new generation of artists. Yet none of 
these clarifications revises the mistaken first premise of [e1]—that is, a definition of rhetoric (or 
of Socrates’ new and just art of speaking) that takes the speech to be the artifact. For a reader of 
the Gorgias, rhetoric is a suspect art precisely because this definition is still assumed to be valid. 
It is this definition, and its assumed analogy—rhetoric the counterpart of flattery—that Aristotle 
addresses in his opening sentence, which claims that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic.14 If 
Aristotle were writing for an audience of sophists, or for a general public assumed to be 
sympathetic to the instrumental view of rhetoric that the sophists espoused, then references to the 
Arts of Speech would be a sufficient opening for dialectical inquiry; but students of Socratic 
inquiry are also familiar with a strong case against rhetoric that is based on those same faulty 
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definitions. If dialectic is artistic, Aristotle implies, then so is rhetoric. What remains is to 
discern, for both arts, what artifacts they produce. 
The other three endoxa—[e2], [e3], and [e4]—are addressed later in chapter 1 of the 
Rhetoric: not by positing, as Socrates had done, a different art from that practiced by the 
sophists, but rather by claiming that the sophists have failed to discern the true nature of the art 
that they claim to teach. Even here, though, in the opening sentence of the chapter, the 
enthymematic structure and the assumed point of view of the argument position Aristotle’s 
readers to see the falsehood of [e2-4]. The first gar clause implies that rhetoric’s scope and its 
relationship to other disciplines can be discerned in the fact that it is common to all human 
beings, and is not the province of specialists. Aristotle has picked up the discussion where 
Gorgias and Polus first went wrong, before they even offered a definition of their art: Rhetoric is 
not the greatest and the best of arts, available only to a few clever and in-the-know aristocrats 
who gain an audience with Gorgias or Protagoras, but rather a discipline that is “concerned with 
such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people.” Still assuming [e1], 
that rhetoric is an art of speech making, he proceeds, “a result is that all people, in some way, 
share in both; for all, to some extent, try both to test and maintain an argument [as in dialectic] 
and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric].”  
Kennedy’s bracketed phrases identify argument with dialectic, and attack and defense 
with rhetoric—assumptions that Aristotle’s students may have shared.15 Yet it is far from 
obvious in the rest of the treatise that attack and defense are the primary activities of the public 
speaker. Rather, Kennedy’s gloss depends on [e2] and [e3]: the common opinions that judicial 
rhetoric is archetypal and that the goal of any speech is to defeat an opponent. If it were to turn 
out that rhetoric, like dialectic, tests and maintains arguments, then rhetoric would have other 
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ends related to the truth or falsehoods of propositions—ends that are available to all persuasive 
uses of language, and not simply identifiable with the external and merely instrumental goal of 
victory. Perhaps Aristotle intentionally refuses to identify which pair of activities is to be 
associated with which discipline precisely because he is inviting consideration of [e2] and [e3]: 
His students can tacitly supply the missing language, thus identifying dialectic with argument 
and truth while identifying rhetoric with victory in an attack or defense; or they can recognize 
both pairs of activities as equally present in both arts. Both dialectic and rhetoric are logical and 
argumentative; both, too, are agonistic. 
Note, too, the reciprocity of the two activities mentioned. Dialectic and rhetoric are 
concerned with testing and maintaining, defending and attacking. Students of the Academy or 
the Lyceum would be familiar with this reciprocity in dialectical exchanges. (Socrates often 
chides his interlocutors for failing to listen carefully to the question at hand or to remember 
conclusions of previous lines of inquiry.) That rhetoric is similarly bi-directional is perhaps 
obvious to anyone thinking of defense and attack in the law court. Thus, another reason for 
Aristotle to assume the truth of [e2] and [e3] early in the treatise is that he intends to show how 
the same kind of reciprocity—speaking, listening, and responding—characterizes rhetoric as a 
whole, and not only the rhetorical contests of the courtroom, which are structurally agonistic.  
After the two opening enthymemes comes the first extended argument of the treatise: a 
tentative four-step reply to Socrates’ claim that rhetoric must be a knack and not an art. Because 
the argument is enthymematic, I have rendered it in a more formal syllogistic order (see Figure 




Figure 5. An imperfect syllogistic rendering of Rhetoric 1.1.2. 
 
I 
a. [It has been observed that] “some do these things randomly and others through an 
ability acquired by habit.” 
b. [Observed things are possible.] 
c. [Therefore, it is possible to succeed either randomly or through an ability 
acquired by habit.] 
II 
a. [Observed phenomena have observable causes.] 
b. [Ia] 




b. Observing the cause is the activity of an art. 
c. [There is an art of observing the cause of a speaker’s success. Call that art 
rhetoric.] 
IV 
a. [An art, by observing the cause of success, can provide a pathway to success.] 
b. [Rhetoric is an art.] 
c. [Therefore,] It would be possible to do the same [i.e. succeed at speaking] by 
following a path. 
 
 
The logic here is (to say the least) imperfect. Most of the premises, especially the tacit ones, are 
dubious, so all of the conclusions are at best tentative. Notice, for example, that while Aristotle is 
saying that all people participate in rhetoric in some way, and he is claiming that it is possible to 
observe causes of success and thereby to succeed “by following a path” (that is, with a reasoned 
account of how success can be achieved), nothing in these four syllogisms suggests that “all 
people” can learn the art and follow the path—only that it would seem to be possible for some to 
do so. Further, it is far from obvious that every observed phenomenon has an observable cause. 
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(Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen disputes this very point, shrouding logos in the mystery proper to 
magic or divine power, and claiming that our honest doubt about the causes of human action 
amounts to an acknowledgement that we are all slaves to logos or eros or the gods.) Aristotle’s 
insistence that rhetoric is (or could be) an art is meant as a subtle rebuke to the historical 
Gorgias, as well as to the Socratic reply to Gorgias’ too-clever-by-half agnosticism; but this 
rebuke begins with an only partially justified optimism about the intelligibility of observed 
phenomena. Perhaps the causes of success or failure are not intelligible. Who is to say that, 
simply because some people succeed and others do not, it is possible to observe the causes of 
success and master the art? 
We discern, then, something other than dialectical rigor in this opening passage. 
Aristotle’s enthymeme seems to have been designed, not with the logician’s demand for 
precision and accuracy, but rather with a teacher’s patience for slowly emerging understanding. 
Aristotle will later state almost offhand that there are some, perhaps many, arts and “capabilities” 
(dunameis) that are “not yet understood” and that people nevertheless speak and reason about 
such subjects, even forming syllogisms about them.16 In context, he is trying to distinguish the 
various kinds of premises and propositions that public speakers use to persuade audiences; and 
he insists that many of these propositions are only incidentally rhetorical. They belong to rhetoric 
insofar as they are used to persuade an audience, but in themselves, they belong to their separate 
arts and capabilities—some of which have not been developed sufficiently for speakers and 
listeners to be able to judge their truth or falsehood. Rhetoric stands in the gap, so to speak, 
between ignorance and knowledge, enabling people to reason together about topics that they do 
not fully understand. The four rough enthymemes in 1.1.2 display this same tentativeness about 
rhetoric itself, which is for Aristotle an emerging discipline. It should be possible, Aristotle is 
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saying, to observe the causes of rhetorical success, inasmuch as there are countless other 
emerging fields of knowledge where causes are becoming ever more visible through patient 
investigation. (Recall Smith’s comments about Aristotle’s invention of syllogistic, and his 
apparent expectation that this investigation would be carried forward by future generations.) 
Aristotle himself has already begun observing the causes of success among persuasive speakers, 
and he will lead his students through them one by one; but in his opening argument, he needs to 
outline for his students (and even to model for them) how the dialectical inquiry will proceed, 
and how the artistic speaker will argue and persuade, given Aristotle’s own imperfect and 
emerging knowledge about this new discipline. 
This sentence also points forward to the definition of rhetoric that Aristotle will offer in 
chapter 2 by reminding Aristotle’s audience that the activity (ergon) of an art (technē) is 
observation (theōrein). Rhetorical artistry—for now, I must emphasize—is the activity of 
observing the causes of success in speech; it is not, as [e1] would have it, the activity of 
composing speeches, nor even the power to achieve victory through persuasion. It is possible, 
Aristotle says, to achieve success by following a path; and the syllogistic structure of his 
argument implies that artistic observation can help public speakers to find such a path; but the art 
itself is theoretical and observational, not practical. The artistic proofs (pisteis) are artistic in the 
sense that it is possible to see and reason about how they are created and how or why they will 
succeed. Speakers make use of such proofs; but rhetorical artists see or theorize about them, 
reasoning about their persuasiveness. A speaker is artistic only to the extent that he or she 
theorizes.  
It is clear, even at this early moment in the treatise, that one learns and practices this art 
as much by listening to speeches as by writing and delivering them, and that the practice of 
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listening to speeches, insofar as the listener theorizes about rhetoric, is on Aristotle’s account 
part of the rhetorical art. Indeed, during the second half of book 2 and much of book 3, Aristotle 
will cite techniques and sentiments of famous speeches, asking his readers to consider whether or 
not these exempli are persuasive. Thus, even in chapter 1, where Aristotle assumes the centrality 
of speech-making to the rhetorical art, he offers a definition of artistry that will eventually lead to 
a rejection of that endoxon. By defining rhetoric as a counterpart of dialectic, and by calling it an 
art of seeing, Aristotle has subtly insinuated notions of reciprocal, or at least agonistic, 
exchanges between practitioners who are alternately speakers and listeners. He has thus opened 
the possibility that the listeners might exercise agency—perhaps even artistry—rather than being 




JUDGMENT, DIALECTIC, AND THE ART OF RHETORIC (RHETORIC 1.1) 
With this outline of rhetoric’s means, ends, and disciplinary boundaries, Aristotle is ready 
to begin his three-part cycle through the five arguments that I outline above (see Figures 2 and 
3), during which he will clarify the relationships among speaker, audience, and subject, settling 
eventually on audience as the most determinative element of the rhetorical situation. 
The problem of the warped audience (1.1.3-8) 
On the first pass, he suggests that the rhetorical handbooks err in attending too much, 
rather than too little, to rhetorical audience; for “only pisteis are artistic,” and the writers have 
focused on “verbal attack and pity and anger and such emotions of the soul”—mere “appeals to 
the juryman.” It is for this reason that Aristotle recommends, initially, that legislators restrict 
speakers’ habit of wandering off topic. What this recommendation would actually entail—who 
would determine, case by case, what is on topic and what not—he does not specify; but he may 
have something like Socrates’ rebuke of Polus in mind, and it is clear that this wish for an 
enlightened legislator to restrict politically deleterious speech is a Socratic endoxon [s2]. 
Aristotle assumes [s2], as well as [e2-4], to point out two weaknesses in the handbooks: 
their neglect of rhetorical pragmata and their consequent ignorance of logical argument. The 
primacy of judicial rhetoric is still assumed, since although he is talking about rhetoric in 
general, he nevertheless uses the legal term “juryman” (dikastēs) to refer to rhetorical audience, 
and the agonistic term “opponents” (tōn amphisbētountōn) to refer to the speakers. Further, he 
continues to assume that rhetoric exerts a unidirectional power of speaker over audience: the 
speaker tries to “warp” the jurymen, or to “lead” them into anger, envy, or pity. This narrow 
focus on rhetorical pragmata, and on the logical argument that is absent from the rhetorical 
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handbooks, leads dialectically to Aristotle’s claim that persuasive speakers have no business 
arguing about the importance or the justice of an act, since about these matters “the juryman 
should somehow decide for himself and not learn from the opponents.” 
This claim is meant to create a theoretical problem, not to state or clarify Aristotle’s final 
teaching about rhetorical treatments of justice. It involves him in a variety of contradictions and 
absurdities that threaten the usefulness of both rhetoric and dialectic. If these arts are concerned 
with matters common to all people, and if pisteis (dialectic’s logical proofs) are artistic, then of 
course the speaker will discuss justice and injustice, importance and triviality—all of which are 
treated in the dialectical topics. Yet, as any thoughtful dialectician will also note, arguments 
about justice, injustice, importance, and triviality reliably cause emotional reactions in human 
beings, since it is the perception of good or evil (and of the magnitude of good or evil) that 
motivates us to feel emotion in the first place—especially anger or envy or pity.1 So the demand 
that rhetoric be fastidious about logical truth while avoiding pathetic appeals threatens to reduce 
not only rhetoric but also its antistrophos dialectic to questions of what is or is not, what has or 
has not happened, and to leave all other matters—especially the ethical questions on which 
dialectic is most useful—to the legislator.  
Aristotle will later conclude, in 1.13, that such legislation would be impracticable. Yet 
the more fundamental problem with this recommendation is evident in an unacknowledged 
contradiction between the claim that “the juryman should somehow decide himself” about 
justice, and the expressed desire for lawmakers to determine as much as possible in advance and 
leave as little as possible to the judges. Perhaps well-framed laws could encourage and reward 
justice and prudence in the body politic, thus educating the citizens (insofar as laws can educate 
them) in the rudiments of these virtues; and perhaps other well-framed laws could narrowly 
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define the meaning of “justice” for purposes of criminal trials, so that jurymen would have only 
to determine whether a particular action does or does not violate that definition. This reading 
may be implied by Aristotle’s famous “straight-edge” analogy: To warp the jury by means of 
their passions and loyalties “is the same as if someone made a straightedge rule crooked before 
using it.” If the juryman is analogous to a measuring rod, then presumably the units of 
measurement have been determined ahead of time by the law; and the jury’s task is to apply 
these units of measurement to a given case’s pragmata. Is it really true, though, that “emotions 
of the soul”—including not only anger, envy, and pity, but also friendliness, indignation, and 
admiration—threaten to make the straight-edge crooked, or to cast a shadow on their judgment 
so that “they are no longer able to see the truth adequately” (1.1.7)? These metaphors reduce 
“truth” to matters of fact—another amputation of the dialectical topics most treasured by 
Aristotle’s students and readers. Thus, the dialectician who affirms the Platonic critique of 
rhetoric soon finds that critique turned against dialectic, too, and begins to question not only the 
handbooks’ endoxa but also the Socratic replies.  
At the same time, Aristotle begins to suggest another theoretical innovation—his 
taxonomy of rhetorical genres—by treating rhetorical audience as the most important factor in 
articulating rhetoric’s aims and determining its scope. As we consider the boundaries that divide 
the realm of rhetoric from that of politics, he implies, we must consider who is capable of 
judging what, and under what circumstances. In 1.1.4-6, he assumes the truth of the speaker-
centered, courtroom-focused endoxa above; but in 7-8, he begins to employ a strategic 
imprecision in the use of terms for audience or judge. Slowly, dikastēs gives way to the broader 
term kritēs, which Kennedy rightly translates as “judge.” Legally, this term encompasses both 
the dikastēs of the courtroom and the ekklēsiastēs of the deliberative assembly; but in common 
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usage, it refers to anyone making a judgment, krisis, of any kind. At the same time, Aristotle 
begins to insinuate various verb and noun forms of dikazō, “to judge,” which is lexically 
different from krisis in a way that our flexible term “judge” obscures. I reproduce Kennedy’s 
translation below, with relevant Greek terms in brackets, to show how Aristotle’s lexis subtly 
widens the scope of inquiry to include various forms of deliberative rhetoric and, potentially, 
even private and unofficial speeches between friends.  
It is highly appropriate for well-enacted laws to define everything as exactly as possible 
and for as little as possible to be left to the judges (krinousi); first because it is easier to 
find one or a few than many who are prudent [phronountas] and capable of framing laws 
and judging [dikazein]; second, legislation results from consideration over much time, 
while judgments [kriseis] are made at the moment, so it is difficult for the judges [tous 
krinōntas] to determine justice and benefits fairly [apodidomai to dikaion kai to 
sumpheron kalōs]; but most important of all, because the judgment [krisis] of a lawmaker 
is not about a particular case but about what lies in the future and in general, while the 
assemblyman [ekklēsiastēs] and the juryman [dikastēs] are actually judging [krinousin] 
present and specific cases. For them, friendliness and hostility and individual self-interest 
are often involved, with the result that they are no longer able to see [mēketi dunasthai 
theōrein] the truth adequately, but their private pleasure or grief casts a shadow on their 
judgment [krisei]. In other matters, then, as we have been saying, the judge [kritēn] 
should have authority to determine as little as possible; but it is necessary to leave to the 
judges [kritais] the question of whether something has happened or has not happened, 
will or will not be, is or is not the case; for the lawmaker cannot foresee these things. 
 
The initial use of krinousi (“those who are judging,” or “those who are deciding”) governs the 
lexical play throughout the rest of the passage. The essential characteristic of all audiences is that 
they must render judgments immediately, “at the moment” of a trial or election. Both the 
ekklēsiastēs and the dikastēs are judging (krinousin) present cases; and, since their emotions 
obscure their judgment (krisei), they are “no longer able to see the truth adequately”—so they 
should be restricted by the lawmaker. Yet Aristotle’s flexible use of krisis and dikazō includes 
lawmakers themselves among “those who judge.” Indeed, the use of dikazein here recalls the 
technical “juryman” (dikastes) language of 1.1.6, while also pointing forward to the difficulty, 
for judges (tous krinonias), of determining justice (to dikaion) in judicial and deliberative cases. 
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This interweaving creates the impression that everyone concerned in any way with rhetoric or 
politics is involved in acts of discernment and of judgment; and it further implies that, though 
Aristotle has subtly widened the realm of rhetoric to include deliberative assemblies as well as 
judicial cases, that realm may extend further—into the deliberations of the legislator or of 
anyone at all. Paradoxically and unexpectedly, Aristotle has replaced technical and culture-
bound legal terminology with more common and less concrete usages, to achieve a broader and 
therefore more accurate definition of rhetoric’s boundaries.2 All people, to some extent, test and 
maintain arguments; all people attack and defend. 
The apparent severity of 1.1.7-8 thus bears an important dialectical relationship to 1.1.6 
and to 1.1.9, as well as to Aristotle’s treatment of proofs in book 2. The “first because” clause in 
1.1.7 implies that rhetorical audiences are engaged in similar activities to legislators, requiring 
the same virtue (phronēsis); yet the difference in their circumstances—namely, that the rhetorical 
audience must render a judgment quickly—suggests that one may need something more than 
prudence to listen and decide well. The rhetorical situation makes audiences vulnerable to 
fallacious argument and unscrupulous appeals to emotion, however prudent those audiences may 
be—hence the need to offer two separate reasons for the inferiority of their judgment compared 
to that of the legislator. This observation gives an incomplete answer to the question raised in 
1.1.6. The juryman, Aristotle suggests, should “somehow” decide questions of justice himself, 
without learning from the opponents; but how? If it were possible to ensure that audiences were 
more prudent, then half of the dilemma would be solved; but what to do about the rhetorical 
situation, which renders audiences vulnerable to appeals to their private emotions, which cast a 
shadow over judgment? 
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The answer, again, is suggested by the lexis of the passage, which points forward to two 
theoretical innovations: the definition of rhetoric that Aristotle will offer in 1.2.1, and the ends of 
the three speech genres, which he will name in 1.3. Consider the Greek sentence that Kennedy 
renders “judgments are made at the moment, so it is difficult for judges to determine justice and 
benefits fairly.” All three ends of rhetoric are included in this sentence: not only justice (to 
dikaion), but also advantage (to sumpheron) and even the beautiful (here, the adverb kalōs, 
“nobly” or “beautifully”). Aristotle will claim in chapter 3 that the telos of rhetoric relates to the 
listener. Here, subtly undermining the common assumptions that rhetoric is primarily a speaker’s 
art and that it is aimed at manipulation (or salutary “leading”) of a passive listener, Aristotle 
identifies the ends of an audience’s judgment (krisis)—which are also the ends of persuasive 
speech—as the just, the advantageous, and the beautiful. 
Moreover, Aristotle says, the act of judging is a matter of “see[ing] the truth adequately”; 
and it is this ability to see, he laments, that is often obscured by private interest. The language 
here closely mirrors that of the definition of rhetoric forthcoming at 1.2.1. Rhetoric is an ability 
(dunamis) in any case to see (theōrein) the available means of persuasion; and, as Aristotle will 
argue shortly in 1.1.11-12, this ability is useful for discerning “what the real state of the case is”: 
that is, for seeing what is true. Warped judges, he says, lack an ability adequately to see the truth 
(mēketi dunasthai theōrein to alēthes). If rhetoric is an ability to see the true and the persuasive, 
and it belongs to the same capacity to see both the true and what resembles the true; if rhetoric is 
useful in helping us to see “what is the real state of the case,” and if some judges, warped by 
private interest, lack “an ability to see the true”; then what is Aristotle lamenting here but a lack 
of rhetorical artistry among audiences? What remedy could one find for this problem, other than 
teaching audiences to think rhetorically—to “see” both the persuasive and the apparently 
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persuasive, the true and the apparently true, including (but not limited to) fallacies and off-topic 
appeals to their self-interest? 
Thus, while considering a severe political remedy for the problem of an audience’s faults, 
Aristotle simultaneously points toward a hopeful account of rhetorical audiences as trustworthy 
judges and powerful artists in their own right. His expansion of the scope of rhetoric to include 
deliberative as well as judicial speakers is also—perhaps even primarily—an attempt to redefine 
his students’ understanding of the audience’s interest in pursuing the universal human goods of 
justice, advantage, and beauty, thereby ennobling the rhetorical art for speaker and audience 
alike. 
The audience’s “natural disposition for the true” (1.1.9-11) 
Part 3 of chapter 1 recapitulates the arguments of part 2 (1.1.3-8), with two important 
additions (see Figure 3 above). First, Aristotle sharpens the distinction between deliberative and 
judicial audiences, which allows him more explicitly to make the claim that audiences exert 
some salutary power over otherwise unscrupulous speakers. Second, having explained that an 
audience’s judgment is (or should be) aimed at determining what is true, he can explain at 
greater length how such judgment works—namely, through the creation or reception of valid 
enthymemes. In 1.1.3-8, he had provisionally accepted [e1-4], and had concluded from these 
premises that legislators ought to restrict the agency of both speakers and audiences by limiting 
the scope of what can be discussed or decided in rhetorical encounters. In 1.1.9-11, he will begin 
to weaken this suspicion of rhetoric’s power, primarily by examining the rational, ethical, and 
political agency of audiences.  
Part 3 (1.1.9) begins, as part 2 (1.1.3) did, by accusing the Arts of Speech of describing 
“matters external to the subject.” However, part 3 adds rhetorical arrangement to the list of 
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irrelevant appeals to the juryman. At first, it would seem that taxis as such is Aristotle’s target, 
and that he is yet again chiding previous theorists for focusing too much, rather than too little, on 
audience. Yet the logical structure of the statement suggests that it is their particular treatment of 
taxis, and their shallow or incomplete view of an audience’s faculty of judgment, that Aristotle 
regards as inartistic. They “concern themselves only with how they may put the judge in a 
certain frame of mind, while they ignore artistic proofs.” The way the handbooks discuss taxis is 
inartistic because, in describing how each part of a speech affects an audience, they say nothing 
about enthymeme. Aristotle is not sketching a logocentric, rather than an audience-centered, art 
of rhetoric. Rather, he is correcting the handbooks writers’ misunderstanding of audiences as 
illogical and easy to manipulate. Judges make decisions, he argues, at least in part by thinking 
logically. Any treatment of rhetorical taxis, then, or of how to “put the judge in a certain frame of 
mind,” must account for the logical relationships between propositions and conclusions in a 
speech, and for how audiences judge such propositions to be true or false. The handbook writers 
have paid insufficient attention to the logical character of persuasion: the fact that all appeals, 
including what Aristotle will later identify as pertaining to the speaker’s character and the 
listener’s state of mind, imply or include rational judgment. The problem with sophistic rhetoric, 
both theoretically and practically, is that the sophists have misunderstood their audiences. The 
handbook writers claim to be able to move the judges by a kind of crude instrumentality, without 
bothering about the logical validity of their arguments. Such methods are inartistic because, as 
Aristotle claimed in 1.1.2, “the activity of an art” is “observation”—specifically, observing and 
explaining why some speakers succeed and others do not. If “humans have a natural disposition 
for the true and to a large extent hit on truth,” and “most believe when they suppose something to 
have been demonstrated,” then “appeals to the juryman” or particular modes of arrangement can 
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succeed only for reasons that the handbook writers have failed to discern. Such appeals succeed, 
in other words, by being enthymematic. Even the most deceptive speech can succeed only by 
seeming to have inferred a conclusion validly from some sort of evidence or principle. The 
sophist believes, incorrectly, that his tricks have worked, and the audience was none the wiser; 
but in truth, Aristotle claims, both the sophist and the audience have been reasoning 
enthymematically; and whether their syllogisms are valid or not, the audience has judged in a 
particular way because they believed that something was demonstrated to be true or false. An 
artistic speaker would know that enthymeme is the body of persuasion; that the activity of a 
judge is seeing what is true, and judging what is good; and that artistic proofs, unlike the narrow 
descriptions of taxis and emotional appeals that the Arts provide, can account for their own 
causes of success.  
It is with this understanding of 1.1.9 that we must approach 1.1.10, which recapitulates 
and revises the legal arguments of 7-8. In 7-8, Aristotle mentioned both the deliberative judge 
and the courtroom juror, but he obscured the difference between the two to focus on the common 
activity of judgment (krisis). Here, similarly, he claims that “the method of deliberative 
(dēmēgorika) and judicial (dikanika) speaking is the same”—that is, that both of them use 
enthymematic reasoning—but he adds that deliberative speeches are better in two important 
ways. First, “deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the state than private 
transactions.” Second, “it is less serviceable to speak things outside the subject in deliberative 
situations, for there the judge judges about matters that affect himself.” Again, the position of the 
judges with respect to the subject of the case determines the artistic speaker’s choices about what 
arguments to use. The pragma of deliberative oratory strengthens an audience’s resistance to 
sophistry, whereas a judicial pragma weakens it. But there are other means of strengthening 
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audiences’ judgment, as Aristotle has already implied; and teaching the art of rhetoric as an art of 
listening would presumably help judges in all contexts—not only deliberative ones—to 
“adequately guard against” speakers’ unscrupulous tactics. In any case, Aristotle has introduced 
one of the central premises of the Rhetoric, which is that rhetorical audiences at least sometimes 
exert power over speakers, restricting their choice of arguments. 
Another implication of this paragraph, which Bryan Garsten has explored at some length, 
is the paradoxical notion that people judge more truly and think more clearly about some 
subjects when self-interest is a motivating factor.3 I call the notion paradoxical because Aristotle 
has just finished lamenting the effects of self-interest on judgment. Part 3 of Rhetoric 1.1 argues, 
on the contrary, that in addition to having a natural disposition for the true, people exercise their 
judgment better when motivated by self-interest than when judging other people’s cases. Both 
the Ethics and the Politics emphasize that people are best at thinking about what concerns them. 
Practical judgment (phronēsis) is built on experience, so people know most about things that 
they encounter daily; moreover, people are more motivated to protect and preserve institutions 
and practices that benefit them. If true, this account of judgment would amount to a significant 
revision of the skepticism about audience that characterized 1.1.4-5 and 7-8. Under the guise of 
giving advice to future lawmakers about how best to protect the state from the hasty decisions of 
a mob, Aristotle has introduced trust in audience’s private judgment as an important element in 
rhetorical theory, thus undermining [e2-4] and their Socratic counterparts. People can for the 
most part be trusted to “guard against” sophistic tricks, and their ability to do so increases as they 
judge matters that are “finer and more important to the state.” If the reason for their superior 
judgment is that these finer matters concern their own interests, then, following the Aristotelian 
dictum that we should define each thing according to its best and most perfect form, the 
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paradigmatic speech is not judicial, but deliberative; the paradigmatic rhetorical tools are not 
manipulative, but logical and truth-seeking; and the end of rhetoric is not power over one’s 
neighbors, but rather the common good, as defined by the interests and loyalties of one’s 
audience.  
One might wish for a reference, here, to Aristotle’s treatment of the virtue of decency 
(epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics—an active condition that, according to Aristotle, supplies 
what justice lacks by seeking the good of one’s neighbors, adapting legal standards to their actual 
needs:  
Not all things are in accord with law, because it is impossible to set down a law about 
some things, so that there is a need of a decree. For a rule for something indeterminate is 
also indeterminate, as is the straightedge used in housebuilding on Lesbos; for the ruler is 
altered to fit the shape of the stone and does not stay rigid, and the decree is altered to fit 
the circumstances. What, then, is decent, and that it is just and better than a certain kind 
of justice, is clear.4 
 
There are times, it would seem, when a flexible measuring rod is more useful and accurate than a 
straight one. When shaping an arch or a column, for example, or when deliberating publicly 
about the specifics of the common good, one might need (so to speak) to bend the rule.5 Perhaps 
Aristotle is assuming some knowledge of the Ethics among readers of the Rhetoric, or vice versa; 
but it cannot be coincidental that this highly specific analogy—the bent ruler as a similitude for 
one’s willingness to adapt a rigid public decree to the ethical needs of a specific moment—
should appear in both treatises. Rhetoric 1.1.3-8 claimed that judges’ partialities would prevent 
them from seeing the truth, and that unscrupulous rhetors would use personal and emotional 
appeals to warp their judgment. Now, in 9-11, those same partialities turn out to be important 
features of good judgment, and not hindrances to it, since as private citizens are better able to 
judge the particulars of a case if those particulars concern them directly. Because they are more 
knowledgeable, and because their private interests make them care about the outcome, they are 
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able to apply legislative standards more accurately and more wisely to the exigencies of the 
moment. The passage above suggests that the ethical virtue most similar to this skill of rhetorical 
judgment is the virtue of decency; and the same analogy—that of the bent ruler—illustrates how 
that virtue works. This similarity justifies my reading of that analogy as a dialectically 
provisional concession to his students’ suppositions: In part 2, Aristotle showed us the 
consequences of making a beginner’s error, of accepting probable arguments from a 
geometrician, or of demanding mathematically precise demonstrations from a rhetorician. Part 3 
shows how the imprecision of rhetorical discourse is no concession to the weakness of 
audiences, but rather a necessary adaptation to the indeterminacy of ethical and political matters, 
and to the specific circumstances of any particular rhetorical situation. 
At the close of part 3 (1.1.11), Aristotle explains what makes pisteis artistic, and justifies 
the claim that enthymeme is the body of persuasion. Appropriately, the argument is itself 
enthymematic—the longest and most complex series of enthymemes yet offered in the treatise—
and engages Aristotle’s readers in the act of judgment that he has just introduced. It is the 
structural counterpart to 1.1.2, which suggested that rhetoric was (or at least might be) an art, and 
of 1.1.7-8, which subtly obscured the technical and legal distinctions between kinds of audiences 
to introduce the notion of rhetorically artistic listening and judging. This passage thus connects 
the “observation” of 1.1.2 with the “judgment” of 1.1.7-8 by arguing that the best preparation for 
a beginning rhetorical artist is to study rhetoric’s antistrophos, dialectic, thereby learning how to 
examine and either confirm or refute another speaker’s arguments.  
Figure 6 lays out the loosely syllogistic structure of this passage. As usual, I enclose tacit 
premises in square brackets, though I concede that there are multiple ways of construing its 
structure. The implicit propositions are as numerous as the explicit ones, and the way that each 
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syllogism leads to the next is largely a matter of the reader’s own determination. Sometimes a 
minor premise becomes a major premise or a conclusion; often, the relationships between terms 
are commonsensical rather than strictly syllogistic. 
Figure 6. Syllogistic rendering of 1.1.11. 
 
I 
a. We most believe (pisteuomen malista) something when we suppose it to have 
been demonstrated.  
b. Artistic method (entechnos methodos) is concerned with proofs (pisteis). 
c.  [Therefore, artistic method is concerned with demonstration.] 
II 
a. Rhetorical demonstration is enthymeme. 
b. Enthymeme is a sort of syllogism. 
c. [Therefore, rhetorical demonstration is a sort of syllogism.] 
III 
a. It is a function of dialectic to see about every syllogism equally. 
b. [IIb.] 
c. [Therefore, it is a function of dialectic to see about enthymeme.] 
IV 
a. [Whoever sees the how the whole arises, also sees how the parts arise.] 
b. [IIb.] 
c. [Therefore, whoever is best able to see how a syllogism arises, is best able to 
see how an enthymeme arises.] 
V 
a. [To be enthymematic is to see how enthymemes arise, and to distinguish them 
from other kinds of syllogisms.] 
b. [IVc.] 
c. Therefore, “he who is best able to see from what materials, and how, a 
syllogism arises would also be most enthymematic—if he grasps also what sort 








a. “It belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and to see what resembles 
the true.” 
b. [The dialectician can see what resembles the true.] 
c. [Therefore, the dialectician can see the true.] 
VIII 
a. Humans have a natural disposition for the true, and to a large extent [their 
common opinions] hit on truth. 
b. [The enthymematic person, who is also a dialectician,] can aim at commonly 
held opinions. 
c. [Therefore, the enthymematic person] has an ability to see and aim at the truth. 
 
 
This passage is dialectically significant primarily because it offers an early description of 
what Aristotle means by “seeing” to endechomenon pithanon. Invention begins when one 
imagines oneself as the audience of a speech and asks, “What would I find persuasive?” 
Aristotle’s use of the first-person plural places his readers in the position of a rhetorical audience 
so that they think about the act of listening and judging. He then moves from observations about 
what “we” do as audiences to a series of inferences about what kinds of arguments are persuasive 
in general. Quite simply, the application of this procedure to particular persuasive situations is, 
for Aristotle, the art of rhetoric; and the treatise will repeat this procedure throughout its 
treatments of topics, logical forms, arrangement, and style. Thus, it is not only true that 
audiences can listen artistically during the persuasive encounter; it is also true that speakers 
practice rhetorically artistic listening, imaginatively, when learning to speak or when preparing a 
speech. 
The passage also engages its reader in the very act that it seeks to describe. In our attempt 
to “see” the structure of Aristotle’s own argument, we discern the features of rhetorical argument 
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in general. When we consider how we would reason or deliberate in response to a persuasive 
speaker, we do not seek perfect syllogisms. Instead, we discover that analogies, metaphors, 
commonsense notions, and implicit premises race ahead of our logical calculus. Such 
propositions, riddled as they are with possible error, nevertheless arrange themselves into a 
roughly syllogistic format and proclaim themselves to be true. The practice of examining such 
propositions and trying to construe their logical relationships makes us into better listeners, and 
therefore better speakers, by building the habit of critical engagement with our own 
presuppositions so that we are ever more aware of our own natural disposition for the true.  
This practice is perhaps analogous to phronēsis, but it is not the same. It is an artistic 
judgment about propositions arranged as enthymemes, and is therefore discursive as well as 
practical. Phronēsis is a virtuous habit of making good judgments about particulars. Like 
phronēsis, rhetorical judgment is developed both through experience and through the conscious 
exercise of reason. Like phronēsis, it is readily available to us in particular circumstances, so that 
we can make judgments quickly (as Aristotle insists rhetorical audiences—like the phrōnimos—
must do). But unlike phronēsis, this form of judgment is primarily exercised through the 
consideration of verbal arguments, which constitute persuasion. Such consideration leads to the 
creation of an artifact—peithō—which is an active state of mind. Thus, rhetorical listening is 
artistic: it is an ability to see and understand the means by which an artifact (persuasion) is 
brought into being. It is not a virtue like phronēsis, which is a mental habit developed for its own 
sake as well as for its good practical effects; rather, this artistic capacity is desirable only in 
relation to the artifact whose production it governs—an artifact that itself is good only in relation 
to a higher good, namely the just, the advantageous, or the beautiful. 
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Better arguments are “by nature . . . more persuasive” (1.1.12) 
It may be tempting to regard 1.1.12 as a contradiction of the two parts that precede it. If 
the rhetorical situation renders audiences susceptible to off-topic appeals, then it cannot be true 
that “the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites” in rhetorical situations, nor 
that “true and better pragmata are by nature always more productive of good syllogisms and, in a 
word, more persuasive.” Yet if 1.1.12 is a third and final pass through the dialectical cycle that I 
have identified, then this comparatively hopeful statement turns out to be a logical next step on 
the way to the definition of rhetoric offered at 1.2.1. It is Aristotle’s most explicit defense of 
rhetoric’s usefulness, and his most pointed justification for the study of rhetoric among 
dialecticians and philosophers. The usefulness of rhetoric, and its worthiness as a subject of 
study, depend on this hopeful view of rhetorical argument, which makes sense only if audiences 
for the most part hit on truth, and are naturally inclined toward deciding what is just and 
expedient in a noble manner, even if they are often incapable of achieving knowledge (epistēmē) 
in the short time afforded them in the rhetorical exchange.  
The transitional sentence to 1.1.12 states again the inadequacy of the rhetorical 
handbooks, adding this time that, while ignoring what is central and treating what is marginal, 
they have focused exclusively on judicial oratory, failing to address a whole genre of the subject 
(deliberative speeches). Chapter 3 will add another genre to the list; but it is worth pointing out 
here that the deficiency of the rhetorical handbooks was not that they focused too little on logic 
or pragmata and too much on audience (dikastes), but rather that they had failed to account for 
the ethical and political seriousness of audiences, and so had focused only on the genres and 
parts of rhetoric that they thought made audiences most vulnerable to illogical appeals. They 
were wrong, even about criminal cases, where persuasion happens through demonstration and 
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not through the application of tricks that excite the emotions and bypass thought. Yet the 
handbook writers’ mistaken notion of their audiences’ pliability has had a larger effect than they 
have realized. Paradoxically, the people who tried to make rhetoric all in all—those for whom 
wisdom and beauty and the world itself are always receding behind a veil of arbitrary nomos and 
self-serving equivocation—artificially restricted the realm of rhetoric to exclude the deliberative 
assembly from its purview, since it is in the ekklēsia that their unscrupulous practices are least 
effective. In other words, to maintain rhetoric’s hegemony and the sophistic premise that logos is 
omnipotent, the sophists had to ignore much of the world to which their speeches referred—
including any rhetorical situations that might give the lie to their cynical theory of language. 
Thus, the sophists’ theoretical inaccuracy about the powers of speech turns out not to have 
enlarged, but rather to have restricted, the purview of the rhetorical art. Aristotle, by seeing more 
clearly the de facto boundaries of a speaker’s power—some of which, to be sure, depend on 
legislation, but most of which depend on the practical judgment and truth-seeing capacity of 
listeners—is able, in consequence, to see rhetoric’s advisory capacity as well as its capacity for 
attack and defense. 
This observation helps to make some sense of the contrast between the next sentence of 
1.1.12—which insists on the superior strength of the true and the just—and its dialectical 
parallels in parts 2 and 3, which emphasized only the artistry of enthymeme. It is on the basis of 
nature (phusis) that truth and justice are stronger. The world itself, including truth and justice, 
exist prior to and regardless of our uses of language. All commonsense audiences discern, though 
they perhaps cannot articulate, this ontological primacy. Such discernment is the basis for an 
audience’s experience of persuasion—that is, for the fact that “we most believe when we believe 
something to have been demonstrated”—and for the fact that enthymeme is in general the 
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strongest of the pisteis.6 The enthymeme is artistic because human beings are naturally disposed 
toward the true, and because we enjoy the activity of deliberation. The activity of an art, 
remember, is to observe or to theorize about the causes of success or failure in bringing about 
something that did not exist before. Logical argument—specifically, enthymeme—is artistic 
because the human mind thinks (for the most part) logically. We can explain how and why an 
enthymeme works because it corresponds to the natural workings of the human mind and 
(roughly) to the world that the human mind seeks to know. Thus, the observation that “the true 
and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites” is revealed as a necessary but previously 
unstated premise for the endoxon assumed by Aristotle’s students: namely, that syllogistic 
argument is artistic while instrumental appeals to the juryman are not. Aristotle’s dialectical 
investigation of this endoxon has revealed that the entire study of rhetoric depends for its 
intelligibility on the premise that people are for the most part good at thinking. 
Now that Aristotle has sketched the relationship between human psychology and 
persuasion, all of the Socratic reasons to suspect rhetoric of flattery or trickery have become 
reasons to study rhetoric and to ennoble the twin practices of public speaking and rhetorical 
listening. Students in the Platonic tradition would always have agreed that it would be “worthy of 
censure” for “judgments not [to be] made in the right way”; but in 1.1.3 and 1.1.9, this censure 
was leveled at speakers, audiences, and the art of rhetoric as such. Now, in 1.12, such censure is 
presumably reserved for those who choose “to persuade what is debased,” and for ethical people 
who leave the city open to sophistic attack by failing to study persuasion. People who would 
never neglect military exercise have nevertheless failed to develop the necessary powers to 
defend themselves and their cities from the unnatural intrusion of debased or unjust speech. 
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Notice that, in this analogy, the act of defense corresponds to the ability to listen and to refute—
not to speak first or to move an audience. 
The third step of Aristotle’s argument—that “speech based on knowledge is teaching,” 
but that “teaching is impossible” with some audiences—parallels Aristotle’s earlier chiding of 
the handbooks for their “appeals to the juryman” and for using the parts of the speech to put the 
judge in a particular frame of mind. Notice how his apparent disdain for appeals to the audience 
has given way to a much more measured claim about the rhetorical situation: Given the 
limitations of time and context, and given that a speaker cannot know whether his or her 
audience is capable of following a full dialectical or scientific demonstration, the speaker should 
not aim to teach, but rather to persuade. This claim, though parallel to the other two, is actually 
directed at the Socratic reply to [e3], and not to [e3] itself. Socrates, Aristotle implies, had 
conflated teaching with rhetoric, first by demanding that Gorgias explain what his speeches are 
about (doctors speak about medicine, shoemakers about shoes), and second by imagining an 
ideal rhetoric at the end of the Phaedrus that would be perfectly tailored to the moral and 
cognitive needs of individual listeners’ souls. While Aristotle does not give up hope that such an 
art of speech may be developed, he finds the Socratic ambition misplaced. Not rhetoric, but 
teaching (whether scientific or dialectical) can achieve these aims. Aristotle has already indicated 
that the art of rhetoric may teach public speakers how to theorize about their own successes or 
failures; and he will later point toward some limited ways in which rhetorical speech may teach 
some audiences; but for now, he is content with the modest claim that rhetoric can pursue the 
good and discern the truth through the study of persuasion. 
The fourth step of the argument parallels Aristotle’s earlier comments about the relative 
strength or weakness of audiences in various rhetorical situations. In the first dialectical pass, at 
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1.1.6, he suggested that all rhetorical audiences (within the limited scope provided by the 
handbooks) were susceptible to appeals to emotion. In the second, he suggested that deliberative 
audiences, who are judging matters that concern themselves, are less susceptible to off-topic 
remarks—and that self-interest combines with their natural ability to judge matters that concern 
themselves to thwart the ambitions of the sophist. Here, on his third pass, he places his own 
readers—aspiring rhetorical artists—in the place of the listener, and asks them to imagine a 
situation in which the need might arise to refute or reject someone else’s unjust uses of speech.  
Further, one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in 
the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what 
is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is 
and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. 
 
Studying both sides of a case serves a theoretical purpose: it helps the student to “see” the real 
state of the case. Such study is also, as it turns out, practical—because, as Aristotle knows, much 
of a rhetorical speaker’s work consists of listening, evaluating, and refuting others’ arguments. It 
is only in listening, then, both to good and to bad arguments, and in judging the differences 
between the two, that the rhetor practices his art in complete fashion. 
One endoxon remains mostly untouched. At this early stage of the dialogue, Aristotle is 
not ready to address the part played by lexis and taxis in artistic rhetoric. He merely wants to 
emphasize in his refutation of [e4] that persuasion occurs through logical demonstration (of a 
particularly rhetorical kind) and not through manipulation. Style and arrangement are, for 
Aristotle, not unimportant; but, like Socrates, he insists that these canons are subordinate to 
logical argumentation and to the consideration of what is best for one’s audience to hear and 
believe. Philologists often claim that book 3, which treats lexis and taxis, is a late appendage to 
the treatise, not at all anticipated by the treatments of topics and means of persuasion in books 1 
and 2.7 Yet, as I have shown, Aristotle will sometimes discipline and restrict a field of 
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knowledge so that it can come into its own. Recognizing the limits of a speaker’s power and 
appreciating the agency of ethically and logically serious audiences helps us to see rhetoric itself 
more expansively. The same will happen with style and arrangement. He has mentioned them in 
chapter 1 as mere “appeals to the juryman,” and has insisted that they are marginal and inartistic. 
Later, though, he will show that, with a proper understanding of audiences’ experience of 
persuasion and judgment, a speaker can think artistically about style and arrangement, too.  
Concluding remarks on rhetoric, dialectic, and sophistry (1.1.13-14) 
This last part of chapter 1 is structurally symmetrical to its opening. In 1.1.1, rhetoric was 
compared to dialectic and, implicitly, to the military art, to show its universal utility: “all people, 
in some way,” defend themselves and attack others with speech. Now, in 1.1.13, the same 
comparison shows not its universality or utility but its honor and distinction: One who cannot 
speak persuasively is even more shameful than one who, due to lack of bodily strength or 
military skill, cannot defend the city as a soldier; and skill at persuasive speaking deserves 
mention alongside “all good things...and most of all...the most useful things, like strength, health, 
wealth, and military strategy,” with the added distinction that the use of words “is more 
characteristic of humans than is the use of the body.”8  
In 1.1.2, Aristotle made the provisional and fallacious claim that we know rhetoric is an 
art because some people simply do succeed at persuasive speaking, and because it is probably 
possible to observe the causes of their success. Now, by contrast, Aristotle claims that rhetoric’s 
“function is not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case, as is true 
in all the other arts,” and that “it is a function of one and the same art to see the persuasive and 
the apparently persuasive.” These claims assume that true statements are ontologically dependent 
on the world that they describe, and that this correspondence between signs and their referents is 
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possible because human beings (whether speaking or listening) are naturally inclined toward the 
true and the good. The “apparently persuasive” refers, simply enough, to arguments that a truth-
loving audience ought not to credit: arguments that are fallacious or deceptive but in some way 
alluring. For Aristotle, then, an audience that has been deceived by a sophist has not been 
persuaded. Manipulation is not persuasion. Such a distinction makes sense of the common 
feeling, after having been duped, that we should have known better. The rhetorical art provides a 
theoretical justification for this feeling, an evaluative language that helps us to discriminate 
between artful and artless arguments, or real and apparent persuasion.  
The beginning of the treatise claimed that rhetoric was the counterpart of dialectic and 
announced Aristotle’s intention to supersede the sophistic Arts of Speech; but it did not 
sufficiently address the differences between dialectic, rhetoric, and sophistry. The terse treatment 
of that problem that closes chapter 1 requires careful parsing. That sophistry is “not a matter of 
ability [dunamei] but of deliberate choice [proairesei]” means that sophistry and rhetorical 
artistry are not in the same category of human thought or action. This distinction, like most 
Aristotelian distinctions, is not simple or straightforward. Aristotle is not saying that there are 
three categories of human being—the sophist, the rhetor, and the philosopher—and that no one 
from any group can claim to be a member of another. (This method of division, best exemplified 
by Plato’s Eleatic stranger, seems out of place in Aristotelian thought.) Nor is Aristotle saying 
that all sophists lack the rhetorical art, or that no rhetorical artist would ever make a sophistic 
argument. Since the rhetorical artist has developed an ability to see both the persuasive and the 
apparently persuasive, it is at least conceivable that she would occasionally choose to use 
specious arguments—though it is an open question whether arguments so employed can 
accurately be described as artistic. Yet Aristotle is also not claiming that the rhetor and the 
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sophist have both acquired the rhetorical art, and that one of them (the sophist) chooses to use it 
unethically—as though a “sophist” were nothing more or less than a morally debased rhetor. 
Perhaps some sophists are also rhetorical artists; yet there are at least some, in Aristotle’s 
reckoning, who are not. He has already emphatically called the sophistic Arts of Speech 
inartistic.  
This problem of nomenclature seems to have arisen from Socrates’ success in 
discrediting the popular rhetoricians of his day. Students in the Socratic tradition might define 
dialectic as an agonistic art that uses inductive and deductive logic to pursue the truth about 
matters of ethics and politics. Dialectic is the verbal art of the morally serious philosopher. The 
sophist, they might judge, is a sort of counterfeit dialectician who diverts people from the path of 
truth for some purpose external to the argument at hand, using equivocation and other tricks to 
twist the natural forms of human thought (induction and deduction) toward absurd conclusions. 
Students in the Socratic tradition understand that some such sophists are more skillful listeners 
and speakers than others. They have met both Gorgias and Polus, both Protagoras and Hippias, in 
a dozen guises. Such people, Aristotle says, share a moral, not an artistic, trait: a willingness to 
use whatever skill they do possess in unscrupulous ways. Sophistry is a matter of prohairesis in 
that the sophist is the one who cares nothing for prohairesis. He shares Callicles’ commitment to 
avoid all ethical commitments whatsoever, and to pursue power, victory, and pleasure without 
bothering about the ultimate good of his audience or the moral good of his actions. This 
nonchalance about the common good, this willingness to try (however effectively or 
ineffectively) to “persuade what is debased,” is the defining characteristic of the sophist. 
Because of Socrates and Plato’s success in painting fifth-century rhetors as sophists, and 
because of Socrates’ claim in the Gorgias that having a conversation (dialegesthai) is more 
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ethically serious and conducive to seeking the truth than “what is called rhetoric” (tēn 
kaloumenēn rhetorikēn), many aspiring dialecticians seem to have dismissed the practice of 
public speaking as a tactic of some less-talented sophists like Polus who cannot bear to answer 
questions or follow a dialectical argument. Yet to call rhetoric an ability to persuade people, or 
(what is worse) an ability to manipulate an audience by making the weaker argument appear 
stronger, is to define the art according to its most debased imitations rather than according to its 
true nature.  
Some arts, to be sure, are ethically neutral: a well-built house may shelter a murderer, and 
a well-made knife kill his victim, through no fault of the builder or the knife grinder, who look 
no further than shelter and sharpness. This division of ethical choice from artistic skill does not 
work so well with rhetoric, however, which deals in words and arguments that are themselves 
ethical or unethical. Building and knife grinding serve the good of the city only to the extent that 
they are employed with good intentions, or in the service of good ends. The good or evil of these 
artifacts’ effects must be judged by ethical and political standards that are no part of the builder’s 
or the knife-grinder’s art. Yet when we judge the ethical and political effects of a persuasive 
speech, we state our judgments as enthymemes—and our enthymemes either praise or blame the 
enthymemes used by the speaker. In other words, the standards by which we judge the ethical or 
unethical uses of rhetorical speech are themselves at least partly rhetorical.   
At this moment in chapter 1, then, Aristotle’s students should be ready to give to rhetoric 
the same status that they have given to dialectic: to treat it as a power of discovering arguments, 
and to admit that those who misuse this power or who imitate its effects in debased ways should 
not affect how the art itself is defined. Like dialectic, rhetoric is naturally inclined toward what is 
true, since its employment of logical form presupposes that the speaker and listener share a 
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natural human orientation toward what is true. Moreover, rhetoric, perhaps even more than 
dialectic, seems to be oriented toward the advantageous, since the very state of mind known as 
persuasion presupposes that one course of action is better than another. Sophistic speech is 
always an abdication of the speaker’s duties as a citizen and neighbor; but insofar as the sophist 
has attained the rhetorical art and can see the difference between persuasive and deceptive 
arguments, valid and invalid syllogisms, his choice to employ the latter is also an intentional 
perversion of artistry.9 
This recapitulation of 1.1.1 thus prepares Aristotle’s students to encounter his new 
definition of rhetoric. This definition will account for rhetoric’s emergent, incipient character; 
tits flexible and theoretical capacities, which enable the rhetor to see what is persuasive in a wide 
variety of contexts; and the ethical orientation of both the speaker and audience. I call the art 
incipient because Aristotle has shown all of the common assumptions about rhetoric to be 
theoretically and practically inadequate. The state of the art as Aristotle finds it is that, while 
public speakers are famous and powerful in Athenian politics, neither those speakers nor the 
sophists who claim to be able to train them can explain what they are doing or why. Like the 
public at large, they seem to define their art according to its most debased, or at any rate its most 
narrowly pragmatic, uses; and such a definition is in Aristotle’s reckoning always deficient. To 
arrive at a more accurate definition, Aristotle has widened the scope of the art to include the act 
of listening. If “it is a function of one and the same art to see the persuasive and the apparently 
persuasive,” then by definition a listener who rejects a speaker’s argument on grounds of formal 
logic or ethical deliberation is, like the speaker, a rhetorical artist.  
Somehow, then, Aristotle has begun to treat rhetoric as a receptive, and not only a 
productive, power. Do all arts consist equally of reception and production? Do all arts involve 
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judgment of others’ works? Or does rhetoric have some special status among the arts, so that the 
hearer of a persuasive speech is artistic in a way that the viewer of a sculpture or the purchaser of 
a house is not? To untangle Aristotle’s teaching on this matter will require a reexamination of the 
definition of rhetoric at Rhetoric 1.2, followed by a reading of select passages on arts in the 




ART AND JUDGMENT IN THE PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS 
Book 1, I have argued, suggests that both speakers and audiences can be rhetorical artists, 
insofar as they discern what is persuasive and distinguish it from what is “apparently 
persuasive.” Moreover, I have suggested that this artistic reciprocity is important for Aristotle’s 
pedagogy: His students are to learn rhetorical artistry by listening to speeches and judging them, 
as well as by practicing their skills as public speakers. Yet even this formulation does not go 
quite far enough in describing the Rhetoric’s commitment to educating rhetorical artists as 
listeners and judges; nor does it clarify the essentially receptive and evaluative character of all 
technai.  
For Aristotle, many so-called “rhetors” are not rhetorical artists, and thinking of such 
speakers as rhetors probably does more harm than good—both to the art of rhetoric and to 
political thought. Public speakers who have learned by knack to move an audience do not 
possess the art of rhetoric; still less have they learned the art of legislation or the science of 
politics. Yet it seems to have been common in Aristotle’s day for polished public speakers to put 
on airs as statesmen, confusing the ability to move an audience with the ability to deliberate 
wisely about law and the common good.1 Capitalizing on this confusion, the sophists treated 
politics as a subdiscipline of rhetoric, hoping to create a kind of institutional legitimacy for 
rhetors as such—men who (they believed) occupied an informal but universally recognized 
public office. Aristotle, by contrast, will define rhetoric as a theoretical capacity, a discipline of 
reasoned discernment about persuasive uses of language. Students in this new discipline will 
observe and enforce boundaries between the study of words and thought, on the one hand, and 
the study of virtue or political constitutions on the other, so that cleverness with words may not 
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be so readily confused with political knowledge or practical wisdom. This new distinction has 
political utility as well as theoretical accuracy. The study of rhetoric might help both speakers 
and audiences to avoid the blameworthy state of affairs that occurs when “judgments (kriseis) are 
not made in the right way.” The study of rhetoric, then, will aid both in judgment of others’ 
arguments and in the making of one’s own counterarguments, so that “it may not escape our 
notice what the real state of the case is,” and “we ourselves may be able to refute if another 
person uses speech unjustly.”2 It is this power to hear, to judge rightly, and (if need be) to refute, 
that justifies the study of rhetoric as an art. These are the reasons why “rhetoric is useful” in 
Aristotle’s estimation: not so that one may gain status in the polis as a well-known rhetor, nor 
even (primarily) so that one may achieve one’s own economic or political objectives through 
persuasion, but so that one may tell truth from falsehood and speak or judge on the side of what 
is true.  
Thus, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle uses the term “art” almost exclusively for the power of 
seeing, of theorizing—and “rhetoric” almost exclusively for a field of inquiry, a discipline. Only 
rarely does “rhetoric” refer to the activity of making speeches.3 “Rhetoric” is not speech making; 
it is a power of seeing and discerning what is (and what should be) persuasive about the common 
good. Phrases like “arts of speech” are always used pejoratively or dismissively to refer to the 
theoretically thin treatments that Aristotle expects his treatise to supersede. Moreover, the 
Rhetoric includes surprisingly few instances of the Greek word rhetor—and in these few cases, it 
is clear that Aristotle is referring to the common usage only for convenience, but that he wishes 
to distinguish that usage from his own. He refers to a persuasive speaker, not as a rhetor, but as a 
legontos; and he frequently elides even this non-technical term, preferring substantive participles 
like dikazomenois (“those who are arguing about justice”) or even active verb forms like 
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sumbouleuonti (“they give advice”).4 Translators tend to obscure this choice by substituting “the 
judicial orator” or “the deliberative speaker” for the verbal form; yet Aristotle seems consciously 
to avoid the formulation “deliberative speaker” so as not to acknowledge any such category of 
person in the polis. There is no such public office, even informally, in Aristotle’s political 
thought. As the first paragraph of the treatise contends, all people try to test and maintain 
arguments; all people accuse and defend, praise and blame, and offer advice. Thus, someone 
speaking in the ekklesia is nothing more than a person offering advice about legislative matters, 
whose advice should be judged by the standards of the common advantage. This lexical 
demotion places all of the artistic emphasis on the quality of the speaker’s advice, and on the 
audience’s judgment of that advice, rather than on the skill or cleverness of the sophistically 
trained speaker. Anyone who has learned rationally to “see” arguments for what they are is a 
rhetorical artist. Someone giving a speech is simply an advisor, praiser, blamer, accuser, or 
defendant. As I have already shown, book 1 minimized the difference between “listener” 
(akroatēs) and “judge” (kritēs) so that Aristotle could examine the activity of persuasion 
whatever the circumstance, treating the activity of “judging” as a broadly human activity and not 
only as a rendering of specific legal decisions in trials and assemblies. A similar lexical choice 
seems to be operative in his use of “speaker” rather than “rhetor,” and in his practice of referring 
to speakers by their particular persuasive acts (advising, praising, blaming, accusing, or 
defending) rather than by their status as rhetors. He thus implies that the art of rhetoric is 
available to any citizen who studies the difference between good advice and bad, and who is 
therefore competent to judge what is or is not persuasive in a given case. 
My reading of these subtle lexical choices in the Rhetoric may seem at odds with much 
plainer treatments of this very question in other treatises. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for 
54 
 
example, Aristotle calls housebuilders and harpists “artists” and says that one learns an art by 
practicing it: by building and playing, not by looking at houses or listening to tunes.5 In the 
Politics, too, Aristotle treats artistry and poiēsis as synonymous, and even goes so far as to 
distinguish making—which is the activity proper to an artist—from judging, which is the 
business of the one who uses the artifact. Users are better judges than makers, he says.6 
Furthermore, there are three statements in Rhetoric 1.2 that seem to contradict my reading. First, 
Aristotle identifies some rhetorical proofs as “artistic” (entechnoi) and others as “inartistic” 
(atechnoi), implying that making or supplying proofs is the activity proper to the rhetorical art. 
Second, he explicitly calls the enthymeme a “rhetorical syllogism” and the paradigm a 
“rhetorical induction,” implying that the art of rhetoric is an ability to produce a particular kind 
of argument. Third, he says that rhetoric, like dialectic, “forms syllogisms,” and that rhetoric and 
dialectic are capacities for supplying words.7 Should we not, then, assume that the art of rhetoric 
is productive of artistic proofs, and of the speeches that use them? Is not the theoretical power of 
rhetoric, like that of any art, a mere preparation for productive activity? And are not the ends of 
the art the same as the ends of production? The Nicomachean Ethics defines technē as “an active 
condition [hexis] involving reason that governs making.”8 Rhetoric, then, would seem to be an 
active condition whereby a speaker, given a certain rhetorical situation, rationally discovers how 
to compose and deliver a speech that persuades his or her audience. By this account, the speaker 
is an artistic rhetor insofar as she applies this theoretical knowledge to a particular rhetorical 
situation. 
This standard account of rhetorical artistry, I will argue, is only partly right. The mistake 
arises, first, from a difficulty in translating the definition of rhetoric at the beginning of chapter 
2, and second, from a failure to observe distinctions between and among technē, noēsis, and 
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poiēsis in the Aristotelian corpus more broadly—a distinction that is part of the Rhetoric’s 
dialectical background. For Aristotle, I will argue, an “art” properly understood is always an 
ability to see, and not only to make. The act of making can be described as “artistic” insofar as it 
is governed by a prior artful noēsis, which in turn depends on the existence of a theoretical power 
in the artist’s own soul. Some proofs are “artistic,” then, not because an artistic rhetor made 
them—surely the inartistic speaker will sometimes happen upon them by chance or habit—but 
because they are the kinds of proofs that an artistic rhetor might be able to “see,” examine, plan, 
design, or judge by artistic standards. Rhetoric, like dialectic, “forms syllogisms” because 
deductive logic is one of the pre-existing patterns of human thought that the rhetorical artist is 
capable of seeing and understanding. A listener who discerns the valid or fallacious syllogistic 
structure of a speaker’s arguments is forming syllogisms—and therefore exercising the rhetorical 
art—no less than the speaker.  
That the Physics and Metaphysics teach and maintain this sharp distinction between 
technē and poiēsis has not always been sufficiently understood and emphasized.9 Yet nothing 
other than this theoretical background could justify Aristotle’s claim early in the Rhetoric not 
only that the activity of an art is observation, but also that “everyone” (that is, everyone in his 
discursive community) would agree with this premise. Art is not the same as making. There are 
inartistic makers, and there are artists who make nothing. 
Starting Again, as it Were from the Beginning 
The first paragraph of Rhetoric 1.2 offers Aristotle’s new, yet still provisional, definition 
of rhetoric, along with an explanation of this art’s relationship to other arts and sciences. 
Strikingly, it says nothing about writing or delivering persuasive speeches. To the extent that it 
identifies an artifact associated with rhetoric, that artifact is persuasion—not a particular kind of 
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speech. It is this focus on persuasion itself, and not on the form or content of the oration, that 
makes rhetoric a unique art. 
Let rhetoric be an ability [dunamis], in each case, to see the available means of 
persuasion [to endechomenon pithanon]. This is the function (ergon) of no other art; for 
each of the others is instructive [didaskalikē] and persuasive [peistikē] about its own 
subject: for example, medicine about health and disease and geometry about the 
properties of magnitudes and arithmetic about numbers and similarly in the case of the 
other arts and sciences. But rhetoric seems to be able to observe the persuasive 
[dunasthai theorein to pithanon] about “the given,” so to speak. That, too, is why we say 
it does not include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus.10 
 
Strangely, though Aristotle earlier claimed that rhetorical speeches only persuade, and do not 
teach, this passage states unequivocally that the rhetorical art is instructive. How are we to 
understand this apparent contradiction?  
If an art is an ability to see, then there is no paradox. Perhaps persuasive speeches do not 
teach their audiences, except in rare cases and limited ways; but a master craftsman in the art of 
rhetoric, like any art, can teach the art’s practices and impart its theoretical capacities to new and 
emerging artists.11 Each art, the passage says, is both “instructive and persuasive” (didaskalikē 
kai peistikē) about its own subject. Presumably, medicine instructs doctors and persuades 
patients—perhaps instructing some particularly teachable patients, too—about health and 
disease. It is hard to see how the geometrician or arithmetician, his other two examples, would 
persuade anyone of anything, since geometry and arithmetic deal with logically necessary 
premises and conclusions. Such disciplines would seem to be in the realm of epistēmē rather than 
technē. Yet the point seems to be that, while sciences instruct, and arts may either instruct or 
persuade, each art and each science has a discernible boundary of expertise. It instructs or 
persuades only about its own subject. Part of the artist’s development consists of the ability to 
find and observe that boundary.  
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It would be easy to elide the phrase “able to observe” and to conclude that, while 
medicine is instructive and persuasive about health, rhetoric is instructive and persuasive about 
“the given.” Yet this reading would involve Aristotle in a fatal contradiction that he is laboring to 
avoid. “The given” is a stand-in phrase for whatever political, economic, or legal circumstances 
happen to be present in the rhetorical situation. Speeches can be persuasive about such matters; 
but surely, in Aristotle’s account, the art of rhetoric is not instructive about them. If it were, then 
the rhetor would be a polymath. This, again, is the error of the sophists: subjecting the study of 
politics to the study of rhetoric, thus distorting both disciplines. 
Aristotle’s careful wording should dispel such confusion. The definition at 1.2.1 creates a 
parallel with what was “instructive and persuasive” in the other arts. As an art—that is, as an 
ability to see—rhetoric has a unique relationship both to knowledge and to persuasion. It is “able 
to observe the persuasive” about “the given.” Its power of observation runs parallel to the other 
arts’ instructiveness: just as medicine is instructive about health, rhetoric is observant about to 
pithanon. Rhetoric does not instruct about “the given”; it instructs speakers and listeners about 
what would be, or perhaps what should be, persuasive in a given context. The facts of the case—
“the given”—must be obtained by other means: by studying politics, economics, war, 
jurisprudence, natural philosophy, or ethics. Aristotle’s coming treatment of the special topics, as 
I will show, models how the rhetorical artist discerns these disciplinary boundaries and 
determines what further investigations—usually in other disciplines—are necessary for one who 
wants to speak or listen well. Rhetoric theorizes about which of these investigations will be 
necessary or beneficial for the persuasive speaker and her audience.  
These distinctions have also been obscured by the standard translation of to pithanon as 
“the means of persuasion.” This English formulation is ubiquitous and therefore ineradicable 
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from Aristotelian rhetorical studies; and, frankly, it is probably the most convenient way to 
approximate Aristotle’s meaning. However, the phrase “means of persuasion” has led to much 
misunderstanding—primarily about the relationship between means and ends in the rhetorical 
art. 
Quite simply, this passage says nothing about “means” of persuasion, and therefore it 
does not imply that persuasion is an “end” that the rhetorical artist hopes to achieve. To pithanon 
is a substantive adjective phrase meaning, simply, “the persuasive [things]”—whether those 
things are means or (proximate) ends. In 1.1.3, Aristotle will identify the ultimate ends of 
persuasive speech, and the rest of the treatise will explore the ways that speakers achieve those 
ends. Both the means and the ends of persuasive speech fall within the theoretical purview of the 
rhetorical artist. Rhetoric is an art of seeing not only what is persuasive, but also why it is 
persuasive; not only how people persuade and are persuaded, but also what ends speakers and 
audiences hope to achieve (and should hope to achieve) by hearing and speaking to one another.  
How has this mistranslation become so common in discussions of rhetoric? The semantic 
limitations of modern English may be to blame: frankly, “the persuasive” would cause even 
more confusion among English readers than does “means of persuasion.”12 Perhaps, too, the 
mistake arises from the common but mistaken assumption that the Rhetoric is a training manual 
for persuasive speakers, who want above all to know how to achieve their aims, however unwise 
or unethical, in the city. Yet I suspect that the mistranslation’s popularity also has something to 
do with the much-misunderstood relationship between rhetoric and phronēsis. 
There is an ongoing debate about Aristotle’s claim in the Nicomachean Ethics that we do 
not deliberate about ends (peri tōn telōn), but only about the means of achieving them (peri tōn 
prōs ta telē).13 Both the Ethics and the Politics offer dialectical investigations of the ends of 
59 
human life, so the claim that we do not deliberate about ends has struck some commentators as 
inimical to Aristotelian thought. However, as Daniela Cammack rightly observes, deliberation is 
not synonymous with reason or thought; it is, rather, “a subcategory of reason.” To say that we 
do not deliberate about ends is not to say that we cannot think about them.14 
Deliberation, the mental activity proper to the virtue of phronēsis, concerns the best 
means of bringing about ends that are within our power and that we have already decided are 
good. Other human faculties may discover the proper ends of human life, or even interrogate 
received wisdom about those ends. We may search for (zeteō), discover and define (horizō), or 
even theorize about (theoreō) those ends; but when we deliberate (bouleuomai) about them, we 
are taking the ends as given and seeking the best means of achieving them. The difference 
between these ways of reasoning arises from the difference in their subject matter. The ends of 
human life are given by nature. They may be discovered and understood—perhaps not by just 
anyone, but by a wise legislator or philosopher—but even for the legislator, the ends of human 
life are not subject to manipulation. Whatever a philosopher may claim or a legislator seek to 
enforce, it will never be the case that human beings do better without health than with it, or 
without justice than with it, or that we will rightly prefer what is harmful to what is 
advantageous. The means of staying healthy or of achieving a just society—and the particular 
material composition of a healthy body or a just constitution—will depend on myriad 
contingencies of time and place. We deliberate about these means, not about the ends they serve. 
By contrast, arts are powers of seeing both means and ends. An artifact, after all, is not 
desirable in itself; it is a proximate end on the way to the achievement of some ultimate one. An 
art is an ability to see a whole chain of efficient causes that will lead to the creation of an artifact 
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whose material and formal causes (which are also seen by the artist) will serve some end outside 
itself. 
Chapter 3 of the Rhetoric will illustrate just how the rhetorical artist should go about 
discovering the ends of various genres of speech, considering how and why those ends ought to 
guide her own speaking and listening. The definition of rhetoric at 1.2 leaves room for such 
investigations, first by using a form of the verb theoreō rather than the verb bouleuomai, and 
second by using two substantive adjectives in the accusative case (to endechomenon pithanon) 
rather than a noun like logos. Translating to endechomenon pithanon as “the available means of 
persuasion” implies that persuasion is the ultimate end of rhetorical speech, that rhetoric has no 
purpose outside moving an audience in whatever direction the speaker may desire, and that the 
art of rhetoric is limited to deliberations about the means of achieving this end. This, again, is a 
mistake of the sophists. For Aristotle, persuasion is a proximate end that exists for the sake of 
other goods—just as a house, the proximate end of the builder’s art, exists for the sake of shelter 
and comfort. To see and reason about these ends is surely part of the master builder’s art, though 
shelter and comfort must be defined and understood in terms that do not belong to carpentry. In 
parallel fashion, seeing and reasoning about the ends of persuasion is part of the rhetorical art, 
though it would take more than rhetorical skill to understand those ends in complete fashion. It is 
true, as Aristotle says in the Ethics, that no rhetor deliberates about whether or not to persuade an 
audience. All public speakers desire to persuade; they deliberate about how to do so.15 Yet the 
theoretical power of technē includes more than the activity of deliberation. The artist sees not 
only the material and efficient causes of an artifact but also its formal and final causes. If rhetoric 
sees the available means of persuasion, it also sees persuasion as a means of achieving what is 
advantageous, beautiful, or just. 
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That the theoretical power of rhetoric asks such questions about the common good, and 
not only about instrumental effectiveness, will be clear from my coming analysis of chapter 3 
and of the special topics. Yet even the first two chapters of the Rhetoric give no reason to 
suppose that Aristotle regards to pithanon as means of achieving a change in the audience’s mind 
or feeling. In his discussions of persuasive speech, “persuasive things” (to pithanon) are never to 
be contrasted with unpersuasive (or ineffective) things, as one might expect if they were mere 
“means.” Book 1 does not claim that previous treatises have given only ineffective methods of 
persuasion, while the current treatise will provide effective ones. Instead, in 1.1.14, Aristotle 
places “the persuasive” in opposition to “the apparently persuasive,” just as he placed “the true” 
in opposition to “what resembles the true” in 1.1.11. It is important to notice the similarity of 
language between the two passages, and to ponder the implications of the phrase “apparently 
persuasive” (phainomenon pithanon) in context of Aristotle’s discussion of sophistry. Here is the 
passage from 1.1.11: 
It is clear that he who is best able to see from what materials, and how, a syllogism arises 
would also be most enthymematic—if he grasps also what sort of things an enthymeme is 
concerned with and what differences it has from a logical syllogism; for it belongs to the 
same capacity both to see the true and [to see] what resembles the true [to te gar alēthes 
kai to homoion tō alēthei tēs autēs esti dunameos idein]. 
 
The similarity of language in 1.1.14 is striking:  
 
That rhetoric, therefore, does not belong to a single defined genus of subject but is like 
dialectic and that it is useful is clear—and that its function is not to persuade but to see 
the available means of persuasion in each case [alla to idein ta huperchonta pithana peri 
hekaston], as is true also in all the other arts […] It is a function of one and the same art 
to see the persuasive and [to see] the apparently persuasive [pros de toutois hoti tēs autēs 
to te pithanon kai to phainomenon idein pithanon]. 
 
Dialectically, the two passages above are parallel treatments of rhetoric’s central ethical 
problem: the ability of clever speakers to outwit and deceive gullible audiences. (It is in 1.1.14 
that Aristotle will call sophistry a matter of prohairesis and not of technē.) Yet the movement 
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from 1.1.11 to 1.1.14 illustrates an important and often overlooked feature of Aristotle’s 
nomenclature. Given the similarity of the passages, it would seem that, in dialectical and 
rhetorical arguments, which treat the indeterminate matters of politics and ethics, “the 
persuasive” and “the true” are near synonyms. The power to distinguish “the persuasive” from 
“the apparently persuasive” is analogous, or perhaps even equivalent (in these circumstances) to 
the power to distinguish “the true” from “the apparently true.”  
Obviously, Aristotle is not claiming, like Callicles or Thrasymachus, that “the true” is the 
arbitrary name we give after the fact to whatever argument ends up prevailing. Audiences may 
follow their passions into error, or reason incorrectly, and so judge foolishly. But a trained 
rhetorician or dialectician can distinguish valid deductions and inductions from invalid ones, and 
well-grounded premises from groundless ones. A valid argument produces persuasion; an invalid 
one only apparent persuasion. In Aristotle’s nomenclature, then, “persuasion” refers only to the 
state of mind that occurs when an audience judges a valid argument to be worthy of support. If a 
hidden or tacit premise is incompatible with that audience’s well-grounded opinions about the 
just or the advantageous, or if a speaker’s deductions are equivocal or otherwise formally invalid 
(and therefore false enthymemes), then persuasion has not occurred. Such a fallacious argument 
may appeal to a corrupt audience; such an audience may even claim to have been persuaded; but 
they are, in Aristotle’s estimation, mistaken about their own state of mind. They have been 
moved, tricked, or deceived, not persuaded.16 
The state of mind called “persuasion,” then, is not a neutral one as regards the truth of the 
case or the moral and political good of the audience. Persuasion is yoked to the best available 
common opinions about ethics and politics, and to the inherently logical character of argument. 
Because of the limitations of the rhetorical situation, even good audiences listening to good 
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speakers may go wrong in their judgments. They must render those judgments quickly, and with 
limited information; and the pragmata about which they are deliberating are not knowable in the 
same way that arithmetic is knowable. Under such constraints, a good speaker and good audience 
can at best hope to reason validly about the matter at hand, and to choose a course of action that 
reaches as far toward the just or the advantageous as their limited powers will allow. Their 
judgment will always be imperfect, and may even be seen as foolish with the benefit of 
hindsight. To admit this fallibility, as Aristotle does both in the Rhetoric and in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, is in no way to stipulate that the art of rhetoric lacks the power to reason about its own 
ends or that it must be content to choose between various means of affecting an audience’s state 
of mind. To theorize about to pithanon is to learn to judge between what an audience should or 
should not believe, given certain facts and circumstances. It is to learn to distinguish between 
valid persuasion and invalid persuasion, knowing (as we must) that even what is truly and rightly 
persuasive may turn out to have been an imperfect choice. If studying arithmetic enables one to 
distinguish between what is true and what only seems to be true about number, then studying 
rhetoric enables one to distinguish between what is persuasive and what only seems to be 
persuasive about ethics and politics.17 
What, then, is the place of deliberation in rhetorical theory? The rhetorical artist, 
observing rhetorical situations, notices that human beings argue and debate about such matters as 
politics and ethics, and sees that these are the same matters about which we deliberate. The best 
speeches, then, will mimic the best kind of deliberation, and will invite audiences to be 
persuaded by the public deliberations of the speaker.18 Further, it is clear that speakers must 
deliberate ahead of time, not only about the matters at hand, but about which arguments to 
present, and how best to present them. All of these matters are within our control. Audiences, 
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too, should deliberate as much as they can ahead of time, learning what they can about the case 
and deciding what kinds of knowledge and arguments they should expect to hear from each 
speaker. In these limited ways, the art of rhetoric is deliberative, and akin to (though distinct 
from) the virtue of phronēsis. Yet rhetoric’s theoretical power reasons about ends as well as 
about means. It sees in advance that the ends of all persuasive speech are the advantageous, the 
just, and the beautiful; and it discloses, in enthymematic form, what is just, advantageous, or 
noble in a given case. This reasoning about ends is an important feature of rhetoric’s power to 
see to pithanon and to distinguish it from to phainomenon pithanon. 
Art, Nature, and Causality (Physics and Metaphysics) 
These receptive and evaluative powers, I will now argue, are not unique to the art of 
rhetoric. Every art, in Aristotle’s estimation, is a kind of observational acuity by which the artist 
renders judgments about the quality or usefulness of artistic productions. This definition of 
artistry in no way hinders or abridges the common association of artistry with making. Instead, 
Aristotle situates the act of making within a larger field of artistic reasoning, thus explaining the 
commonly observed phenomenon that the best makers are often unable to describe or discuss 
their work, much less to teach others how to develop as artists, whereas people who seem to have 
the best understanding of an art are sometimes less successful as makers. It has often been 
observed that, for Aristotle, not every maker is an artist; only the one who can give a rational 
account of her own production has obtained the theoretical power that Aristotle calls technē. Yet, 
as I will argue, it is equally true that not every artist is a maker. Some possess the theoretical 
capacity but not the practical or poetic know-how. Indeed, the one who possesses the art in the 
most complete and self-sufficient fashion—the master craftsman of Metaphysics 1.1—is defined, 
not as the best maker, but as the best theorist: the one who knows and can explain an artifact’s 
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four causes. Seeing this distinction in the Physics and the Metaphysics will lend credence to my 
claim that all arts are theoretical, and that Aristotle maintains an important distinction between 
artistry and production. 
Of course, neither the Physics nor the Metaphysics is primarily about technē. Rather, in 
each treatise, the discussion of art is pedagogically necessary for the theoretical treatment of two 
other subjects: thinghood and causality. Comments on art are meant, first of all, to distinguish 
contingent things that come to be “by nature” from those that come to be “not by nature”; and, 
second, to provide an easily understandable rubric for causality, which he can then apply to the 
study of natural things or eternal things. Because human beings come to know things first of all 
by experience and imitation, and only second by dialectical or theoretical investigation, and 
because Aristotle’s readers are likely more familiar with the process of making artificial things—
say, houses and beds and ship rudders—than they are with the coming-to-be of natural things or 
the unchanging subsistence of eternal things, it makes sense for Aristotle to treat the causes of 
artificial products (beds and rudders) alongside those of naturally occurring things (trees and 
human beings), and to infer from this comparison an etiological rubric that comprehends both the 
natural and the artificial (and, he hopes, the metaphysical or eternal). It turns out that the causes 
of natural things are analogous to the already-familiar causes of artifacts. So the discussion of art 
is a pedagogically necessary and dialectically shrewd step on the road to understanding physics 
and metaphysics. It is not, even in the Physics and Metaphysics, meant to be a comprehensive or 
perfect description of artistry as such. We should therefore understand each of these expositions 
as incomplete and provisional, and should notice both the subtle differences between the 
treatises’ treatments of technē and the dialectical revisions internal to each treatise. The use of 
“art” to refer to performance or production is, for Aristotle, a commonplace that must sometimes 
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be adopted when discussing a different topic; but it is not the best or most precise way to use the 
term, and the two treatises will gradually revise this usage as Aristotle clarifies the mental 
activities common to all people whom we call artists.  
To begin, then, the Physics divides all “things that are” into things that are by nature, and 
those that are “not by nature.”19 At first, Aristotle is content to equate the phrase “not by nature” 
with the phrase “by art,” assuming the common definition of art as production.20 Anything, then, 
that comes about by human activity or skill, and not by nature, is a product of art. Yet even here, 
Aristotle begins to refine the common usage. He clarifies that the habit of referring to things 
themselves as “nature” and as “art”—calling a tree “nature,” for example, or a sculpture “art”—
is imprecise and unhelpful. These are things, he says, which come about by nature and by art, 
respectively; they are not themselves either nature or art. This distinction is the first dialectical 
step by which Aristotle begins to distinguish art from production. 
The first observable difference between the natural and the unnatural has to do with the 
source of motion or of rest. Things that come about by nature “have in themselves a source of 
motion or of rest,” while things that come about by art have no such innate impulse. To be sure, 
the wood out of which a bed is made is an unchangeable given; it simply is what it is. But any 
changes wrought in the wood, changes on account of which it becomes a bed and not merely a 
log or a plank, come from some agent outside the material. Trees, by contrast, grow and change 
as they do because of an internal and inherent motivating force; and that source of motion simply 
is what it means to be a tree. “Nature,” then, as opposed to art, is “a certain source and cause of 
being moved and of coming to rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not 
incidentally.”21 Thus, when we talk about “nature,” we are talking more about form than about 
material: the distinction between tree and bed is not primarily a material distinction, since in a 
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certain way both may be made of oak or of pine, but rather a formal distinction: the tree grows 
and shapes itself according to its own internal source of motion, whereas the bed is shaped by 
some external agent.22 
From this contrast, Aristotle infers his famous four causes, or reasons for a thing’s being 
what it is. A bed and a table may both be made of pine logs; but each has its own formal cause,  
since each comes to be what it is by taking its own particular shape. Similarly, each has its own 
efficient causes (that is, their own sources of motion): the tree’s efficient causes inhere in itself 
and can be found in the tree’s earliest manifestation as a seedling. The bed, however, has 
external efficient causes, including the art of carpentry, a particular carpenter, and a particular 
series of actions (cutting and joining). The final cause, or telos, is different, too. For the natural 
thing, the final cause is simply to be what it is. Form (eidos) is end (telos). The carpenter, in 
making the bed, has an aim other than simply being a carpenter: a finished bed is the aim of the 
act of making. The bed, too, has an aim other than being itself: it is meant to support comfortable 
sleep. Thus, artificial things are distinguishable from natural things by the relationship among the 
four causes. For a natural thing, the form is the end, and the efficient cause is a member of the 
same species (say, a parent). The natural thing’s very thinghood is indistinguishable from its 
form and its telos. By contrast, a thing is recognizably artificial if some external agent has 
brought form to bear on matter, for the sake of at least two external ends: the production of an 
artifact, and someone’s future use or enjoyment of that artifact.  
For easy reference, I reproduce the four causes with their conventional (post-Aristotelian, 
Latin) names below. The examples I provide are from the Physics. Note that the formal cause is 
not merely the shape of the artifact or of the natural thing. Rather, Aristotle insists that the form 
of a thing simply is what it means to be that thing: to be a tree is to have the form of a tree; to be 
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a bed is to have the form of a bed. Thus, a bed may be made of stone or of metal and still be 
recognizable as a bed; and a wide variety of plants, though different in material, may all be easily 
and correctly designated as “trees” because of their similarity of form. Moreover, a carved 
replica of a tree is not actually a tree (though it shares a tree’s shape and may even be made of 
wood). Thus, for Aristotle, the thing itself is separable from its form only in speech. What we 
call the “form” is simply a description in human language of what it is to be that thing. The 
formal cause of a thing is included in its definition.  
Figure 7. Aristotle’s four causes (Physics 193a-195b). 
Cause Example 
Material: “That out of which something 
comes into being.” 
bronze statue, silver bowl (194b 25); 
letters of syllable, parts of whole, 
hypotheses for conclusion (195a 15). 
Formal: “the form or pattern, and this is 
the gathering in speech of the what-it-is-
for-it-to-be” (194b 28). 
number, or 2:1 ratio, for octave; syllable 
for letters; whole for parts; conclusion for 
hypotheses (195a 20). 
Efficient: “The beginning of change or of 
rest” (194b 30). 
legislator of law; father of child; maker of 
made thing; art of sculpture for statue. 
Final: “that-for-the-sake-of-which;” “the 
best thing and the end of the other things” 
(195a 25). 
health for walking around. 
being a tree for a tree. 
shelter for a house. 
 
Efficient causes, especially of artifacts, are not always so neatly tied to thinghood. 
Aristotle notes that for any given thing, there may be innumerable proximate causes between the 
original mover and the product. It may take many remedies, for example, administered in a 
particular order, for a sick person to get healthy, and the regimen is likely to differ depending on 
both the doctor and the patient. The medical art is the first mover, the first efficient cause, of 
healing; but a particular doctor, and each of that doctor’s particular recommendations, are also to 
be understood as efficient causes on the way to health. The definition of health need not include 
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these efficient causes, as they are external to health itself. However, when a thing or state of 
being has been brought about by art, the art itself is always the prior and ultimate cause: 
It is necessary always to seek out the ultimate cause of each thing. [...] For example, a 
man builds because he is a builder, but is a builder because of the housebuilder’s art; this, 
then, is the prior cause, and thus with everything.23 
 
This claim seems to create a difficulty in describing what happens when an inartistic maker, 
working by habit according to experience, produces a beautiful or useful artifact without 
understanding or being able to explain what led to her success. When such a person succeeds in 
building a house, the house still seems to have come about by art—or at least not to have come 
about by nature; but surely the housebuilder’s art was not the house’s first efficient cause.  
How, then, does Aristotle account for the causes of success among inartistic makers? He 
does so by treating some causes as “potential” and others as “at-work.” Until a builder starts 
building, she is only a potential, not a kinetic (or at-work) cause of a house’s coming to be. Once 
she starts building, she is a cause “at work.”24 Yet even while she builds, the art remains only a 
potential cause with respect to the house. The art does not make the house; the builder does. If 
the art itself is ever at-work, it is at-work with respect to the builder—that is, by making the 
builder into an artist (or into a better one). This distinction enables Aristotle to account for the 
artist him- or herself as a work-in-progress: a given builder may not possess the expertise to plan 
his or her work artistically, but may be developing that expertise through imitation of other 
builders, or by repeating effective techniques that she has discovered in the past. We become 
better artists, says the Nicomachean Ethics, not merely by practicing the activity of making, but 
by doing so under the guidance of an expert teacher who can ensure that we develop the right 
habits and draw the right inferences and generalizations about the causes of our success.25 A 
builder under such tutelage is not “finished,” so to speak; the art, for this builder, is still 
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incipient, and is not the original cause of her success; but it is at work on her soul, and is making 
her into an artist as she reflects on her own practice and that of others.  
Notice that Aristotle is not saying that the inartistic builder possesses the art potentially, 
and the artistic builder actually; rather, he is saying that, for the artistic builder, the 
housebuilder’s art is the original cause of the excellent house, but only insofar as the art is 
responsible for that housebuilder’s own status as an artist. The housebuilder actually brings the 
house into being, and is the active efficient cause while she is doing so. With respect to the 
house, the art is only ever a potential efficient cause. This distinction is observable, says 
Aristotle, in the temporal relationships between the maker, the thing made, and the art itself:  
What is at work and particular is and is not at the same time as that of which it is the 
cause, as this one healing with this one being cured or this one building with this being 
built, but not always so with what is potential. The house and the house-builder are not 
finished off simultaneously.26 
 
Thus, there is a difference between how arts and artists cause things to come into being, and how 
arts or artists themselves come into being. Non-natural things come into being, either by art or 
not by art, when a person engages in the activity of making. In either case, the at-work efficient 
cause is the maker. In the case of an artistic maker, there is an additional, prior, efficient cause: 
that is, the art, which is a reasoned conception of what the product should be, of what ends it 
should achieve, and of how it should come about. This art is active with respect to the maker, 
since it is on account of this art that the maker is an artist; but it is only a potential cause (though 
the original one) with respect to the artifact, since the builder herself initiates the first motion that 
brings form to bear on material. 
An oft-quoted passage in the Metaphysics, which describes how an artistic maker 
produces an artifact, preserves this distinction between art and making and provides some 
clarification as to how a technē can function as an efficient cause of an artifact’s coming to be 
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while remaining merely potential, and never at-work, with respect to that artifact. The Physics, 
remember, distinguished between natural and unnatural things, but did not describe how artistic 
making differed from non-artistic making. The Metaphysics picks up the discussion by drawing a 
further distinction among “products,” or things that come about by activity and not by nature. 
“All products [poiēseis],” says Aristotle, “result from art [apo technēs], or from aptitude [apo 
dunameōs], or from thinking [apo dianoias].”27 Those resulting from art are those “whose forms 
are in the soul” of the maker. Further, the particular art possessed by that maker simply is the 
form of the thing to be made: “the medical art is the form of health, and the house building art is 
the form of a house.” A moment’s reflection on this claim, in context of the above discussion of 
the Physics, reveals its importance as a lynchpin for Aristotle’s other observations about art: 
because the formal cause of any thing simply is what it is for that thing to be, and because the 
artist is the one who understands the artifact in all of its causes and parts, the art is nothing more 
than the form of the artifact as it exists in the soul of the artist. Further, because “form” is 
distinguishable from the thing itself only in speech, the artist is the one who can give a speech 
about the artifact. This definition of “art” explains why the artist is the one who can provide a 
reasoned account of what is to be built, how, and why. 
How, then, does art affect making? In what sense does an artifact come about apo 
technēs? One might expect Aristotle to say that the maker actuates the art, or makes the art an at-
work cause rather than a potential cause, in her act of making. But he never says so. Rather, he 
divides the productive motion—that is, the motion by which something comes to be “not by 
nature”—into two reciprocal acts: thinking [noēsis] and making [poēsis]. The artistic maker 
begins by thinking about the form and end of the desired artifact, and then reasons backwards 
through a series of efficient causes “to that which, at last, one is capable (dunatai) oneself of 
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making.” So the artist thinks about an entire sequence of efficient causes and effects before 
actuating those causes in the material. “From that point on,” Aristotle says, “the motion [kinēsis] 
is called production [poiein].” The maker thinks about what to do, and then performs those acts 
in reverse order, causing the desired effects that were the starting-point of the artist’s thought.28  
Aristotle thus introduces a distinction between three terms that are often conflated in 
common speech, and that had even been conflated early in the Physics and the Metaphysics. 
1. Art (technē) is an always-potential “form” of an artifact in the artist’s soul. The 
medical art is the form of health. It provides the artist with the ability to see, or 
perhaps to foresee, what will (or should) be made. 
2. Thought (noēsis) is the mental activity whereby the artist discerns what steps would 
be necessary to produce an imagined effect or artifact. Note that, while an artistic 
maker engages in such thought for the sake of making, there is no indication in the 
text that such thought must be followed by making to be artistic.  
3. Making (poēsis) is the introduction of formal changes to some material, so that the 
material becomes an artifact. In any process of making, the first such act—drawing a 
saw across the first board—is the first in a series of proximate efficient causes, on 
account of which the builder is the first at-work efficient cause of the artifact’s 
coming to be.  
Thus, it is only in the case of an artistic maker that “health comes about from health, and a house 
from a house.” Insofar as the process is artistic, the artifact results from art (apo technēs) because 
its original efficient cause is the form of health or of a house—a form in the maker’s soul that 
exists before, and therefore can guide, the productive work. But that form, artistic and ensouled, 
is always potential, never active, with respect to the artifact. The doctor is active in bringing 
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about health in the patient’s material body, the builder in bringing about a house in the material 
world.  
An inartistic maker possesses no such form in his or her soul; so, for the thing that results 
from inartistic making, the original efficient cause is the maker him- or herself. Such things, we 
must infer, come about from aptitude or from thinking, but not from art. (We have seen that, for 
the artist, both thinking and aptitude are operative, but they are guided by the form of the artifact 
in the artist’s soul. Art, rather than being one of three ways that things come to be, turns out to 
unite the other two according to a coherent understanding of causality.) In many cases, though, 
the house is being built by an artist who is still emerging, still in progress as an artist. Perhaps 
she builds a house according to a template, and stops building once she has completed the 
prescribed steps: Thus, as Aristotle says, the active efficient cause ceases to be at work at 
precisely the moment that the artifact is finished being built. But the art itself is at work on the 
builder as she reflects on her finished house, compares and contrasts it with other buildings, 
remembers what went well and what did not, consults with a master craftsman, and plans how 
future houses might be built. “Knowledge and art,” Aristotle says in the Metaphysics, “result 
from experience, for experience makes art”; but art is perfected only when, “out of many 
conceptions from experience, one [generalization] arises from those that are similar.”29 A maker 
becomes an artist, then, not only by making, but by thinking about the artifact and making 
generalizations about its properties. It is not at all clear from the Metaphysics that such 
generalizations concern only one’s own works of art: the conceptions come about “from 
experience,” and the universal judgment arises from works that “are similar”—either in their 
success or in their failure. In fact, there are artists who lack experience as makers—who have 
learned to categorize artifacts, to explain their causes, and to infer general principles of 
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excellence, but who either do not or cannot heal particular patients or build particular houses. 
The existence of such ineffective makers and practitioners proves that, for Aristotle, an “art” is 
not necessarily a process of learning to make. Technē and poiēsis are different. (See Figure 8.) 
Figure 8. Efficient causes of any thing’s coming to be, not by nature. 
 
By Art Not by Art 
 
Original (potential) efficient cause:  
Art, which is the form of the artifact in 
the artist’s soul. 
 
Original (potential) efficient cause:  
None 
First at-work efficient cause: 
Artistic maker, who begins working 
only after thinking and planning a 
series of acts to bring about a desired 
form and end. 
 
First at-work efficient cause: 
Inartistic maker, who begins working 
according to habit or imitation, but who does 
not understand how the series of actions will 
lead to any particular form or end. 
 
Subsequent at-work efficient causes: 
A series of changes wrought on the 
material according to a rational plan 
discerned by thought (noēsis) and 
communicable in speech (logos).  
 
Subsequent at-work efficient causes: 
A series of changes wrought on the material 
according to a knack gained by experience, 
which never rises to the level of hexis 
because it is not governed by reason or 
communicable in speech. 
 
 
Perhaps the mere critic, the observer and evaluator of artifacts, possesses the art in an 
incomplete sense, and is deficient with respect to the art; but Aristotle never says so. He admits 
that such a person is a worse maker than an experienced artisan, and that only the experience of 
particulars will lead him or her to improve as a maker. Yet the “master craftsman” (architechtōn) 
rightly receives greater honor and regard than the artisan (cheirotechnēs), not because we 
compare their products and find the master craftsman’s to be superior, but because the master 
craftsman has superior knowledge and wisdom. 
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Problems with Art and Judgment in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics 
We are now in a position to deal with some apparently contrary suggestions in the 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, where arts are treated mainly as productive hexeis and not 
as theoretical dunameis. The Ethics distinguishes between “three kinds of things that come to be 
present in the soul”: pathei (feelings), dunameis (powers or capacities), and hexeis (active 
conditions). Both the virtues and the vices, it turns out, are species of hexis, and are neither 
feelings nor powers; they are moral postures toward one’s feelings and powers, so that one feels 
and acts rightly. Powers and feelings, which are instantiated in one’s choices, become habits; and 
a habit, once it has become a stable part of one’s character which one chooses knowingly and for 
its own sake, becomes a hexis or active condition. 
In book 6 of the Ethics, Aristotle defines “art” as “an active condition involving true 
rational understanding that governs making.”30 This definition seems to contradict Aristotle’s 
claim that rhetoric, an art, is a theoretical dunamis. Perhaps art, as a hexis, governs both dunamis 
and dianoia (as the Metaphysics suggests) in a way analogous to virtue’s governance of dunamis 
and pathē in the Nicomachean Ethics. Moreover, this definition of art from the Ethics suggests 
that an art governs production—poiēsis—and not use or evaluation of artifacts. Aristotle defines 
“art” this way to draw a sharp line between making and acting, as well as between technē and 
phronēsis. It is by the virtue of phronēsis, and not by any art, that people make judgments and 
choices about what is best for themselves and their cities.31  
The Politics presents a similar set of problems. This treatise does introduce a distinction 
between making artifacts and judging them—but it does so in a curious way, as an attempt to 
explain why the multitude is sometimes better at political deliberation than is a single legislative 
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expert. Though the demos lacks expertise in the art of governance, Aristotle says, a multitude 
may nevertheless choose officials more wisely than political experts, in part because  
there are some [arts] concerning which the maker might not be the only or the best judge, 
but where those who do not possess the art also have some knowledge of its works. The 
maker of a house, for example, is not the only one to have some knowledge of it, but the 
one who uses it judges better than he does, and the one who uses it is the household 
manager; and a pilot judges rudders better than a carpenter, and the diner, not the cook, is 
the better judge of a banquet.32 
 
Thus, just as the Ethics claims that phronēsis, and not the rhetorical technē, enables people to 
make judgments about human goods, so the Politics claims that assemblies sometimes make 
better judgments than political experts precisely because the people lack artistry—like the 
household manager who knows, even better than the builder, how a house should look and 
function. 
Yet these distinctions need not imply that artists are not good judges of artifacts, or that 
the skillful artist has nothing to say about the quality of other makers’ products. In the Ethics, 
Aristotle follows his definition of “art” with a statement that emphasizes its theoretical and 
observational, not the productive, capacity: 
All art is concerned with the process of coming into being, and to practice an art is also to 
consider how something capable of being or not being, and of which the source is in the 
one who makes it and not in the thing that is made, may come into being.33 
 
This explanation is consistent with my analysis of the Physics and the Metaphysics: Aristotle 
does not specify that the one practicing the art is the one producing the artifact; indeed, he seems 
to go out of his way not to identify the one with the other. To practice the art is to consider the 
product and the producer from a theoretical distance. 
 I readily concede that phronēsis does more than any art can do to discern and obtain the 
goods of human life, and to make good judgments about action. Indeed, the virtue of prudence 
may be necessary, though not always sufficient, for making good judgments in rhetorical 
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situations—a point that Aristotle himself makes in the Rhetoric.34 Yet the above passage from 
the Politics is not Aristotle’s last word on artistic judgment. He offers this sketch of users, artists, 
and judges in an introductory manner, without working out any specifics about the interaction 
between judgment and artistry. He has just finished offering the opposing view—namely, that it 
is best always to assign the task of judging to a person who has been educated in the art or 
science that the judgment concerns. He also suggested that a person with such an education may 
be called an “artist,” even if she is not a maker, since we use the term “doctor” to refer not only 
to the one who heals, but also to anyone who is “educated with respect to the art.” Having placed 
these two views of artistic and inartistic judgment in tension with one another, Aristotle wonders 
whether artists or users make the best judges, but he provides no definitive answer to the 
question. Book 3 of the Politics thus creates a problem for legislation and public deliberation, to 
which Aristotle will suggest a solution in his investigation of education in book 6.  
There is a passage in the Physics that seems to address this very problem, reinforcing the 
distinction between art and production by insisting that users, and not only producers, can be 
artistic. Its archetypal example is the pilot of a ship, who judges rudders better than the carpenter, 
just as Aristotle argues in the Politics that the household manager may judge houses better than 
the builder does. The difference is that, in the fuller theoretical treatment offered in the Physics, 
Aristotle calls the pilot an artist. 
At 194b, the Physics divides arts into two categories: those that direct the making of an 
artifact, and those that govern its use. The pilot of a ship, by this account, is no less an artist than 
is a maker of rudders. Both the pilot and the maker, presumably, gain their art by drawing 
generalizations from many experiences, which enable sound judgment about a rudder’s material, 
form, and purpose. Indeed, as artists, both would have to understand the relationships between all 
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four causes of a rudder’s coming to be; but Aristotle claims that the user will have a better 
understanding of a rudder’s form, and the maker a better understanding of its matter. In the case 
of the carpenter and the pilot, one can easily see why: the carpenter has put saw and chisel to 
wood, so he knows how wood behaves; whereas the pilot has used the rudder to steer a ship, so 
he has a much subtler understanding of its shape, and of the ways that its shape interacts with the 
vagaries of wind and wave. And here is the key point: because the artistic user of a rudder 
understands its form better than the artistic maker does, the user’s technē fits the seemingly 
narrower definition offered in the Ethics. An art, remember, is the form of the artifact in the 
artist’s soul. The pilot of a ship, though he never puts chisel to wood or hammer to nail, has a 
reasoned habit of mind that governs the making of ships and rudders. What shipwright would 
neglect the advice of a wise pilot? What pilot would decline to provide it? And it would seem 
that the artist who possesses the form of the rudder in its most complete and comprehensive 
sense—the master craftsman who knows all four causes and has mastered both making and 
judging through vast experience of particulars—would be the sort of person who could explain 
both the pilot’s job and the shipwright’s.  
Hence, though using and making are emphatically different categories of activity, the art 
that arises from experience in using is surprisingly similar to the art that arises from experience 
in making; and, as Aristotle suggests, it is easy to see how the two artists’ respective areas of 
expertise would inform one another’s work. Aristotle’s terminology is well suited to this 
phenomenon precisely because he has taken such great pains to separate art from production, to 
preserve the essentially theoretical quality of “arts.”  
79 
Poetic and Stochastic Arts: On Making and Maintaining 
I have been saying that artists understand the relationships between the four causes of an 
artifact, and therefore possess the form of that artifact in their souls, as though this were an 
unproblematic assertion. But what exactly does the artist discern about the material, the form, 
and the end of an artifact? How does this discernment enable the artist to think thoroughly and 
accurately about efficient causes? And finally, how do these artistic deliberations work for 
speakers and audiences in a rhetorical situation? 
Recall that in nature, the form of any thing is its telos. To be a certain kind of natural 
thing simply is to have that thing’s form, and to have that form is to aim at that thing’s natural 
ends. For this reason, natural things reproduce according to their own kind, whereas artists make 
things that are materially, formally, and teleologically different from themselves. A painter is 
also a human being; but to be a good painter is not the same as to be a good human being. But a 
good oak tree reliably produces other good oak trees—by nature and not by art. Hence artificial 
making requires deliberation about how efficient causes will bring about a particular form; but 
the artist also knows, somehow, what form will serve the artifact’s desired ends. She sees that, 
while the material cause pre-exists the artifact in the material world—there could be no houses if 
there were no building materials—the formal and final causes nevertheless are ontologically 
prior to the efficient and material causes with respect to the artifact’s coming-to-be. The artist 
discerns or discovers these formal and final causes; she theorizes about them, defines them, and 
deliberates about how to achieve them; but she does not create them. In fact, the maker herself is 
truly responsible only for efficient causes. She initiates efficient causality on the material to 
bring about a form, for the sake of an end, both of which existed in her soul before the project 
began—and both of which existed in the world before she discovered them.  
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Consider Aristotle’s example. A house, he says, is always built with heavier things lying 
underneath lighter ones. A stone foundation supports a wall of packed dirt, which supports a roof 
of wood or thatch. It would be almost right, but not quite, to say that houses are built this way by 
necessity: heavy things fall with greater force than lighter ones, and light things can be held up 
better by heavy ones than vice versa. A truer and more artistic explanation would begin by 
stipulating that houses are built “for the sake of enclosing and sheltering” their inhabitants.35 To 
attain this end, it is necessary to build a house with walls and a roof; and the physical properties 
of building materials determine how walls and a roof can be built stably. Building materials 
behave in the ways just described, so it is necessary to put stronger and heavier ones underneath 
lighter and weaker ones—not because such an arrangement is necessary in itself, but because the 
end for which a house exists necessitates such a formal arrangement of material. Lighter 
materials serve the purposes of the house better when they rest on heavier ones, and heavy 
materials serve those ends better by supporting light.36 Because houses have a certain purpose, 
they must have a certain form; and because materials have certain properties, they must be 
arranged in a certain way to create that form and achieve that purpose. For any artifact, then, 
there is a hierarchy of causes: end governs form, which governs material by making use of that 
material’s given properties. Those properties likewise govern the efficient causes that the artist 
must employ. 
To possess an art, then, is to understand precisely how telos governs both form and 
matter, even though a given material exists in the world before the artist ever discovers her 
conception of an artifact’s form or end. Paradoxically, Aristotle says, “the necessary is 
conditional, unlike the end”: the end determines what form the material will necessarily take, and 
the artistic maker is the one who both sees and can describe why a particular end demands that a 
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particular form be brought to bear on particular materials, whose characteristics are also 
“necessary,” in the sense that they inhere in the material and are not changeable.37 They provide 
effective limits on the possibilities of making; and without such necessary characteristics, such 
pre-existing constraints, no particular artifact could come to be. Saws could not exist were there 
no such material as iron, which is harder than wood (and therefore capable of cutting it) but more 
malleable than stone (and therefore capable of being bent and shaped to form teeth). Iron 
provides just enough resistance to the saw-maker’s manipulations to make saw-making possible. 
The maker arranges these pre-existing materials in such a form that their natural and necessary 
characteristics achieve the artifact’s ends; and the artistic maker understands and can explain 
how and why such an arrangement is possible and good. 
What, then, is Aristotle implying when he says that “everyone” in his readership would 
agree that the activity of an art is “seeing” (theoria), or that rhetoric is an ability (dunamis) to see 
the persuasive (to pithanon)? As has often been pointed out, Aristotle is not saying that the 
artistic rhetor will always be more effective than one who speaks by knack gained from 
experience. On the contrary, he is saying that speakers with an experiential knack or a natural 
aptitude for manipulating audiences might often prevail over rhetorical artists whose pursuit of 
persuasion proceeds according to rational and communicable principles. He is, however, 
claiming that true persuasion can be achieved intentionally by the artistic speaker, and only 
incidentally by the inartistic speaker. Those who lack the true art of rhetoric may move audiences 
effectively, but do not understand their own words’ effects, and (what is more important) do not 
understand whether those effects amount to persuasion or not. Even the most effective inartistic 
speaker, one who never loses a vote, may for all that success never truly persuade anyone of 
anything, or may do so only intermittently and incidentally.   
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To understand rhetoric as an art, then, one must assume the following premises and pose 
their attendant questions.  
First, if the artifact that rhetoric studies is persuasion, then persuasion is not itself the 
“art,” but is something that comes about by art. The rhetorical art is a reasoned conception of 
what persuasion is, of how and why it comes about, and of what ultimate ends it serves. So the 
student of rhetoric should ask and wonder about the four causes of persuasion: material, formal, 
efficient, and final. She should notice, for example, that while it may be convenient to call 
persuasion the “end” of public speaking, such a statement makes sense only if she can also 
identify the further ends that persuasion itself must serve. These, ultimately, are the aims of 
rhetorical artists, whether speaking or listening.  
Second, if an art is the form of an artifact in the soul of an artist, then the rhetor possesses 
the form of persuasion in her soul. What precisely does this mean? By what disciplines of mind 
might the artistic rhetor discover and acquire this form? Through what kinds of experiences 
(making, using, observing) might she gain the true generalizations and universal judgments that 
constitute the form of persuasion—enabling her, therefore, to give a true rational account of 
persuasion’s being what it is? 
Third, whatever the material and formal causes of persuasion might be, the rhetorical 
artist must discover or “see” them, not create them. The maker of a bronze sphere makes neither 
bronze nor the form “sphere.”38 Thus, when a rhetorical artist speaks effectively and 
persuasively, she brings about a particular instance of persuasion; but she has not made 
persuasion itself, or even the material or the form of persuasion as such. Both existed before her 
speech; both are “necessary” and ontologically prior to any particular instance of persuasion. In 
what sense do they exist before the rhetorical encounter?  
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These first three considerations already seem to imply that the art of rhetoric is not the 
exclusive province of persuasive speakers. For one thing, the rhetorical art might govern the 
“use” of persuasion as well as the “making” of it. Perhaps, in the rhetorical situation, there is an 
analogue for the ship’s pilot. Might the experienced and artistic rhetorical listener know the form 
of persuasion even better than the artistic speaker does? Furthermore, the rhetorical art might be 
possessed by someone who never speaks in public, or who lacks natural talent for speaking, or 
who has never been successful as an orator. Like every art, rhetoric is gained by experience 
joined to judgment, usually under the direction of a teacher. Such experience need not be 
productive to be artistic.  
Fourth, although the material and form of persuasion exist before the persuasive speech 
and do not depend on it for their being, both the planning and the making of a persuasive speech 
subordinate the formal, material, and efficient causes to the final cause. The material cause of 
persuasion, whatever it might be, is “necessary,” so to speak, like stone or iron; its properties are 
given. Yet this material cause is also conditional, in the sense that it comes to be in the artifact 
only by the choice of the maker or the user and for the sake of some end. The artistic way to 
think about persuasion, which is also the theoretically true way, is to begin by identifying 
persuasion’s end, and then to imagine what material and form would accomplish that end, and 
finally to reason backwards through a chain of efficient causes that would bring such persuasion 
to being. A producer of persuasion who works artistically will always have in mind, not only 
persuasion, but persuasion’s ultimate ends; and the artistic observer of persuasion will identify 
and correctly explain this teleological subordination, even when a speaker cannot do so. How 
exactly does this process work with regard to rhetoric, and how can it be taught? 
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Fifth and finally, it is worth noting that there are some arts—medicine is the example 
offered both in the Metaphysics and in the Rhetoric—that seem to cooperate with nature or “to 
complete what nature is unable to finish off,” rather than imitating nature by bringing about 
something new.39 The imitative arts include what we would call “fine” art, such as sculpture 
(which imitates the human form), but also ship-making, whose artifact floats like a duck or a 
fallen leaf. Arts like medicine, on the other hand, bring about states of being that are quite 
natural. Health is the natural form of a living and growing body. To be healthy is nothing other 
than to be a human being in good working order. Thus, medicine’s “artifact,” so to speak, is 
actually a natural state whose formal and final causes are in perfect harmony: the form of health 
is its end. Sometimes, for one reason or another, nature falls short of its goal, and art must 
intervene.  
In post-Aristotelian philosophy, this class of arts that cooperate with nature would be 
expanded to include any art whose form and material exist largely outside the control of the 
artist, and therefore do not reliably submit even to the master craftsman’s manipulations. (Every 
doctor fails eventually; every patient dies someday.) Chrysippus and Philodemus call these arts 
“stochastic,” or speculative, since their practitioners can find only probable, never reliable, 
means of success.40 Stochastic arts include the repair of previously built artifacts, since the one 
repairing a house or a ship is not responsible for its original, and perhaps deficient, design and 
construction. In a stochastic art, a failure of production is not necessarily a failure of artistry, or 
even a failure of experiential knowledge of particulars. A master craftsman might know all that is 
to be known, might have the form of the artifact in his soul, and might have gained all the 
requisite experience to do as well as anyone could imaginably do—and still fail to cure an ailing 
patient or to repair a broken-down house. 
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That Aristotle thought of rhetoric as a stochastic art in this latter sense is 
uncontroversial.41 No matter how well the rhetorical artist studies the demographic 
generalizations and the enthymematic forms that Aristotle provides, she will sometimes be 
confounded by the vagaries of a particular audience, opponent, or political circumstance. Yet I 
discern another “stochastic” quality in rhetoric, another way that it is analogous to medicine. 
Rhetorically artistic speech brings about persuasion, like medicine brings about health, by 
cooperating with a naturally occurring and naturally growing form of human thriving. As 
medicine is to the body, so artistic rhetoric is to the human capacity for language: rhetoric mends 
human thought, supplying artistic persuasion where natural human capacities (such as the senses) 
and nonartistic hexeis (such as phronēsis) fall short of discerning what is true about the common 
good.  
At times, the Ethics and the Politics seem to indicate that the intellectual virtue of 
phronēsis is sufficient to account for all good deliberation. Yet phronēsis is in no sense an ability 
to persuade or to think about persuasion.42 Perhaps phronēsis is the best one can hope for with 
most audiences, and certainly phronēsis is far more important for human thriving and for the 
health of the polis than is rhetorical training. Nevertheless, having discerned in the Rhetoric 
some salutary effects of rhetorical training on the deliberations of an audience, I hope to show 
that the Rhetoric fills a real theoretical and practical need that the Ethics and the Politics 
discerned but did not treat. It is true that rhetoric sometimes dresses itself up like ethics or 
politics, pretending to an importance that it does not possess. It is also true, though, that the 
disciplines of ethics and politics tend to resist or neglect the influence of persuasive speech on 
deliberation and judgment, looking to political constitutions, legislation, household economics, 
friendship, and military skill to sustain the city and to support wise decision-making. Arnhart and 
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Garsten suggest that a wise and artistic rhetorical speaker can move the city in a salutary 
direction by persuading citizen-listeners—whose endoxa have been shaped by the constitution, 
the laws, and the customs of their households—to judge prudently about particular cases that 
lawgivers could not foresee. But there is an additional civic need, I will argue, for rhetorically 
artistic listeners: men and women who can see the ways that speech either encourages or 
discourages good judgment, and who can respond to such speech rhetorically—either by being 





JUDGMENT AND THE ENDS OF PERSUASION (Rhetoric 1.2-3) 
Perhaps the most significant Socratic critique of rhetoric was the charge that rhetors have 
been unable to define their art’s pragmata. Aristotle began book 1, chapter 1 by assuming, 
likewise, that rhetoric would need to be defined according to the matters that its speakers 
address. However, in the course of his dialectical investigation of those matters, he came to focus 
on the nature of rhetorical audience, a consideration that helped him in turn to redefine rhetoric’s 
subject-matter, not according to the expertise of speakers, but according to the priorities and 
abilities of the human beings that such speakers presume to persuade. Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
Rhetoric recapitulate this same dialectical movement from speaker to audience in greater detail. 
In chapter 2, after offering his new definition of rhetoric—a definition that, I have 
argued, allows for the possibility of listening as a rhetorical activity—Aristotle proceeds to name 
and taxonomize the rhetorical “proofs” that the possessor of this art should be able to “see.” In 
this first taxonomy, the entire rhetorical situation—speaker, audience, and subject—is inferred 
from the kinds of proofs that speakers invent. Speakers argue logically, they present themselves 
as credible, and they appeal to their audiences’ emotions. Hence, Aristotle creates the famous 
“rhetorical triangle” by observing three kinds of proofs operative in speeches—and not by 
observing speaker, audience, and subject as distinct elements, each operative in its own right. 
While Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric has left room for audiences to practice the art, his first 
taxonomy of that art continues to assume the centrality of speech making.  
Chapter 3, however, describes the rhetorical situation from a more theoretical, 
observational vantage point. It identifies each element (speaker, audience, and subject), and then 
treats the means of persuasion as ontologically subordinate to (and not only practically 
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dependent on) audiences’ reasons for listening and deciding. Tellingly, it is this second way of 
construing the rhetorical situation that reveals the ends of persuasive speech: the just, the 
advantageous, and the beautiful. The dialectical arrangement of chapters 2 and 3 reveals this 
central tenet of Aristotelian rhetoric: that the ends of persuasive speech are to be found in the 
listener’s political good, and not in the speaker’s desires. It is not only practically more effective, 
but also theoretically more accurate and comprehensive, to define the rhetorical situation in 
terms of the good of those who are being persuaded rather than in terms of the desires of those 
who are persuading.  
Chapters 2 and 3 do not neglect the speaker or the speech. They identify, define, and 
divide the rhetorical topics and the forms of rhetorical argument (paradigm and enthymeme). Yet 
these definitions come at a strategic moment for Aristotle’s treatment of audience. Chapter 1 
showed, but did not explain, how enthymemes should work: it drew Aristotle’s readers into the 
kind of thinking that artistic speakers and audiences must do when they consider arguments 
rhetorically. At 1.1.2, 1.1.7, and 1.1.11, Aristotle offered sequences of enthymemes that were, at 
first glance, persuasive or even obvious, but that turned out to require careful parsing for the 
student of dialectic who might wish to identify their tacit premises and to evaluate their validity 
(apart from their de facto effectiveness). In chapter 2, Aristotle provides a theoretical account for 
this strategy. Enthymematic reasoning is effective, he explains, because it uses an audience’s 
already at-work deliberations, inviting or requiring listeners to supply tacit premises or logical 
connections to make sense of probable conclusions. It is this active participation, he implies, that 
makes the enthymeme artistic; and one of the artistic speaker’s defining characteristics is her 
attentiveness to such participation. In both chapters, Aristotle’s own method of presentation 
continues to be enthymematic; but in several places, the tacit premises in his argument concern 
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the centrality of audience—both to the artistic speaker’s deliberations about pisteis and to the 
rhetorical theorist’s attempts to explain how such proofs operate. As chapters 2 and 3 sketch the 
goals and arrangement of the rest of the treatise, they continue to engage Aristotle’s reading 
audience in a way that mimics the critical engagement of a rhetorically artistic listener. Thus, 
chapters 2 and 3 reveal the reciprocal and collaborative nature of rhetorical invention, 
arrangement, and delivery, suggesting that persuasion is a product not only of a speaker’s 
making, but also of an audience’s active use of argument. 
The Speaker and to pithanon (Rhetoric 1.2) 
Aristotle’s first sketch of the rhetorical situation at 1.2.1 is incomplete and provisional, 
not least because it is inconsistent with his definition of the rhetorical art. By assuming the 
centrality of speaker and speech to rhetorical theory, he is returning to the first mistaken endoxon 
of the Arts of Speech. This dialectical recapitulation of chapter 1 ensures that Aristotle’s ultimate 
refutation of sophistic rhetorical theory is neither a response to a straw man nor a rehearsal of the 
Socratic critique. Rhetoric 1.2 offers a speaker-centered art that is worthy of Aristotle’s attention: 
one that sets clear limits for rhetoric’s pragmata, that accounts for artistic theorizing, and that 
examines all the available pisteis (that is, to endechomenon pithanon). This more systematic 
treatment of rhetoric, which is still centered on the speaker’s act of making and delivering 
speeches, nevertheless makes use of the discoveries of chapter 1 and tries to explain how 
speakers persuade.  
After his definition of rhetoric, Aristotle divides rhetorical “proofs” into two species: the 
inartistic and the artistic (see Figure 9). Inartistic proofs “are preexisting”—witness testimony, 
contracts, and the like—while artistic proofs are “provided by us” and must be invented. The 
latter proofs achieve persuasion by three means: through the speaker’s own character  
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(speaker/ēthos), through the audience’s emotional state (audience/pathos), and through the facts 
and arguments themselves (subject/logos).1  
The dialectically provisional character of these distinctions should be obvious to anyone 
who has written a speech or read Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Books 1 and 2 will develop the 
relationships between these kinds of proof, not only by listing and itemizing the kinds of 
propositions peculiar to each, but also by revealing the substantial overlap between them. For 
one thing, witnesses and contracts do not, by themselves, prove anything. They require 
interpretation, either by the audience or by the speaker. Like all argumentative speech, these 
interpretations will always be either deductive or inductive; they will always be formed from 
propositions, arranged in some order to prove some conclusion. Aristotle will treat testimony and 
documentary evidence in just this way in Rhetoric 1.15. Whatever inartistic proofs have been 
provided, the speaker must still invent arguments about them that are logically demonstrative, 
ethically credible, and emotionally appealing. What is more important, the kinds of proofs that 
Aristotle identifies as “artistic” are also composed of given and unchangeable realities in the 
rhetorical situation. Virtues of character and emotional qualia simply are what they are; and an 
audience’s emotional predispositions and beliefs about the good are not endlessly malleable. 
They are pre-existing givens that the speaker must address. 
The three pisteis overlap, too. A speaker who seems unethical will excite disgust or anger 
in the audience, while one who seems virtuous will inspire trust and sympathy; hence ēthos and 
pathos overlap. To show, or seem to show, one’s good character or good will, one will need to 
use enthymeme or paradigm—and to be careful about which propositions to state and which to 
leave tacit. Usually it is the conclusion—I am a good person and you should trust me—that one 
should imply rather than state. Of course, the decision to do so can be made artistically only by 
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one who understands enthymeme. Thus, ēthos requires logos. Jamie Dow has shown at length 
that Aristotle treats the emotions as in some sense “representational”—that they provide proper 
grounds for one’s conviction that the world is as one perceives it—and that such grounds can be 
stated logically.2 Thus, a logical argument as to the state of the world often implies or seeks to 
cause an appropriate emotional response; and every passion tacitly implies a conviction that is in 
principle open to logical scrutiny. Thus, while these distinctions are helpful in a rudimentary 
way—they may help the beginning student of rhetoric to distinguish some kinds of propositions 
from others—they do not provide the kinds of sharp theoretical distinctions that Aristotle claims 
they do; and readers of the Rhetoric should not be surprised when his treatment of each “kind” 
reveals its dependence on the other two.3 
There are indications, even in chapter 2, that Aristotle is aware of these complications, 
and that his dialectical strategy is to show the inadequacy of the speaker-centered theory by 
continuing to observe and examine the complexities of audience psychology and judgment. For 
example, his brief description of persuasion “through the hearers” is clearly a dialectical 
variation on the claims he made in chapter 1 about the handbook writers’ unethical practice of 
“warp[ing] the jury by leading them into envy or anger or pity.” 
[There is persuasion] through the hearers [akroatōn] when they are led to feel emotion 
[pathos] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment [kriseis] when grieved and 
rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile. To this and only this we said contemporary 
technical writers try to give their attention. The details on this subject will be made clear 
when we speak about the emotions.4 
 
Here, he admits that leading an audience to feel emotions is a legitimate and artistic way of 
achieving persuasion. It is one of the pisteis that the art of rhetoric can see and theorize about, 
and it is therefore one of the techniques that an artistic speaker can employ rationally and by 
method. Thus, Aristotle has moved past the first chapter’s contrast between the enthymeme 
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(which alone was claimed to be artistic) and appeals to emotion, which warp the jury. From the 
listener’s perspective, the contrast between emotion and judgment has similarly been revised. In 
chapter 1, Aristotle said that emotional appeals “make a straightedge rule crooked” and “cast a 
shadow on their judgment,” but chapter 2 claims, more simply, that “we do not give the same 
judgment” when in different emotional states. A grieving person will judge differently from a 
joyful one; a friendly person differently from a hostile one. Emotion affects judgment but does 
not necessarily distort it. Thus, Aristotle introduces observations about the overlap between logos 
and pathos that will characterize his treatment of the passions in the first half of book 2. 
Yet again, Aristotle shows the reasonableness of this change, not only by arguing for it 
directly, but also by using the first-person plural (apodidomen) to place his readers in the 
mimetic position of the audience. We are meant to consider, from the audience’s point of view, 
what it is like to feel emotion while rendering a judgment. From this point of view, it becomes 
obvious that emotion and judgment coincide in some way, and that the rhetorical art will need to 
theorize about the effects of logic on feeling and vice versa, rather than putting them at odds.5 
This change in posture toward the emotions, which comes about as a direct consequence of 
considering persuasive speeches from the audience’s perspective, necessitates a change in 
Aristotle’s posture toward the handbook writers as well. Whereas 1.1.5-7 emphasized their 
narrowness of focus—they treat only emotional appeal through arrangement, and have nothing to 
say about enthymeme—chapter 2 emphasizes their failure even to address pathos adequately: 
they merely “try” to give their attention to pathos. Now, Aristotle can promise a fuller treatment 
of emotions in an upcoming chapter—a treatment that should not be surprising, given Aristotle’s 
profound concern in the Politics and in the Ethics with the effects of pleasure, pain, and the 
passions on deliberation and moral choice. 
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Aristotle is aware, then, that the taxonomy of proofs is incomplete, provisional, and in 
some ways inadequate, just as he was aware of the dialectically provisional quality of his 
recommended strictures on audience in chapter 1. This first sketch of artistic appeals leads to an 
equally incomplete and rather halting account of what it means to be an artistic speaker, which is 
a dialectical review and improvement of 1.1.11. There, Aristotle had argued that an artistic 
speaker would be one who understood rhetorical apodeixis, which is enthymeme; and that the 
same person would be able to distinguish what is true from what is only apparently true. This 
observation led him to argue that rhetoric, like dialectic, is a capacity for discriminating between 
real enthymemes and apparent ones, and that rhetoric’s ability to invent fallacious arguments is 
no reason to suspect it (any more than one suspects martial arts) of harmful tendencies. Now, in 
chapter 2, he returns to that discussion after having discerned that persuasive speakers employ 
ethical and pathetic appeals as well, and that such appeals can be artistic. He must now add 
knowledge of virtue and emotion to the requirements of the rhetorical artist:  
Since pisteis come about through these [three means], it is clear that to grasp an 
understanding of them is the function of one who can form syllogisms and be observant 
[theōrēsai] about characters and virtues and, third, about emotions (what each of the 
emotions is and what are its qualities and from what it comes to be and how).6  
 
Notice the continued focus on theorizing. The function of the rhetorical artist is “to grasp an 
understanding” of the three kinds of persuasive appeal. This function belongs to one who “can 
form syllogisms,” not necessarily write and arrange them into a persuasive speech; who can “be 
observant about characters and virtues,” not necessarily speak eloquently about them or persuade 
an audience that she possesses them; and who can be observant about the emotions—not 
necessarily excite or appeal to them. I have called this account incomplete and halting because, 
having stated these three requirements, Aristotle launches into a more extensive genus-differentia 
definition of logical proof, distinguishing the enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism) from the 
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paradigm (rhetorical induction), before returning yet again to the question of rhetorical artistry 
and redefining it from yet another point of view. As he lurches back and forth between 
descriptions of the rhetorical art and taxonomies of rhetorical proofs, attempting to revise each in 
light of new discoveries about the other, he transcends and improves upon each tentative 
formulation by considering the place of rhetorical audience. For example, having just 
differentiated between enthymeme and paradigm, he observes that “speeches using paradigms 
are not less persuasive, but those with enthymemes excite more favorable audience reaction.” 
(He still maintains the distinction between moving an audience and being persuasive.) He then 
promises to explain the reasons for the difference at a later point in the discussion—after he 
attends to a prerequisite subject.  
That subject is a definition of rhetorical artistry that attempts to account for the audience 
as thoroughly as it accounts for speaker and speech. Its first clause, “Since the persuasive is 
persuasive to someone,” parallels the opening clause in the preceding passage (“Since pisteis 
come about through these [three means]”), thus highlighting this shift in point of view. Here, for 
the first time in the treatise, the causes of persuasion begin to be evident, and Aristotle places his 
students in a position to answer the questions about the rhetorical art that, as I argued at the end 
of the last chapter, the incipient rhetorical artist must pose. 
This etiological discernment begins, first, with a clarification about kinds of audiences 
and particular listeners. Though Socrates had imagined an ideal rhetorical art that would lead 
individual souls toward virtue, Aristotle points out that knowledge of particulars is not artistic. 
Particulars are infinite and unknowable; and, to the extent that one can master particulars, one 
does so by experience and not by art. Therefore, if the persuasive “is persuasive to someone,” 
then theoretical knowledge of persuasion would have to form generalizations about arguments 
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that work on classes of audiences or in species of rhetorical exigency. In this respect, rhetoric is 
like all other arts. Productive skill is gained through experience; artistic wisdom, by making 
generalizations about causality and by dealing with species and genera.  
Second, the subjects about which rhetoric forms arguments, and the forms of those 
arguments themselves, are determined by the nature of rhetorical audience—the most important 
“given” that the rhetorical artist must observe and account for. The difference between dialectic 
and rhetoric, Aristotle says, is that dialectic theorizes about what seems true “to people in need of 
argument,” while rhetoric theorizes about what seems true “to people already accustomed to 
deliberate among themselves.” These listeners have all the good qualities described in Rhetoric 
1.1: They are capable of discerning truth, and for the most part hit on truth; they deliberate in the 
course of their normal lives, always seeking the good (albeit imperfectly); and, when judging 
matters that pertain to them, they are capable of ignoring the sophist’s distractions, since their 
passions direct their reason toward the truth of the case. Yet a rhetorical listener “is assumed to 
be a simple person” who is “not able to see many things all together or to reason from a distant 
starting point.” Rhetoric’s function (ergon), then, “is concerned with the sort of things we 
debate”—things “that seem to be capable of admitting two possibilities,” and that can be 
reasoned about without requiring a long chain of syllogisms. Here, then, comes Aristotle’s 
famous description of the workings of rhetorical argument: Because rhetorical audiences are 
already accustomed to deliberation, but because they have little patience for long syllogistic 
proofs, both enthymeme and paradigm work by stating only the premises and conclusions that 
must be explicit, and by trusting that the hearer will supply what is tacit.7 
Chapter 1 claimed that enthymeme was the body of persuasion, and chapter 2 adds 
paradigm as a technique that is no less persuasive. I infer that paradigm, too, can be called “the 
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body of persuasion,” though it excites less favorable audience reaction. A body is both matter 
and form; so if enthymeme and paradigm are the “body of persuasion,” then their material causes 
would be persuasion’s material cause, and their form, persuasion’s form. Persuasion, then, is 
materially nothing more than propositions: premises, drawn from or based on the audience’s 
preexisting common opinions. Chapter 2 has already identified eikota, sēmeia, and tekmerion as 
the kinds of propositions, stating conclusively that there are no others than these, since 
propositions (like all material causes) are things that we discover in nature, whose properties are 
necessary, and which therefore provide the resistance to manipulation that is necessary for any 
artifact to exist. (Aristotle will later revise this taxonomy slightly; see my treatment of 
enthymeme in chapter 6.) The definition of enthymeme makes clear that the audience is active, 
not passive, in supplying such propositions when they are tacit in the speech. The endoxa, on 
which these propositions draw, concern not only what is factually true but also what is morally 
good and what one ought to feel about given circumstances. Thus, the endoxa, stated as 
propositions of one kind or another, are the material cause of persuasion, regardless of the kind 
of proof (ethical, logical, or pathetic) that a speaker invents. 
The formal cause of persuasion—again, regardless of the kind of proof—is logic, as 
Aristotle describes it in the Topics and the Posterior Analytics; or, to put it more precisely, the 
formal cause of an enthymeme is its conclusion, which is in some logical way necessitated by the 
yoking together of its premises.8 A syllogism, whether dialectical or rhetorical, comes to be a 
syllogism on account of this conclusion, which is the statement in speech of what the premises, 
taken together, simply do imply. Note that such logic preexists the rhetor, the speaker, and even 
the audience. It can be discovered, but not created—like the form of a sphere. Speakers and 
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audiences build specific instances of enthymeme, but they do not create syllogistic ex nihilo. 
Ontologically, a given speech or enthymeme is contingent; logic itself is necessary. 
Practically, too, a given speech is dependent on logic, because audiences, no matter how 
simple, are at least incipiently logical. Deduction and induction, because of their ontological 
primacy, are inherent in all speech. Because all humans desire to know, we come to believe 
things by means that are formally similar to our means of arriving at knowledge. Our natural 
inclination toward truth is the reason why all persuasion comes about by induction or by 
deduction, or why “it is always necessary to show something either by syllogizing or by 
inducing.” We “produce logical persuasion,” Aristotle insists, “by means of paradigms or 
enthymemes and by nothing other than these.”9 Thus, no speaker can persuade without at least 
seeming to derive conclusions from premises in a valid way. 
To say that enthymeme or paradigm is the body of persuasion is to say that the state of 
mind known as persuasion is nothing other than the possession of validly grounded conviction, 
arranged according to the rules of logic. To be rhetorically artistic, then, is (in part) to have the 
rules of logic imprinted on one’s soul: to have learned the form of persuasion so thoroughly that 
one’s utterances or beliefs are consciously and consistently logical. It is also, apparently, to know 
different classes of audiences well enough to know how precisely to arrange enthymemes and 
paradigms to be persuasive to them: what to state, and what to leave out, and in what manner, so 
that they will be able to recognize the logic of one’s arguments and collaborate in their own 
active state of persuasion. 
Aristotle’s halting, hesitant discussion of the rhetorical art, which implies but does not 
state or develop the theory I have expounded above, mimics the emergence of rhetorical artistry 
in a conscientious but novice persuasive speaker. By writing, delivering, and listening to 
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speeches—that is, by gaining experience with the particulars of speech-making and persuasion—
the emerging rhetorical artist learns to see and predict the effectiveness of particular kinds of 
arguments. At first, perhaps, she believes that some are artistic and others are not. (What could 
she have done about that witness whose testimony, which may even have been coerced, refuted 
her clever argument from probability?) Among the artistic proofs, some seem to be achieved by 
putting the audience in a particular frame of mind; others, by making the speaker appear to be 
credible; and still others, by making the argument itself seem logically valid. Yet the moment 
that she begins to generalize or theorize about these argumentative techniques, she runs up 
against a limitation: Some arguments work better than others, irrespective of the three classes of 
proof that she has identified; and the difference between the effective and the ineffective seems 
to arise, not from the techniques themselves, but from some unknown pre-existing qualities of 
listeners, which make them disposed to believe some arguments more than others. The 
realization that “the persuasive is persuasive to someone” thus marks the beginning of rhetorical 
artistry. Only with this premise firmly in mind can the rhetorical artist begin to make accurate 
generalizations about persuasion and explain the hierarchal relationships between its four causes. 
The speaker becomes a rhetorical artist when she consciously discerns the persuasive quality of 
these paradigmatic and enthymematic forms and begins consciously to put them to use in her 
own practices of invention, arrangement, and delivery, thus applying to new particular situations 
the judgments and conceptions that she has derived from delivering and hearing speeches in a 
wide variety of situations. Yet each listener, too, may participate in the efficient causality of his 
or her own persuasion—first, by deliberating about the speech’s propositions, and second, by 
supplying tacit premises to complete enthymemes and paradigms. 
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The Audience and the Ends of Persuasion (Rhetoric 1.3) 
Chapter 3 mimics the development of rhetorical artistry from this side of the rhetorical 
situation, defining rhetoric as it appears to an attentive audience. While the speaker-centered 
theory of chapter 2 was capable of discerning material and formal causes of persuasion, it is the 
audience-centered theory of chapter 3 that discerns persuasion’s ends.  
Notice the tacit premise in the chapter’s opening enthymeme: “The species [eidē] of 
rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number [of classes] to which the hearers [hoi 
akroatai] of speeches belong.” Chapter 2 has already discerned that rhetoric’s disciplinary 
boundaries depended on the qualities of its listeners; but chapter 3 takes as a matter of tacit 
assumption that the internal structure of rhetoric itself—not only its definition, but also its 
differentiae—depends on kinds of audiences, and not of speakers or arguments. This new 
premise arises from the earlier chapter’s realization that audiences are (or may be) active in the 
rhetorical situation, since their endoxa are the given material on which the speaker works, since 
they actively supply the tacit premises of enthymematic reasoning, and since their active 
judgments are directed toward the speech’s ultimate ends. To make sense of this interaction 
between the speaker and the audience, Aristotle defines the rhetorical situation theoretically 
rather than practically: “a speech consists of three things: a speaker [legontos] and a subject on 
which he speaks and someone addressed, and the objective [telos] of the speech relates to the last 
(I mean the hearer).” To derive a rhetorical theory merely from an observation of the kinds of 
arguments speakers make is to reason inartistically, and therefore mistakenly, about persuasion; 
for the artist always understands an artifact in terms of its telos, and not the other way around. If 
the persuasive is always persuasive to someone, then the rhetorical artist will think about 
listeners first, whose ethical and political ends are the unchangeable ends of artistic making. She 
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will consider particular arrangements of words and arguments only as proximate efficient causes 
to be employed in service of those ends.  
Aristotle divides audiences, first of all, between those who theorize and those who judge; 
and second, by the temporal orientation of the circumstances on which they judge (past or 
future). This consideration of audience produces three different “rhetorics”: the epideictic, the 
deliberative, and the judicial (see Figure 10). Much misunderstanding about this generic division 
results from interpreters’ latent assumption that Aristotle is defining three different kinds of 
speeches, or that the word “rhetoric” means the activity of speaking. It is true that, later, he will 
identify some speakers and some speeches as judicial or deliberative; but for the time being, he is 
speaking about three genera of rhetoric, and of three different “rhetorics.” Because listeners do 
these three things—theorize about the present, judge about the past, or judge about the future—
there would therefore be three different genres of rhetoric (that is, three different classes of 
rhetorical situations in which people exercise their ability to discover to pithanon). From this 
conclusion Aristotle infers the existence of three “rhetorics,” or three different ways of theorizing 
about persuasion (and not three different ways of speaking).  
The division of rhetoric into epideictic, judicial, and deliberative genres, each with a 
readily available “example” (the court, the assembly, and the display piece) is perhaps so 
familiar by now that it is easy to miss the significance of this method of division. Aristotle could 
have begun by naming the three existing rhetorical fora and inferring the three genres from this 
political arrangement. Instead, he treats the assembly and the court as mere examples of 
deliberative and judicial situations, not as necessary conditions for the exercising of the 
rhetorical art. There are qualities of human thought and action as such—specifically, judging 
matters that concern the past, the present, and the future—that define rhetoric’s structure. (Even 
102 
 
the epideictic audience, he will later admit, renders judgments about what is beautiful and 
praiseworthy.) 
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If persuasion, and not a speech, is rhetoric’s artifact, then persuasion must aim at ends 
external to itself. Yet Aristotle insists that these ends are not merely the immediate practical 
results of a jury or an assembly’s krisis (that is, the condemnation of an alleged criminal or the 
approval of a proposed course of action). How does Aristotle infer, from the audience-centered 
taxonomy I explicate above, that the ends of persuasive speech are the advantageous, the just, 
and the beautiful?  
To appreciate the significance of this inference, we must preserve the lexical distinctions 
that Aristotle has drawn. The just, the beautiful, and the advantageous are not ends of “rhetoric,” 
or of the three “rhetorics”; they are, rather, the ends of three kinds of speakers and speeches.10 In 
1.3.1-4, Aristotle placed his readers in the position of rhetorical theorists who recognized the 
centrality of audience to the workings of persuasion, and who could therefore “see” that the 
qualities of an audience would determine speakers’ means and ends. Now, in 1.3.5-6, he begins 
to observe and categorize the ends that speakers pursue when confronted by these three 
audience-determined rhetorical situations. People come to the assembly to make decisions about 
the common advantage; they come to the courtroom to preserve justice by punishing criminals 
and acquitting the innocent; and they come to public festivals to celebrate what is beautiful or to 
condemn what is shameful. Political institutions like the ekklēsia, with all of the traditions and 
norms that evolve for their use, arise for the sake of these preexisting purposes—the just, the 
advantageous, and the beautiful—which, in turn, assume a shared understanding of the common 
good. This common understanding determines the ends that the rhetorical artist discerns by 
theory, just as it restricts the arguments of public speakers in practice. 
Thus, as a matter of fact, all speakers simply do treat the just, the advantageous, and the 
beautiful as the ends of their respective discourses. Aristotle never says that speakers always 
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understand, or even that they often know anything about, these ends. Rather, the inherent 
features of the rhetorical situation and of human language and thought necessitate that all 
arguments assume these three ends. There is no other way of arguing or convincing anyone of 
anything, except to show that the desired judgment is advantageous, just, or noble.  
Thus, Aristotle’s careful distinction between “rhetoric” and “speaking” achieves a kind of 
poetic mimēsis, an imitation of the emerging artistic listener’s growth in the ability to theorize. 
Recall that chapter 1, like much of the treatise, used both first- and third-person plural verbs 
rather loosely, to create the sense that the rhetorical artist sometimes thinks like a speaker, and 
sometimes like an audience. Chapter 2, examining the rhetorical art from the perspective of an 
emerging artistic speaker, preferred first-person plural verbs for acts of speech-making (except 
for the single aberration discussed above, which enabled the artistic speaker to recognize the 
importance of audience). Artistic proofs are provided “by us”; rhetoric concerns matters about 
which “we debate”; rhetorical syllogisms are defined as “those in which we state topoi.” Chapter 
3 shifts the perspective, treating speakers as the objects of a rhetorical artist’s investigation and 
using third-person verbs to describe what they are observed to do. Readers are in the position of 
the rhetorical theorist (that is, the artist), drawing on their own habitual practice of listening. To 
develop the art of rhetoric, they must think like listeners, defining speech-acts according to the 
kinds of judgments that they would be likely to render; then, they must recall details of speeches 
they have heard in the past, and make generalizations about how speakers argue. Such inductions 
reveal the just, the advantageous, and the beautiful, not as the conscious choices or sincere 
wishes of the most effective public speakers, but as the natural ends of all persuasive speech—
the ends that are simply and necessarily implied in any attempt to argue or deliberate. Here and 
throughout the treatise, Aristotle seems to avoid using the word rhetor, preferring legontos 
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(“speaker”) or, later, such verbal forms as “those who are offering advice.” Again, this lexical 
choice places Aristotle’s readers in the position of a rhetorical audience who must ask what that 
advice should aim to achieve. 
In the Physics, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the artistic builder was an 
ability to see how particular arrangements of material would serve the house’s intended use—
that is, sheltering its inhabitants. An inartistic builder may mistakenly think that an arrangement 
of materials—stone, then wood, then thatch—is the “end” of her work; or she may think, 
correctly but incompletely, that the materials must be arranged this way because (as a rule) heavy 
things support light ones; or she may even discern that the materials should be arranged this way 
because otherwise they would fall. The end of her work, she might reason, is a good house; and a 
good house should stand. The artistic builder understands these proximate ends in terms of the 
ultimate one—shelter and comfort—and explains material and formal causes in those terms. To 
take another example, one can imagine an inartistic doctor whose deliberations stop short of 
achieving health, the art’s ultimate end: one who thinks that the end of his art is to administer a 
particular treatment, since the symptoms call for it, or to cure a particular disease that ails a 
patient, but who is unable to rise to the level of generalization needed to attend to a patient’s 
health as such.  
Likewise, the inartistic speaker may believe that a finished speech, or a speech that 
excites a favorable audience reaction, is the goal of her activity of making. With a little more 
foresight and artistic training, she may begin to posit victory over an opponent or effective 
persuasion as the ultimate end, like a builder reasoning that a well-built house should stand. The 
fully artistic rhetor sees that the invention and delivery of speeches are proximate efficient causes 
of her artifact’s coming to be. Her artifact is persuasion: a logical, ethical, and affective state in 
106 
 
the audience’s soul. Since persuasion is an artifact, it is likely not its own end (unless it is 
something like health, which the patient would desire for its own sake). But no audience should 
desire to be persuaded for the sake of persuasion. Because persuasion is not itself a good, the 
way that health and knowledge are, it must aim at some end outside itself, a good that we desire 
for its own sake. A house that fails to provide shelter is obviously not a good house, and no 
artistic builder would think she had done her work well if the roof leaked or the walls collapsed. 
The speaker’s artifact, persuasion, is likewise artistically good only to the extent that it achieves 
good ends. 
So, when Aristotle identifies speakers’ ends as the beautiful, the just, and the 
advantageous, he is saying that a speech is rather easily judged by any observant person as good 
or not, as effective or not, insofar as it aims at these ends. Just as any fool knows that a leaky 
roof means an incompetent builder, any fool can see that a persuasive speech is only as good as 
its effects on the audience and the city. To be sure, the stochastic character of rhetoric may 
mitigate such judgment. It is not “the function of medicine to create health but to promote this as 
much as possible; for it is nevertheless possible to treat well those who cannot recover health”; 
and rhetoric, like medicine, deals with pre-existing human qualities (the virtues, the emotions, 
and the endoxa). A speaker may fail to persuade a listener of some good thesis because the 
listener’s habits or opinions are corrupt beyond any cure. She may also to persuade such an 
audience well, by identifying incomplete goods that her listeners can understand and desire, even 
if they would roundly reject greater or more complete ones. Yet this mitigation has its own rather 
obvious limits. Medicine, even when dealing with corrupted bodies that are beyond cure, 
nevertheless looks to nothing outside of health, since health is the natural good of a living body. 
Proximate goods, such as temporary and incomplete cures, are good only insofar as they achieve 
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some part of health or some semblance of it. Since persuasion is always persuasion of someone 
toward some end, persuasion is good only insofar as the end of that persuasion is good for the 
ones persuaded.  
This consideration of ends provides another reason to reject the notion that rhetoric is an 
ethically neutral power of moving audiences, as though it were equally possible to persuade 
audiences in any direction and it were a matter of ethical choice (and not also of rhetorically 
artistic noēsis) whether or not “to persuade what is debased.” Chapter 1 posited that “sophistry is 
not a matter of ability, but of prohairesis”—a claim that has led some to believe that rhetoric is 
an art that by its very nature reasons in opposite directions (thus supplying proofs for the true and 
the false, the noble and the base), and that ethical deliberation is another matter altogether. 
According to this line of thinking, the ethically good orator will restrain her own uses of the 
means of persuasion, and a good legislator will restrain the uses of persuasive speech in the city, 
by means of legislation, ethical discipline, or phronēsis—the way that weapons manufacturers 
may be prohibited from selling to known criminals. On the contrary, Aristotle states that the end 
of judicial speakers is justice; of deliberative speakers, utility; and of epideictic speakers, the 
beautiful. It would seem that, to Aristotle, a speech that persuades what is debased is obviously 
not only ethically culpable, but also a failure of art—like a house with an uneven foundation or a 
leaky roof.11  
This understanding of speakers’ goals and audiences’ judgments may seem naïve. 
Obviously, many effective speakers intend some end other than what is beautiful, just, or 
advantageous. Yet Aristotle wants the rhetorical theorist to consider the natural and given ends 
of persuasive speech, thereby arriving at a definition of rhetorical artistry that accounts for 
speech’s ends—and not to define the art according to its most corrupted and debased 
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practitioners. It is likely that the majority of audiences will fail to notice this discrepancy 
between unscrupulous speakers’ unstated goals and the natural ends of language, and will also 
fail to notice the defective forms of argument that result from this discrepancy. Counterfeit 
notions of the just and the beautiful are much harder to discern than is a leaky roof. On the 
speaker’s side, then, the problem for Aristotle’s theory is not that some speakers simply do 
pursue bad ends; for, as I have shown, makers in many domains fail to discern the ends of their 
artifacts, or the relationships between efficient and final causes. The problem for a coherent 
Aristotelian rhetoric is to show that such speakers must nevertheless appeal to notions of the 
good that inhere in audiences’ deliberations and in human language. Ethically bad uses of speech 
are, in the most complete sense, rhetorically inartistic, though they may display artistry or 
artificiality in some limited respects (such as turns of phrase or techniques of amplification); but 
rhetorically artistic persuasion is always ethically good—though admittedly in an incomplete 
sense—because of the inherent character of the material on which they work (that is, common 
opinions about the good) and because of the inescapable and pre-existing forms that such 
materials must take to be persuasive (i.e., induction and deduction).  
On the audience side, however, the problem is to show how rhetorically artistic listening 
differs from phronēsis, and to make the case that even the phronimos would render better 
judgments if she were also a rhetorically artistic listener. Why, in other words, is art necessary in 
a domain (like practical judgment) that seems to belong to virtue? If the act of listening can be 
rhetorically artistic in Aristotle’s sense, then such listening must perform some function that 
phronēsis does not perform—a function that relates either to the making or to the use of 
persuasion. Such artistry would be analogous, in some sense, to the pilot’s art, which governs 
both the making and the use of rudders, and to the medical art, which enables the educated 
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person to make good judgments about health and sickness even if he or she is not a practicing 
doctor. To answer these objections, then, we must turn again to the Ethics and to the Politics for 
an examination of the relationship between art and judgment in the education of free citizens, 
and for a treatment of the uses of language in the development of a healthy soul or a well-
governed city.  
Salutary Listening in the Nicomachean Ethics 
I have already shown that Aristotle’s definition of technē in the Nicomachean Ethics is 
compatible with my understanding of arts as theoretical rather than productive capacities. 
However, Aristotle also takes pains to distinguish artistry from both the practical and the 
intellectual virtues, especially the virtue of phronēsis.12 He describes some limited ways in which 
certain virtues can be said to belong to certain arts, but he never develops in any great detail how 
the study of arts contributes to human thriving. Thus, it will be necessary to distinguish the art of 
rhetorical listening, which contributes to a citizen’s ability to render good judgments in rhetorical 
situations, from the virtue of phronēsis, which is useful more generally in making practical 
decisions that lead to human happiness. 
Aristotle’s terseness about the arts’ political utility should not be taken as a sign that he 
thinks of rhetoric (or any other art) as politically inconsequential. He thinks that dialectic, for 
example, is necessary for the philosophical study of ethics and politics; but neither the Ethics nor 
the Politics provides a full treatment of dialectic. That treatment he leaves to the Topics and the 
Sophistical Refutations. The opening sentence of the Ethics claims that every art and every 
inquiry aim at some good. Rhetoric is named alongside martial strategy and household 
governance as one of the arts that are “most honored,” and that are therefore immediately 
subordinate to politics in a way that, say, shoemaking and metallurgy are not.13 And, while some 
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offhand comments about rhetoric in the Politics indicate Aristotle’s disdain for demagoguery, it 
is important yet again to remember that he does not define anything according to its most 
debased manifestations. Artistry is different from practical judgment, of course, but this 
distinction need not imply that it is vulgar or unimportant. 
Several passages in the Ethics ponder the importance of careful and judicious listening, 
and while such passages never quite stipulate that such listening is a matter of rhetorical skill, 
Aristotle nevertheless implies that rhetorical training would make the virtuous person a better 
judge of arguments. Take, for example, the distinction that he makes at the beginning of the 
treatise between the modes of discourse that are proper to each discipline. The purpose of this 
distinction is to warn students away from seeking necessary demonstrations in matters of politics 
and human happiness, since those matters are indeterminate and contingent. It is nevertheless 
possible to attain wisdom about such matters, he says, by pointing out the truth “roughly and in 
outline.” However, only some kinds of listeners will profit from such ethical discourse: Those 
who have been habituated to virtue from a young age will better be able to grasp the truth of 
ethical premises, and those who have extensive experience with the particulars of public life will 
better be able to discern the usefulness of such principles in practice. Yet even among such 
ethically good and broadly experienced listeners, some additional education may be necessary 
for the rendering of good judgments about speech. I quote the passage at length.14  
And it is necessary also to take each of the things that are said in the same way, for it 
belongs to an educated person to look for just so much precision in each kind of discourse 
as the nature of the thing one is concerned with admits; for to demand demonstrations 
[apodeixeis] from a rhetorician [rhētorikon] seems about like accepting probable 
conclusions [pithanologountos] from a mathematician. 
All people are good at making distinctions [krinei kalōs, “judging well/nobly”] 
about the things they are acquainted with, and each is a good judge [agathos kritēs] of 
those things. Therefore, good judgment goes along with the way each one is educated, 
and the one who has been educated about everything has it in an unqualified way. For 
this reason, it is not appropriate for a young person to be a student of politics, since the 
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young are inexperienced in the actions of life (bion prazeōn], while these are the things 
about which politics speaks and from which it reasons. Also, since the young are apt to 
follow their impulses [pathesin], they would hear [akousetai] such discourses without 
purpose or benefit, since their end is not knowing but action [ou gnōsis alla praxis].  
[…] About the one who is to hear this discourse [kai peri men akroatou], and how 
it ought to be received [kai pōs apodekteon], and what task we have set before ourselves, 
let these things serve as prelude. 
 
Notice the similarities of word choice, and therefore of conceptual focus, between this passage 
and the first chapter of the Rhetoric. The problem with ethical and political discourse generally, 
like that of rhetorical situations, is that some people lack the experience and the virtue to judge 
speeches well. Yet they can more or less be trusted to judge well about things that they have 
experienced. However, while it is true that experience and virtue are the most important factors 
in the formation of a good listener, it is also true that “good judgment goes along with the way 
each one is educated, and the one who has been educated about everything [peri pan] has it in an 
unqualified way.” Paideia, it would seem, must begin with the inculcation of virtue, which is a 
prerequisite for all kinds of judgment; but judging speeches well may require all manner of other 
educational attainments, which Aristotle does not list here because at the moment he is not 
concerned with the totality of liberal education. Nevertheless, he implies that at the very least, 
someone listening to political discourse ought to be able to distinguish between different kinds of 
demonstration [apodeixeis], and should know something about arguments from probability 
[pithanologountos]. It is significant that he mentions a rhetorical speaker here, and not a 
dialectical one. Where, if not Aristotle’s own treatise on rhetoric, would his readers go to learn 
what kinds of proofs to expect or accept from such a speaker? 
The Ethics even suggests that rhetorical training might be useful in making distinctions 
about various kinds of good. Early in chapter 1, Aristotle introduces the problem of multiplicity 
of goods: Is the good in itself a unity, a single governing thing or form that resists or confounds 
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any attempt at description or definition? Or do various so-called “good” things share some 
identifiable property—some goodness that is the same in all of them? Or, finally, is “good” 
merely a convenient name we give to a wide variety of things that we happen to desire, but 
whose properties in themselves are only incidentally similar? (This is roughly the same series of 
questions debated in Plato’s Protagoras.) When Aristotle introduces these problems in the 
Ethics, he wonders whether “these things ought to be let go for now, since to be precise about 
them would be more at home in another kind of philosophic inquiry.”15 He returns to the 
problem later, naming the beautiful, the pleasant, and the advantageous as three related terms, all 
of which we call good; and of course, the whole of the Ethics is a meditation on the good life for 
human beings (which turns out also to include the just). Yet it is not clear where Aristotle is 
directing his readers for a more precise treatment of the good in itself, of its various 
manifestations, and of the names we give to those good things. Perhaps he is referring to his 
identification of good with “that for the sake of which,” and therefore with each being’s telos, as 
developed in the Physics and the Metaphysics. (Christopher Mirus resolves the problem by 
identifying the good with “actuality,” and in resolving the problem of unity and multiplicity by 
saying that each thing becomes good by actualizing its potentialities.)16 However, for a study of 
how the good is treated in human language—which, according to the Politics, is the faculty that 
makes us able to apprehend the good in the first place—Aristotle might just as well refer his 
readers to Rhetoric 1.3, where the advantageous, the noble, and the just are identified as the ends 
of persuasive speeches, and to 1.6-15, where the many tangled manifestations of the good are 
catalogued and categorized according to the kinds of premises and propositions they require.  
That Aristotle is thinking of rhetorical study (in addition, perhaps, to metaphysical 
inquiry) becomes clear a few pages later, when he is trying to distinguish between two ways of 
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calling human achievements good: that is, between praise (epainos) and honor (timē). We praise 
people for “some sort of attribute or for holding [themselves] in a certain condition,” but we 
reserve honor only for the highest goods—those on account of which people are self-sufficient or 
blessed or seem nearly to be divine. This distinction will later help Aristotle to tease out the 
difference between virtue and happiness, on the one hand—virtue is praised, happiness 
honored—and between happiness and pleasure, on the other. (We neither honor nor praise 
someone for experiencing pleasure.) Yet this distinction, too, seems out of place in a dialectical 
study of ethics, since it is a matter not of human action as such but rather of the affective 
language we use to express our approval of such action. Again, Aristotle says that the question is 
at home in a different field of study; but this time, he specifies which field he has in mind: 
Praise [epainos] belongs to virtue, for from this, people become apt at performing 
beautiful actions, and honorific speeches [engkomia] are similarly for deeds, whether of 
the body or of the soul. But perhaps to be precise about these things is more appropriate 
to those [who] have taken pains over honorific speeches [tois peri ta engkomia 
peponēmenois], but for us it is clear from what has been said that happiness belongs 
among things that are honored and among ends [tōn timiōn kai teleiōn]. And it seems to 
be this way because it is also a source, since every one of us does everything else for the 
sake of this, and we set down the source and cause of good things as something honored 
and divine.17 
 
The encomium is one of the species of epideictic speech—a sister species to the speech of praise 
(epainos). To tell the difference between these two modes of language, and to distinguish both 
praise and encomium from honor, belongs not to the field of ethics but to the study of rhetoric: 
Aristotle spends an entire chapter of the Rhetoric making just these kinds of distinctions. One 
sentence is worded almost identically to its counterpart in the Ethics: “Praise is speech that 
makes clear the greatness of virtue. There is thus need to show that actions have been of that sort. 
Encomium, in contrast, is concerned with deeds.”18 This parallel language establishes that 
Aristotle has the study of rhetoric in mind when he claims that some kinds of distinctions about 
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the good are more at home in some other field than in ethical study: Aristotle may even be cross-
referencing the Rhetoric at this moment in the Ethics. It further suggests that the ethicist should 
defer to the rhetorician, not only for the drafting of discourse that praises and blames, but also in 
judging whether someone else’s distinctions about such matters are sufficiently “precise.” The 
expert that Aristotle would consult on these matters is someone who has “taken pains” over 
speeches of praise: the verb poneō implies one who has studied such speeches carefully, reading 
and hearing and evaluating them, not merely one who has composed or delivered them. 
Learning to listen well—to be aware of one’s own opinions and passions, and of one’s 
own susceptibility to persuasion—also turns out to be a prerequisite for ethical and psychological 
study. To know the ends of human life, one must consult the opinions of others and be willing to 
submit to valid persuasion, but also to resist what is invalid or plainly false. One should always 
begin with the commonly held principles of one’s neighbors; yet one should not, as Sardanapalus 
did, accept the “completely slavish” opinions of “most people,” namely that life is no more than 
the pursuit of bodily pleasure. One must of course be humble about one’s deficiencies; yet one 
must not allow such humility to cloud one’s judgment. Too often, Aristotle says, “when [people] 
are conscious of ignorance in themselves, [they] marvel at those who say [that happiness] is 
something grand and above them.”19 Yet again, though, a complete skepticism or resistance to 
persuasion would be inhuman. The work of a human being, on account of which we are able to 
achieve happiness and not only the pleasure of nutrition and perception, is that we can be 
persuaded by articulate speech:  
What remains [after nutrition and perception] is some sort of life that puts into action that 
in us that has articulate speech; of this capacity, one aspect is what is able to be persuaded 




In context, this “aspect” of human life that “is able to be persuaded by reason” is nothing more 
than the irrational part of the soul. Aristotle is saying that, because human desire and spiritedness 
can be restrained by the rational part, figuratively “listening to” the rational part’s advice, 
humans act in accord with reason in ways that beasts and plants do not. Aristotle will later make 
this very argument to prove that the irrational part of the soul is composite: 
It appears that the irrational part of the soul is twofold, since the vegetative part of it has 
no share at all in reason, while the desiring and generally appetitive part does share in it 
in some way, insofar as it listens to and can obey reason. In the same way too we call 
listening to one’s father or friends “being rational” (echein logon) [...] And that the 
irrational part is in some way persuaded by reason (peithetai tōs upo logou), is indicated 
by admonition and by every sort of chastisement and encouragement.21 
 
The activity of giving and receiving advice is both evidence for the existence of this division in 
the soul and a useful analogy for how the division works. Right reason “persuades” the appetitive 
part of the soul, just as a father advises a son; and a well-trained soul will listen to its rational 
part in the same way that a good son listens to his father. But we also know that the appetitive 
part exists—that there is a part of our soul which is not itself rational, but which can learn to 
obey reason—precisely because we have all had the experience of being persuaded by another 
person’s reason either to follow or to resist our own desires. In other words, the experience of 
listening and of being persuaded—of knowing consciously that we have been persuaded, and of 
reflecting on the reasons why—is a necessary prior experience for someone who wants to 
understand Aristotle’s psychology. 
Elsewhere, Aristotle speaks of the passion of “spiritedness” (thumos) in much the same 
way. Thumos is the desire for honor—which, when slighted, manifests as anger or a desire for 
revenge. This passion seems always to listen to reason to some extent, since the very notion of 
honor requires some sense of just deserts. To perceive a slight is to believe that one has been 
done an injustice, which of course assumes some notion of justice or propriety as a tacit premise. 
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Yet having heard just this much of what reason has to say—that justice exists, that it is 
important, and that someone may have withheld one’s just deserts—thumos rushes ahead and 
seeks revenge without investigating the particulars. Like the appetitive part of the soul as a whole 
(which is the seat of all the passions), thumos seems to participate in reason only to the extent 
that it truly learns to “listen” before inciting action.22  
Finally, in anticipation of the advice on education that he will offer in the Politics, 
Aristotle suggests at various places near the end of the Nicomachean Ethics that the study of 
music has a purpose beyond learning to sing or play: that is, habituation to the right kinds of 
pleasure and pain, which leads to good judgment about tunes and performances.23 This 
observation is a kind of extended analogy for habituation to pleasure and pains more generally—
as well as for Aristotle’s dilemma in the Politics about the uses of education in forming good 
judgment. Good judgments about music, like good judgments about arguments or laws, seem to 
arise from a combination of experience of particulars, habituation to right pleasures and pains 
(through good families and neighbors), careful training in the principles of excellence that 
govern the discipline, and rational examination of excellent exemplars. The passages below 
come in quick succession at the end of book 10.24 
A person of serious stature […] enjoys actions in accord with virtue and disdains those 
that result from vice, just as a musical person is pleased by beautiful melodies and pained 
by bad ones.  
 
[Perhaps] pleasures differ in kind, for the ones that come from beautiful things are 
different from the ones that come from shameful things, for it is not possible to feel the 
pleasure that comes from something just without being a just person, or the pleasure that 
comes from something musical without being a musical person, and similarly in the other 
cases. […] 
 
Each person is at-work in connection with those things and by means of those capacities 
that satisfy him most: a musical person by hearing and with melodies, a lover of learning 
by thinking and with topics of contemplation, and so too with each of the rest. 
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Those of the sophists who profess that art seem to be very far from teaching it. For they 
do not even know at all what sort of thing it is or what sorts of things it is concerned with; 
otherwise they would not class it as the same as, or even inferior to, rhetoric, nor would 
they think it an easy thing for someone to make laws by collecting the laws that are well 
thought of, since he would be able to pick out the best ones, as if picking them out did not 
require understanding, and judging them rightly were not a very great task, as it would be 
in matters pertaining to music. For it is those who have experience with each sort of thing 
who judge its works rightly, and understand by what means and in what manner they are 
achieved, and what sorts of things harmonize with what others. 
 
Learning music, then, which is an art—not a virtue—can habituate someone to experience pain 
or pleasure rightly or nobly; and the art makes one better both at listening and at performing. 
Indeed, arts are useful examples of the ways that we achieve excellence or knowledge in any 
field; and the sophists, who subordinate politics to rhetoric, might learn some humility about 
their vaunted expertise by observing how musicians learn to judge good tunes from bad ones. 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric may help such sophists to see the disciplinary boundaries of rhetoric, and 
perhaps even teach them to be better judges of persuasive speech. That it helps us to judge and to 
refute their fallacies is clear from the Sophistical Refutations: “It is the task of one who has 
knowledge about a thing to speak the truth about what he knows, and to be able to expose the 
individual who makes false statements.” Conversely, we might with profit recall from the 
Eudemian Ethics that one who lacks education in any subject and is unable to refute false claims 
will be subject to the arguments of charlatans.25 
Education and Judgment in the Politics 
I have suggested that early treatments of arts in the Politics—like those in the 
Nicomachean Ethics—are oblique and indecisive: Aristotle wonders, at first, how the arts 
contribute (if at all) to human thriving and to the health of the city, but leaves a resolution of this 
problem for the end of the treatise. These early statements about the arts’ vulgarity, and about the 
artist’s inability to judge his own artifacts as well as the user does, should be read in tension with 
118 
 
Aristotle’s later and more extensive treatment of arts as part of the education of aristocratic 
youth. 
For example, the Politics raises but does not resolve the question of who in the city is 
best able to make political judgments. Large assemblies, even if composed of people who are not 
wise, may make better decisions than smaller groups of the wise or the educated, since they will 
bring more expertise and experience en masse than even the most elite few would be able to 
exercise. There are pragmatic as well as ethical reasons for inviting citizens to deliberate together 
about matters that affect them. Not to allow public deliberation is to fill a city with enemies: 
people who have no stake in the city’s success, and who do not believe that the city serves their 
interests. They would soon begin to believe that they were being subject to an unjust and entirely 
arbitrary rule, reasoning that no one person (no matter how enlightened or benevolent) could 
discern in every particular case what is best for them, and that in practice most rulers are not 
likely even to try. 
Aristotle does not, however, treat deliberative assemblies or judicial courts as unqualified 
goods. In several places, he suggests that it is politically unhealthy for such gatherings to exert 
power over anything but the particulars of a given exigency, since political stability requires the 
laws not to change often or on a whim. Further, he seems to think it salutary for assemblies to 
meet rarely, and for a short time, not only because frequent meetings would upset the delicate 
balance created by the constitution and the laws, but also because assemblies and juries render 
the best judgments when they can be attended by farmers and other such rural citizens—the very 
people who are least likely to enjoy serving as judges. The marketplace, Aristotle says, is full of 
idle men who like speechifying for the sake of mere spectacle, and who therefore have both the 
time and the inclination to attend frequent and lengthy assemblies. Such people are apt to be 
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frivolous and fickle in their judgments, or to reward sophistic cleverness rather than solid 
deliberation about the common good. The laws, Aristotle suggests, ought to restrict this 
busybody element. Farmers will be willing to leave their work for short times, spaced over long 
intervals, but only if the assemblies’ purposes are serious; and once there, they will not tolerate 
long speeches that veer off topic or that suggest anything but the most practical solutions to 
pressing problems. Farmers also desire political stability, so they are skeptical of legislative 
innovations. The way to make assemblies politically healthy and useful, then, is to structure them 
so that people with the most practical judgment will attend. The obvious inference is that the best 
listener and the best judge is the phronimos, who may or may not (but probably does not) have 
rhetorical or dialectical training. 
In relation to the Rhetoric, though, this inference is not so obvious. For one thing, these 
recommendations assume a largely uneducated populace as a given fact of political governance. 
At no place does Aristotle describe, nor could he imagine, a populace composed entirely of 
people who have the leisure to study dialectic and rhetoric; nor, indeed, would he think that such 
a city would be healthy. The free yeoman class possesses virtues that are good in themselves and 
that are necessary for the success of the polis. With minimal training, they make better and more 
courageous fighters than the savage lifelong soldiers of the Spartan regime. Their virtues, gained 
through habituation to the right kinds of hardship and strain (not the artificially extreme 
deprivations of the military state), make them good soldiers as well as good assembly members. 
Furthermore, the city needs their product; and the material facts of water, soil, and seed leave 
farmers little time for anything besides farming. Yet no one would infer from these observations 
that the arts of soldiery and generalship are somehow unnecessary for one who wants to make 
judgments about military strategy. Aristotle sees no need to add this caveat, because it is so 
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obvious. It may be that in some cases, the virtues peculiar to a farmer are sufficient to promote 
good soldiery or even some parts of good military strategy; but the artistic military strategist 
understands the causes of success in a more thorough and orderly way, and such understanding is 
always, or nearly always, an aid to wise judgment about military matters. Surely the same can be 
said about rhetoric, given its proximity to generalship in the opening of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Nor should Aristotle’s recommendations about the composition of a deliberative 
assembly cause us to conclude that he sees no role for the rhetorical art in forming good listeners. 
In fact, his treatment of aristocratic education suggests just the opposite. Children should study 
the arts, he says, to become good judges of made things. Such judgment, as we have seen, is no 
less artistic than is artistic making; but what is its importance? Without the Politics, we might be 
tempted to understand such education as a mere ornament to the good life—as a kind of elite 
connoisseurship that marks off the city’s best families as in-the-know. For Aristotle, though, 
learning to judge artifacts is a matter of household economics, of political leadership, and of the 
contemplation of virtue and beauty. It is essential, and not auxiliary, to the good life. 
Training in music is the archetypal example, but not the only one. At the end of book 7, 
Aristotle sets down his first principle of education: “In all those matters where habituation is 
possible,” he says, “it is better to habituate immediately from the beginning.”26 Such matters 
include everything from exposure to heat and cold, to “the sorts of play” in which children 
engage, to “the quality of the stories and tales” that they hear. The effect of “foul speech” on 
children is a matter of particular concern for Aristotle: “the legislator should banish foul speech 
from the city more than anything else (for by speaking readily about some foul matter one comes 
closer to doing it), and particularly from among the young, so that they neither say nor hear 
anything of this sort.” Speaking and hearing are both means of habituation, either for good or for 
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ill. The same holds true for “unseemly paintings or stories,” and of “lampoons [and] comedy”: 
though Aristotle does not seek to banish these from the city (as Plato’s Socrates suggests might 
be done in the Republic), he claims that legislators, parents, and nurses should take great care 
that “everything mean...be made foreign to the young, particularly things...that involve either 
depravity or malice.” Since “all art and education wish to supply the element that is lacking in 
nature,” it is the job of educators to improve upon children’s natural growth by directing it 
toward the good and the beautiful. “All such things [stories, tales, and forms of play] should 
prepare the road for later pursuits.” Children learn to love, or at least to consider normal, 
whatever they encounter earliest; so an education that excludes the base and the depraved, while 
including what is useful, just, and beautiful, will “make [citizens] immune to the harm that 
arises” from stories, plays, and speeches that they hear as adults. Hence, it would seem that one 
of the chief tasks of the educator is to cull the works of art that children will encounter and come 
to love, since viewing or hearing works of art will always incline the soul toward some virtue or 
vice, some beauty or ugliness. In the earliest stages of life, educators do not so much teach 
children to judge works of art as they choose which works are most likely to inculcate an innate 
sense of what is good while making evil seem foreign or undesirable. Speech-acts, including not 
only works of art (such as plays and stories) but also the idle talk of adults in a household, have a 
similar effect on the soul and therefore require a similar judiciousness. 
Book 8 begins, then, by inferring some useful principles of educational policy: that 
education should be compulsory and centrally regulated, and that it should serve the ultimate end 
of the city by inculcating the requisite habits and attitudes in its young citizens. The rest of book 
8 is Aristotle’s only extant extended discussion of education in the arts, and it is clearly 
incomplete. (He promises a full treatment liberal learning, but the Politics as we have it includes 
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only hints at what this lost discourse might have recommended.) Of this book’s seven extant 
chapters, four are devoted to education in music (see Figure 11).  
Figure 11. Chapter outline of Politics book 8. 
1. Education and the city’s telos. 
2. Problems in educational theory; liberal and slavish education. 
3. Music and leisure. 
4. Strenuousness and moderation in exertions. 
5. Music and character formation. 
6. Performing music and listening to music. 
7. Conclusions about musical education: means and ends. 
 
 
It is clear from these chapters that Aristotle considers the education of a free person to be 
a matter of inculcating virtue, which is good in and for itself, and that practical and artistic 
studies ought always to be oriented toward such education in character. Any training that makes 
one attentive to the pleasures or desires of a customer or client, and not to the goods of one’s 
own soul or to the advantage of one’s family or friends, is vulgar and unworthy of a free person. 
At the beginning of book 8, though, he draws no such hard line between the manual arts and the 
acquisition of knowledge. Rather, he treats both the arts and the sciences as though they might be 
either liberal or illiberal, depending how they are learned and for what ends. He observes and 
evaluates educational practices to measure how well they promote liberality of mind and body 
for children so employed. 
Among the “accepted sorts of learning,” music stands out for the ambiguity of its ends 
and for the persistent disagreements as to its vulgarity or liberality. Everyone seems to agree that 
“letters and drawing” are “useful for life” in a variety of ways, and that gymnastics promote 
courage, health, and vigor. But why teach a child music? It is not useful for business, household 
management, or politics—at least not directly, as reading and writing are. Nor does music 
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condition the body, as gymnastic exercise does. But it does enable one to enjoy oneself nobly in 
times of leisure, which is chosen for its own sake. So, Aristotle concludes, there must be some 
sorts of education—perhaps not just music—that are chosen for their liberality and nobility, and 
not for their usefulness.27 By examining an art that seems to have limited utility, he has discerned 
ends of education that we desire for their own sake—and has thereby concluded that utilitarian 
concerns ought to be subordinate to liberal ones in education as a whole. It is here that Aristotle 
provides the tantalizing promise of a full treatment of liberal education, presumably using his 
investigation of music as an educational paradigm, just as he did in book 10 of the Ethics. All he 
is willing to say at this dialectical juncture is that liberal studies, though perhaps also 
immediately useful, would be desired for two other higher reasons. First, they would make 
“many other sorts of learning” possible (the characteristic example is letters); and second, they 
would make one “expert at studying [...] beauty,” as drawing makes one expert at judging the 
beauty of bodies. He will later add that liberal learning strengthens body and mind (and does not 
enervate them through excessive exertion), and that it is governed by a sense of the beautiful. 
Only by investigating the ends of an apparently useless subject of education does 
Aristotle discern the truly liberal character of two other arts, which he had previously treated as 
utilitarian. Before discussing music, he had claimed that education of free citizens would need to 
prepare them for the work of household economics and of political leadership—a claim that he 
has not abandoned. Yet his view of these very occupations has now been enriched or improved 
by his consideration of leisurely learning and the contemplation of beauty—two intellectual 
activities that we desire for their own sakes, to which occupation in business and politics are now 
treated as subordinate. We learn letters and drawing for the sake of business, but we transact 
business for the sake of leisure; and a fine enjoyment of leisure requires the abilities of writing 
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and drawing, not so that one might produce artifacts, but so that one might read, learn, view, and 
judge. By identifying these uses of writing and drawing as the ultimate ends of their study, 
Aristotle in no way minimizes their usefulness for daily business. He is simply arguing that their 
immediate uses are not their ultimate purposes. To seek everywhere for the element of utility, he 
concludes, is the mark of a vulgar mind. Many, perhaps all, pursuits that Aristotle and others 
have previously treated as slavish and utilitarian might be unveiled as liberal and noble by a yet-
to-come (but now, alas, lost) Aristotelian investigation of ultimate ends. 
The last four chapters of the Politics continue to refine the differences between liberal 
and slavish education, not by distinguishing liberal from slavish subjects, but by describing what 
habits and dispositions make a mind and body free. Each of the arts is treated as though it can be 
activated in reciprocal directions: writing and reading, drawing and viewing, performing music 
and listening to it. In each case, it is the latter (receptive) activity that Aristotle treats as liberal 
and noble; and he consistently teaches that we learn productive capacities for the sake of being 
noble judges (and not the other way around). If this reciprocity is inherent in the study of 
productive arts, then of course learning to listen is inherent in the study of rhetoric; and we might 
even expect Aristotle to treat this application of the art as the more liberal and self-sufficient of 
the two. Just as the child who learns to draw will make a better judge of the beauty of bodies, so 
the child who learns to speak persuasively will make a better judge of the truth or falsehood of 
“the body of persuasion,” the enthymeme. And just as learning one’s letters makes one capable 
of learning any number of subjects by reading about them, so the mastery of rhetorical argument 
will make one capable of hearing and judging any number of speeches in the courtroom or the 
assembly.  
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I have argued that Aristotle’s treatment of music would seem, from the dialectical 
structure of the treatise, to be a paradigm for his understanding of liberal education as a whole; 
but I discern a special correspondence with the study of persuasive and poetic speech, and not 
only because music and speech were so closely intertwined in Athenian theatrical 
performances.28 The logic by which Aristotle discerns music’s effects on the soul, for example, 
might work equally well for discerning analogous effects of persuasive speech. Virtue and vice 
begin with correct or incorrect experience of pleasure and pain; listening to music, likewise, 
makes one feel pleasure or pain, either rightly or wrongly. Habituation to such experiences 
concerns “nothing so much as [...] judging and enjoying respectable characters and noble 
actions.”29 Listening to a noble tune, and learning to take pleasure in it, makes the soul noble; 
“this is clear from the facts.” Imitation of nobility, whether in language or in music, habituates 
the soul to an appreciation of such virtues; and the same is true of their opposites. (Recall 
Aristotle’s strictures against mean speech in the presence of children.) It is necessary for children 
to learn to play instruments and to sing because otherwise it would be difficult or impossible for 
them to become excellent judges of song: in other words, they learn to play and sing so that they 
will learn to love what is beautiful and shun what is frivolous or debased. Aristotle recommends 
that youth who are being educated for political virtue should not learn tunes or instruments that 
seem to exist only to show off the musician’s talent—those that are spectacular or frenzied in 
rhythm and melody—and that they should not participate in musical contests, which would 
habituate them only to exciting favorable audience reaction (and not to the enjoyment of beauty 
for its own sake). This preference for truth and beauty over competitive spectacle is analogous to 
the Rhetoric’s preference for enthymematic persuasion over the crude instrumentality of the Arts 
of Speech. Thus, what is said of music applies to speech; and if musical education is oriented 
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toward noble judgment of tunes and performances, then so rhetorical education must be oriented 
toward good judgment of persuasive speeches. 
Language and the City 
This requirement seems all the more fitting for Aristotelian political philosophy when we 
consider the opening two chapters of the Politics, which seek to discern the city’s four causes—
especially its final cause—by describing how cities come about. Having posited that all 
partnerships come about for the sake of some good, Aristotle speculates that human partnerships 
must have started small, for the sake of families’ and households’ stability and safety, and must 
then have grown into extended alliances of families and friends—first villages, and then cities. 
Natural hierarchies, Aristotle says, provided rational order to such partnerships and oriented each 
member’s actions toward a common good. The city, then, is “the partnership arising from several 
villages that is complete;” and its completeness is discernible in that, “while coming into being 
for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well.”30 It is on account of this telos that 
Aristotle calls the city “natural.” Assuming some knowledge of the etiology he develops in the 
Physics, he then says that “the nature of [any] thing” is simply “what [that] thing is [...] when its 
coming into being is complete.” The city is the natural completion of human association because, 
having come into being to provide safety and security, it can then provide the necessary 
conditions for human flourishing, which is the end of human life.  
The city’s material cause, then, is not only human beings, but rather human associations 
that exist for the sake of common advantage. Its form and its telos are the same: the city simply 
is the relationships and hierarchies between human beings, by which and in which they live well. 
These relationships give rational order to human life, not only orienting us toward the good but 
also constituting the goods that are peculiar to human life. Because of these associations, which 
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are the form of human flourishing, Aristotle concludes that the human being is, by nature, “a 
political animal”—that is, a member of a city. We are complete in our human nature in and 
through our natural political associations. 
Why are human beings naturally political? In one way, as I describe above in the 
Introduction, we are more naturally coupling beings than political ones: It takes no formal 
training to start a family. We share this natural orientation with the beasts. Yet our capacity for 
speech creates another natural end, one that paradoxically requires reason and care. As speakers 
and listeners, we are naturally able to discover and pursue goods that transcend survival. These 
ends are therefore natural, but they require art and virtue—which come about by intentional, 
rational training. Thus, our capacity for speech is one efficient cause of cities’ coming to be, and 
a necessary condition for any city’s survival, not only because speech and reason give us a 
competitive advantage for survival, but also because a city is fundamentally and definitionally 
reliant on this capacity that discloses the form and the ends of human association. 
That man is much more a political animal than any kind of bee or any herd animal is 
clear. For, as we assert, nature does nothing in vain; and man alone among the animals 
has speech. The voice indeed indicates the painful or pleasant, and hence is present in 
other animals as well; for their nature has come this far, that they have a perception of the 
painful and pleasant and indicate these things to each other. But speech serves to reveal 
the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust. For it is peculiar 
to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad 
and just and unjust and other things [of this sort]; and partnership in these things is what 
makes a household and a city.31  
 
Speech’s primary utility—revealing the advantageous, the just, and other things of this sort—is 
the same as its persuasive ends as discerned in the Rhetoric. The division between rhetoric and 
politics, which Aristotle takes such pains to preserve, is simply a distinction between knowledge 
of political subjects and knowledge of how to be persuasive about them. Yet political science the 
and rhetorical art discern the same etiology and the same utility in their considerations of speech 
128 
 
itself. It turns out that all speech, and not just persuasive speech of the three kinds that Aristotle 
analyzes in the Rhetoric, exists for the sake of disclosing the good.  
If, as Aristotle claims, this end is intrinsic to speech, then it is also true (as I have been 
arguing) that a morally bad argument is always in some way rhetorically inartistic. The end of 
speech simply is the good, so of course every persuasive argument assumes premises about the 
good. “Vote for this measure” is short for “It would be good (advantageous, just, noble) for you 
to vote for this measure.” This orientation toward the good makes human associations more than 
alliances for mutual protection. It is what makes the city more than the hive. The city comes into 
being for the sake of life, and exists for the sake of living well; but it is language, with its 
inherent reciprocity and its orientation toward the good, that makes us able in the first place to 




MATERIAL CAUSES:  
SPECIAL TOPICS, CHARACTER, AND PASSIONS (Rhetoric 1.4 – 2.17) 
At Rhetoric 1.4, having finished his preliminary sketch of rhetorical theory, Aristotle 
begins to investigate the nuances of argument and persuasion, focusing first on what I have 
called persuasion’s material cause: the opinions, attitudes, and propositions that compose 
enthymematic persuasion. Following his stated plan, the rest of book 1 will list the special topics, 
which he divides between the three genres of speeches, and book 2 will examine the three pisteis 
and the common topics, which are not bound by speech genre but are observable across the field 
of rhetoric.1 The special topics, Aristotle says, are less strictly rhetorical than the pisteis and the 
common topics, since their premises originate in disciplines other than rhetoric and depend for 
their validity on those other disciplines’ standards of inquiry and truth. The pisteis, by contrast, 
arise from the features of the rhetorical situation, which in turn are rooted in the speaker and 
audience’s shared human nature; and the common topics arise from the structure of language and 
thought, and not from the pragmata of any other art or science.  
These chapters are not, as is commonly assumed, merely a storehouse of arguments for 
persuasive speakers. They do provide extensive lists of premises, propositions, and strategies of 
argumentation, but Aristotle maintains his theoretical distance from the particular procedures of 
rhetorical invention, so that what the reader encounters is more like an observational outline of 
what speakers and listeners do than a list of rules or strategies for how to be persuasive. In a 
handbook, one might expect to see extended examples of how to compose or deploy each kind of 
premise, or how to appeal to an audience’s age or political loyalties; but in these chapters, such 
examples are sparse and spare, offered with what seems to be a disinterested nonchalance. The 
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observations on emotion and character are stated in general, theoretical terms, so that it is up to 
the individual rhetorical artist to discover how such observations might be used. This theoretical 
stance, coupled with Aristotle’s continued use of first-person plural, invites the rhetorical artist to 
imagine herself as an audience or judge at least as often as she imagines herself a speaker. About 
each proposition and proof, she wonders not only how she might deploy it persuasively, but also 
when and under what circumstances she herself would find such an appeal persuasive. Moreover, 
Aristotle often turns rhetoric’s faculties of persuasion against rhetors themselves, or against his 
students’ own rhetorical position, laying bare the characteristic follies, fallacies, and 
vulnerabilities of youth, wealth, democracy, ambition, philosophy, and even rhetoric. A student 
at the Academy or Lyceum, whether a venal politician in the mold of Alcibiades or a lover of 
wisdom like Theaetetus, will find himself wondering about his own faculty of judgment, seeking 
to discern which of Aristotle’s arguments would persuade him, and why. Discreet references to 
Athens’ emerging class of eloquent speakers—their vanity, their habit of equivocation, and their 
claim to be both a benefit and a potential menace to the city—confirm that Aristotle intends his 
students to master the techniques of persuasion not only as means of persuading audiences but 
also as means of judging and refuting bad arguments. 
Taxonomical Difficulties 
It is surprisingly common for commentators to acknowledge the theoretical stance of 1.1-
3 but to treat chapters 4-15 and all of book 2 as though Aristotle were writing a practical 
handbook for speakers. Kennedy labels chapters 5-6 “Ethical topics useful in deliberative 
rhetoric”; chapter 8, “Topics about constitutions useful in deliberative rhetoric”; and so on. 
Charles Sears Baldwin, whose analysis of book 1 emphasizes the theoretical quality of the 
treatise, nevertheless has this to say about the special topics for deliberation: “Since in politics, 
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for example, the public speaker needs to know something of finance, war, commerce, legislation, 
Aristotle gives him a suggestive summary of what he should learn.”2 Translating to pithanon as 
“means of persuasion” encourages this view. The topics, by this definition, are places where 
speakers go to find the propositions they will need to address a given problem; and the pisteis are 
guidelines for how to adapt those propositions to various rhetorical situations. The speaker who 
studies these central chapters of the Rhetoric will thus have an ever-growing bank of “available 
means,” and will become more persuasive to the extent that he or she learns to deploy them. Yet 
this speaker-centered point of view gives rise to several intractable problems of interpretation, 
with attendant practical difficulties for the canons of speechwriting.  
First, the boundaries between the three speech genres, between the common and special 
topics, and between the three pisteis break down rather quickly, so that the storehouse ends up 
looking rather untidy and loses much of its supposed utility for speakers.3 Each of the so-called 
“special” topics, which was alleged to provide propositions useful in one genre of speech, turns 
out to be useful in the other two—not only for creating logical arguments, but also for 
establishing a speaker’s credibility and appealing to an audience’s emotions.4 The three pisteis, 
too, overlap in countless ways. One who speaks logically or knows her subject will, on the 
whole, gain credibility; and one who is credible will also more consistently achieve persuasion 
through emotional appeal. Some of the common topics (such as degree of magnitude) are also 
treated as special topics (greater or lesser good, amplification); and the special topics themselves 
receive a second summary treatment at the beginning of the section on enthymeme.5  
Sometimes Aristotle acknowledges these redundancies, as when he explains that the 
special topics for epideictic speeches are also, incidentally, the elements of ethical proof (though 
this overlap apparently goes unnoticed at 2.12, where Aristotle takes up the ēthos of the 
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audience). More often, he requires the reader or listener to discover the overlap for him- or 
herself and to wonder whether the second treatment of a given subject adds anything to the first. 
Because his investigation of the topics and proofs obscures the very disciplinary boundaries that 
Aristotle claims to have drawn, it is not clear that his taxonomy would help any persuasive 
speaker to discover the proofs most appropriate for an occasion or speech—especially given the 
fact that, on the question of how to adapt a proposition or appeal to any particular rhetorical task, 
Aristotle has so little to say. 
Second, it has always been difficult for readers of the Rhetoric to account for the 
disciplinary status and the persuasive utility of the special topics. These topics are not properly 
part of rhetoric; each belongs to another discipline, which has its own internal standards for truth 
and accuracy. Aristotle has repeatedly complained about persuasive speakers’ habit of pretending 
to know more than they do, and he has tried to distinguish the study of persuasion from the study 
of law, war, or ethics. Moreover, as he has already pointed out, the audience for a public speech 
lacks the knowledge necessary to benefit from discipline-specific discourse, and a rhetorical 
situation affords a speaker insufficient time either to learn or to teach such matters. Yet Aristotle 
presents these topics as necessary for deliberative, judicial, and epideictic speakers, respectively, 
even arranging his treatise so that the special topics are encountered before the three pisteis. He 
seems to want to have it both ways: to avoid Gorgias and Isocrates’ error of claiming all 
available knowledge for rhetorical study, but to insist nevertheless that public speakers must 
achieve competence in fields other than rhetoric if they are to be persuasive. To complicate 
matters even further, he presents these topics only in outline, and at several places reminds us 
that the study of rhetoric can take us only so far, since precise knowledge belongs to the 
disciplines themselves. Perhaps this imprecision is a condescension to rhetoric’s comparatively 
133 
low power of focus, just as hypokrisis will later be described as a necessary but regrettable 
concession to the faults of listeners. Yet such an accommodation would seem to encourage, 
rather than to mitigate, public speakers’ habit of overreaching. Reading Aristotle’s treatise, an 
aspiring orator learns just enough of politics and ethics to seem credible on such matters to an 
uninformed audience, and is moreover assured by the treatise itself that rhetorical study neither 
can nor should provide any further competence. Will not such an orator then deploy these 
imprecise propositions to achieve unjustified victories in rhetorical contests? Regardless of his 
intentions, will not his speeches violate the ethical standards that Aristotle identified in chapters 
1–3, which Aristotle takes to be inherent in the study and practice of persuasion? How does 
Aristotle draw the boundaries between rhetoric and other disciplines, and to what extent should 
the rhetorical artist seek or claim to have achieved proficiency in those disciplines? 
Third, and most puzzling, there are a few passages in these chapters where Aristotle 
seems unabashedly to recommend the use of invalid and unethical argumentative techniques. 
Such passages are rare: most of the time, when discussing the special topics and the first two 
pisteis, Aristotle maintains the theoretical distance from the rhetorical situation that he 
established in 1.1-3. But in those few passages that prescribe techniques for speakers, Aristotle 
sometimes states that one ought to “seem” credible, or to make someone else seem culpable or 
praiseworthy, with little regard for truth or accuracy.6 He recommends learning to argue on both 
sides—not, as stated previously, so that one may learn the truth of the case, but so that one might 
use whatever propositions are at hand to achieve a persuasive goal. Both in their immediate 
context and in context of the treatise as a whole, these passages are jarring. Their sophistical 
recommendations undermine the very claims that Aristotle has used to justify the study of 
rhetoric: that truth is naturally stronger than falsehood, and that audiences for the most part hit on 
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truth; that it belongs to the same capacity to see the true and the apparently true, the persuasive 
and the apparently persuasive, and that the study of rhetoric helps the truth to prevail politically; 
that sophistic speech is a matter of prohairesis and is in no way part of the rhetorical art, which 
studies opposing arguments only to discern which are truer and more persuasive; and, finally, 
that the inherently logical character of all persuasion and the inherently ethical character of all 
language require the rhetorical artist to identify the ends of persuasive speech in terms of just, 
advantageous, and beautiful outcomes for the audience. 
To be sure, some apparent inconsistencies can be explained by the messiness and 
indeterminacy of political and ethical matters. An argument that would be sophistical in one case 
may be valid in another. (We may need a flexible ruler to measure the circumference of a 
column’s base, and a straight one to measure its height.) Further, it is simply the nature of 
rhetorical speech, like dialectical speech, to reason in opposite directions; and some of the 
sophistic arguments presented in book 2 may simply be an attempt to analyze all the ways a 
given proposition might be used, to prepare the virtuous public speaker for sophistical arguments 
that she will encounter in future debates. As Arnhart explains, Aristotle “cannot ignore such 
modes of argument—for the good rhetorician must understand such things if he is to be well 
armed against them.”7 Yet Aristotle does not always point out which arguments are fallacious 
and which are valid. In book 1, chapter 9, for example—which I examine in detail below—he 
positively recommends argumentative techniques that we would expect him to reject as unethical 
or invalid. 
Most would agree that the persuasive speaker, in Aristotle’s judgment, has some latitude 
in choosing imperfect means of persuasion to bring a given audience to good ends, like a doctor 
prescribing medicine to a sick person that would be toxic to a healthy body. Arnhart even claims 
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that “the study of rhetorical reasoning depends less upon distinguishing truth and falsity than 
upon discerning the subtle gradations of truth in rhetorical argumentation.” If such latitude could 
fully explain Aristotle’s apparent moral and logical laxity, then perhaps no further comment 
would be needed. Yet it may be necessary to admit that such attempts to explain these 
inconsistencies amount to little more than special pleading. If the first three chapters, which give 
Aristotle’s theory of argumentation, say that rhetoric is useful in that it makes truth and the good 
politically efficacious, while comments from later chapters recommend a method of invention 
that is untroubled by ethical or logical niceties, one must conclude that the Rhetoric is an 
incoherent treatise. Its textual history is muddled, in any case. It may have been composed at 
various times in Aristotle’s life and stitched together rather clumsily by any number of unknown 
redactors. Perhaps the sophistic recommendations of 1.9 were a late development in Aristotle’s 
thought, as he grew older and more realistic about the demands of politics and began to shed 
some of the more severe and uncompromising ethical strictures of the Academy. Perhaps, 
instead, such recommendations are a corruption of Aristotle’s teaching by a student or scribe. 
Given the treatise’s textual history, we cannot know.8  
Perhaps our discomfort in reading these passages arises not from any inconsistency on 
Aristotle’s part but from our presumption that the art of rhetoric is primarily a practice of 
persuasive speaking. This speaker-centered point of view requires us to subordinate rhetoric’s 
theoretical capacity, which Aristotle takes as its essential and definitional trait, to the productive 
activity of writing and delivering public speeches. It is this speaker-centered focus that leads us, 
erroneously, to be surprised by the messiness of Aristotle’s storehouse of arguments, and by the 
fact that he seems to treat sophistic arguments as though they were every bit as “available” and 
no more debased than valid ones. If, however, we treat these chapters as a theoretical 
136 
 
investigation of the features of argumentative exchanges between various kinds of speakers and 
audiences, and if we keep in mind that Aristotle means to train his students to approach both 
speaking and listening with rhetorical artistry, then we may see the sophistic recommendations in 
a new light: as a kind of pedagogical tool meant to exercise students’ faculties of judgment, 
provoking them to reason about the true and the apparently true, the persuasive and the 
apparently persuasive, the virtuous and the debased, or the expedient and the merely convenient. 
If, in addition to this perspectival reorientation, we recall that the treatise is organized 
dialectically, and that the first three chapters of book 1 have already posited dubious premises or 
formally invalid enthymemes about rhetoric itself, then it should come as no surprise that some, 
perhaps many, of his recommended rhetorical arguments are also fallacious. Still less should it 
surprise us that the disciplinary boundaries that he draws around the rhetorical art, or between 
kinds of proofs within that art, are blurry and ever-shifting. His treatise is the first attempt 
(known to him or to us) to provide a theoretical and comprehensive description of this emerging 
discipline, and it is one of the first attempts (excepting Plato’s dialogues) to instruct emerging 
rhetorical artists through the pedagogical methods of dialectic. I have already argued that 
Aristotle’s pedagogy makes use of human beings’ natural tendency to learn by imitation: not that 
Aristotle wants to provide model arguments or speeches for us to memorize and imitate—this is 
the pedagogy of Lysias and Isocrates, who assume that the speech is the artifact and persuasion 
the telos—but, rather, that his treatise is a mimēsis of the kind of inquiry he asks us to undertake, 
knowing (as we now do) that the artifact of rhetorical speech is persuasion, and that its end is the 
common good of speaker and audience. We participate in that inquiry by interrogating the claims 
that Aristotle makes about persuasion.  
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As the emerging rhetorical artist reads or listens to these chapters, she makes halting but 
ever more expert judgments about which kinds of arguments and techniques would be ethical or 
artistic in any given case. A debased use of argument, listed or even recommended in book 1, 
may be in tension with an observation about the character of the audience in book 2; or a 
fallacious inference may be corrected and refuted in the chapters that address invalid 
enthymemes. The exercise of reading books 1 and 2 is dialectical and agonistic, mimetically 
preparing the student both to invent and to evaluate, to advance and to refute, the propositions 
she encounters there. She learns from this treatise to judge speakers’ uses of logical, ethical, and 
pathetic appeals as either persuasive or only apparently persuasive, thus developing her capacity 
to see and judge both the means and the ends of particular persuasive speeches that she will 
compose or hear in the future. 
The Special Topics and the Rhetorical Artist (1.1.4-15) 
The special topics come before the rhetorical proofs because, paradoxically, it is the 
special topics (and not the rhetorical proofs) that achieve the ends of persuasive speech. To know 
what would actually be advantageous, noble, or just in a given polity requires knowledge of 
politics, ethics, history, economics, law, and philosophy. Rhetoric cannot provide knowledge of 
these disciplines, but it does provide knowledge of how audiences come to believe those 
disciplines’ claims; and the study of persuasion, as opposed to seeming persuasion, leads the 
rhetorical artist to the conclusion that she must study these other disciplines to understand the 
place of persuasive speech in the city’s pursuit of the common good. Studying the special topics 
before the pisteis helps the emerging rhetorical artist to ground her understanding of human 
speech in the subjects that speeches address, and to remember that words (as signs) are 
ontologically dependent on their real-world referents—even when those referents are 
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abstractions like justice and beauty.9 This ontological grounding will provide a salutary limit on 
the rhetorical artist’s uses of the three proofs. An enthymeme, as I will later show, is fallacious 
precisely to the extent that it ignores or perverts these extra-rhetorical standards of truth. Recall 
Gorgias’s claim (in Plato’s dialogue) that even the wisest legislator will always be ineffectual in 
the city if he lacks rhetorical skill. Aristotle thinks, on the contrary, that law and custom are by 
nature stronger and more lasting than rhetorical arguments; that good laws and family traditions 
do more than even the best speeches can do to teach people virtue and to sustain the city’s 
institutions; and that sophistries can have only limited effects on a city with good laws. In the 
Rhetoric, he places the special topics first to show how a rhetorical artist might see the limits of 
rhetoric’s own competence—a kind of disciplinary humility that empowers the artist to be 
enriched and supported by adjacent arts and inquiries.  
To know these limits is perhaps useful for an aspiring public speaker; but it is more 
useful to an audience or a judge. Audiences, in Aristotle’s estimation, should not think of public 
speakers as possessing any special professional capacity. There is no such public office, even 
informally, as “rhetor.” Rather, in 1.3, Aristotle tries to de-professionalize the new field of 
rhetoric by avoiding the word “rhetor,” and by employing the word “speaker” (legontos) only 
rarely. His preference for more precise terms, usually active verbs—sumbouleuō (to give 
advice), dikazō (to bring charges, to speak in judgment), epaineō (to praise), and psegō (to 
blame)—ensures that his students will identify the ends of rhetorical persuasion with the ends of 
human language, and not with the ambition of any given speaker. In keeping with the principle 
that one always defines a phenomenon according to its most perfect manifestation, Aristotle 
theorizes about public speaking as though giving good advice, securing a just sentence, or 
exalting what is noblest in human nature were the straightforward purposes of persuasion. The 
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treatise thus trains students to expect such good advice from speakers, and to judge speeches 
according to whether or not they provide it. This expectation is a fundamental quality of a 
rhetorically artistic listener. 
Chapters 4-15 continue this practice, never once referring to a “rhetor,” but referring 
often to “those who are giving advice” and its equivalent terms for the other two genres of 
speech. This lexical choice is most pronounced in the transitional sentences between chapters or 
subheadings, where translators often mistakenly insert what they take to be an implied “orator” 
or “speaker.” In the Greek, the omission is conspicuous, especially given Socrates’ definitional 
focus on the words “rhetor” and “rhetoric” in the Gorgias. For Aristotle, the rhetorical artist 
“must grasp what kinds of good or evil the deliberative speaker [ho sumbouleuōn] advises 
about,” seeing that “the important subjects on which people deliberate and on which deliberative 
orators give advice in public [hoi sumbouleuontes agoreuousin] are mostly five in number.”10 
One learns such matters, not to be a convincing speaker, but because “For the security of the 
state it is necessary to observe all these things.” Similarly, one must study “the elements 
[stoikheia] of good and advantageous in the abstract” because “the objective [skopos] of the 
deliberative speaker [tō sumbouleuonti] is the advantageous,” and the forms of various 
constitutions because this is “the greatest and most important of all things in an ability to 
persuade and give good advice [pros to dunasthai peithein ka kalōs sumbouleuein].” A rhetorical 
artist should learn about “virtue and vice and honorable and shameful” because “these are the 
points of reference for one praising or blaming,” and the sources of syllogisms about wrongdoing 
and justice because these are observable in speeches of accusation and defense. 
In none of these transitional headings does Aristotle use the word rhetor or even 
legontos, nor does he use second- or first-person pronouns or verbal forms to refer to acts of 
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speaking. Rather, he maintains both the theoretical distance and the ethical orientation that 
characterized chapters 1–3, speaking of advisors, accusers, defendants, and those who are 
praising or blaming in the third person as objects to be studied or as sources of speeches that one 
might hear or judge. He seems to have no interest in learning how a professional or ambitious 
rhetor might achieve some venal aim. What interests him, instead, is how a rhetorical theorist can 
identify and categorize the characteristics of good advice, of justifiable praise or blame, and of 
credible accusation or defense. He is not investigating how best to win a case or to gain applause; 
he is wondering how best to tell the difference between someone who is advising well and 
someone who is not. We learn from the treatise “what kind of good or evil the advisor advises 
about”—“advisor” is probably a better translation than “deliberative speaker”—and from what 
sources such an advisor will derive her syllogisms. Indeed, Aristotle has already told us that “the 
result” of the natural ends of language is that speakers simply do, as a matter of fact, speak in 
certain observable and definable ways: advisers about the advantageous, accusers about the just, 
and so on. As rhetorical theorists, we study these propositions so that we are familiar ahead of 
time with the kinds of subjects that speakers are likely to address—and so that we know what 
kinds of expertise to expect from them. Someone who is giving advice about political action 
should know about our constitution—not so that he can adapt his argument to our endoxa, but 
because the safety of the city is in its laws and the preservation of the constitution is 
advantageous.11 
What should impress us about Aristotle’s treatment of the special topics is not, as so 
many commentators insist, the Rhetoric’s imprecision about political and legal matters, but 
rather the fact that Aristotle seems to demand such extensive knowledge about politics and law 
from a public speaker.12 To give good advice in the agora, the speaker needs to have studied 
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“war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws”: that is, the 
whole of politics and economics. She should also know about “happiness and its parts” (that is, 
the whole panoply of goods that make up a happy human life)—and, to boot, “the elements of 
good and advantageous in the abstract.” To praise or blame someone, she needs to have studied 
“virtue and vice and honorable and shameful”—that is, all the standards by which neighbors, 
family, and friends judge their own and one another’s achievements. The reason to study these 
subjects is not so that she can unjustly praise a mediocre person, but so that she can understand 
“what is characteristic of a worthy person” and praise him or her accordingly.13 To accuse 
someone or to defend herself, the speaker needs to have studied an extraordinary range of 
subjects: first, legislation and legal theory, to understand the requirements of both the natural and 
the civil law; second, human psychology, to understand why people break laws or do wrong, and 
to analyze in any given case whether a person was likely to have done so; and third, the 
particular forms of evidence (that is, the “inartistic proofs”) that are admissible in a variety of 
legal situations. Finally, in all three genres of speech, the speaker needs to have studied both 
what is familiar and what is foreign: what is known or taken for truth in the audience’s home 
city, as well as “what has been discovered elsewhere.”14 If a philosophical treatise is available on 
the subject, then Aristotle recommends reading it; and he takes several opportunities to remind 
his students that speakers should do their own original research through travel and observation. 
Such studies will help speakers to discern what is just or unjust, advantageous or harmful, noble 
or base—not merely what is likely to move an audience or to achieve victory. 
Given the extent of these recommended studies, interjections like the one at 1.4.12—“But 
all these subjects belong to politics, not to rhetoric”—should be read as injunctions for rhetorical 
artists to study politics, not as an encouragement for aspiring public speakers to stay within the 
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boundaries of the rhetorical discipline. A speaker who takes comfort in the fact that rhetorical 
audiences are ignorant, or who excuses his own ignorance or imprecision because of the 
constraints of the rhetorical situation, has missed Aristotle’s point: that, in discerning the 
disciplinary boundaries of rhetorical study—learning what is and is not persuasive—the 
rhetorical artist also discerns that she needs other disciplines to achieve her persuasive aims. The 
topos metaphor, combined with the “seeing” metaphor from rhetoric’s definition at 1.2.1, seems 
to be deliberate. The rhetorical theorist can see the territory of neighboring disciplines, gazing 
over the boundary lines that divide rhetoric from politics, and realizing from a distance that a 
journey into political territory would be both informative and beneficial. Like a shipwright who 
consults with a lumber merchant or a pilot, or a legislator who consults with a military strategist, 
the rhetorical artist must study politics and ethics to achieve the ends of rhetorical speech and 
judgment. Such artistic noēsis will lead her to be curious about all kinds of facts and propositions 
that an instrumentally effective, professional “rhetor” might think unnecessary, tangential, or 
even counterproductive. As Aristotle explains in the Nicomachean Ethics, the problem with 
sophistic rhetors is not that they speak too well; it is that they speak too often on subjects about 
which they know so little.15 These chapters may prevent the rhetorically artistic speaker from 
committing such overreach. What is more important, they will train rhetorically artistic listeners 
to recognize sophistical superciliousness when they hear it. 
The Uses of Sophistry in Aristotle’s Dialectical Pedagogy 
That Aristotle teaches this faculty of judgment is clear from his treatment of praise and 
blame in 1.9. This chapter is often cited as evidence of Aristotle’s moral ambivalence about the 
means of persuasion: It is the first place in the treatise, and the only place in his treatment of 
special topics, where he prescribes specific techniques for speakers; and those recommendations 
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are almost without exception sophistical. The placement of this advice, however, is 
pedagogically strategic. Aristotle has already identified deliberative rhetoric as the exemplary 
type of this theoretical power, since people are naturally better at deliberating about their own 
advantage than at judging the guilt, innocence, virtue, or vice of another person. But his 
treatment of deliberative speeches in 1.4-8 began training the artistic listener in the habits of 
judging good “in the abstract,” as well as judging greater and lesser goods—habits that are 
necessary, not only for giving and receiving advice, but also for praising and blaming one’s 
fellow citizens. Thus, Aristotle’s preference for deliberative rhetoric turns out to be theoretical 
and epistemological, not only practical. His observation in book 1 that audiences simply are 
better at judging deliberative speeches seems to have been a preparatory remark meant to justify 
(for the emerging rhetorical artist) his choice to treat deliberative propositions first. This choice 
had a more substantive purpose, though: the study of the common good is foundational for the 
study of praise or blame; and the study of praise and blame is foundational for the study of what 
is legal or illegal. We praise what is good, and blame what is bad; we reward what we praise, and 
punish what we blame. Chronologically, and as a matter of paideia, human beings experience 
reward and punishment first, as pre-rational children; then praise and blame, as children and 
adolescents. Then, only in adulthood (if at all) do we formulate defensible generalizations or 
principles about the beautiful, the noble, or the advantageous in itself. As a matter of theory, 
however, we begin with principles about the good before working out the more practical matters 
of praise, blame, and legality.16 Like all inquiries, this one can be pursued in either direction: 
either starting (as Aristotle did in chapter 1) from what we know and do in daily life, and 
working from these experiences toward the principles that undergird them, or starting (as he does 
now) from theoretical principles, and working out what is best to do. This methodological 
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reciprocity mirrors the artistic noēsis described in the Metaphysics. The demiurge, a mere maker, 
begins working on material without a theoretical conception either of the desired form or of its 
proper ends. Her techniques follow a memorized procedure or pattern, like a public speaker who 
achieves a rote competence in judicial oratory by imitating popular logographers. The maker 
becomes an artist by learning to see ahead of time the desired ends of her artifact, and then by 
discerning (in reverse order) what steps to take to achieve these ends.  
The overlap between deliberative and epideictic propositions is pedagogically useful, 
then, as well as a de facto feature of the rhetorical discipline. During the exploration of greater 
and lesser goods, nominally under the rubric of deliberative propositions, Aristotle has reminded 
his students that “of two goods, that which is nearer the ‘end’ is greater”—a premise that will 
prove useful in deliberative speeches, to be sure, but that will be equally useful in judging 
speeches of any genre or purpose; and he has also reminded his students of such speeches’ 
reliance on the traditions and opinions of “the wise” in making sound judgments:  
And what the wise—either all or many or most or the most authoritative—would judge or 
have judged the greater good are necessarily so regarded, either absolutely or in terms of 
the practical wisdom [phronēsis] by which they made their judgment.17 
 
We begin reading chapter 9, then, with the greater and lesser good in mind, and with a morally 
and philosophically substantive (though perhaps not a very nuanced) understanding of the 
relationship between common opinion, custom, authority, and the ends of human life. We come 
to this chapter having learned that good advice maintains and even strengthens these 
relationships, drawing on the wisdom of tradition to advance our knowledge and pursuit of the 
common good. 
The coming discussion of what is noble or shameful, worthy of praise or of blame, is a 
logical next step in this dialectical exploration of what is persuasive. Having thought carefully 
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about what is good, we may with greater confidence wonder about what specific habits or actions 
we ought to praise and blame. The first half of 1.9 describes to kalon in the abstract, just as 
chapter 6 described the advantageous in the abstract, so that speakers and audiences alike may 
see the linguistic boundaries that define their investigation of the good in question. From afar, as 
it were, we discern in outline what is noble or beautiful in human political action. We see that the 
beautiful is chosen for itself, or for its own inherent goodness, and is therefore pleasant and 
praiseworthy; that it includes virtue, which both preserves and produces other things that are 
beautiful; that the greatest virtues are those that are useful to other people, such as justice, 
courage, and liberality;18 that both the causes and the effects of virtue are honorable, as are its 
signs and works; and, finally, that “things good by nature and that are not benefits to [the agent]” 
are beautiful, “for such things are done for their own sake.”  
These distinctions between the beautiful and the base apply to one’s words and thoughts, 
and not only to one’s actions, as Aristotle illustrates with a quotation from Sappho:  
[Alcaeus speaking] I wish to say something, but shame hinders me. 
[Sappho replying] If you had a longing for noble or honorable things 
And your tongue had not stirred up some evil to speak,  
Shame would not have filled your eyes, 
But you would have been speaking about what is just. 
 
The poem provokes a reflexive examination of rhetorical artists’ own persuasive ambitions, 
providing us with a memorable standard of judgment for speeches that we plan to compose or 
that we will later hear. Not only the deeds of the one being praised, but also the speech of the one 
praising, may be judged as noble or shameful. Sappho places her reader in the imaginative 
position of a rhetorical listener: Seeing shame in Alcaeus’ eyes, she judges his projected ethos to 
be a sham. The obsequious indirectness of his speech betrays him as a hypocrite and a flatterer, 
one who (in Aristotle’s phraseology) is trying to “persuade what is debased.”  
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After citing this poem, Aristotle begins to test his students’ ethical mettle and their 
rhetorical artistry. He introduces two premises about honor and local custom that are true as far 
as they go, but that would seem to be in tension with his claims in both the preceding and the 
succeeding chapters unless they are parsed very carefully. The first premise is that “victory and 
glory are among honorable things; for they are to be chosen even if they are fruitless, and they 
make clear a preeminence of virtue.” The second is that “things peculiar to each nation are 
honorable [among them]”—such as long hair in Sparta, which is “the sign of a free man.”19  
The truth of these premises—that all people honor victory, and that the signs of liberality 
and leisure differ from city to city—is not in dispute, and may even be an extension of Aristotle’s 
earlier claim that we derive our notions of the good from the judgments of wise or honored 
people in our cities. However, the first premise—that victory is always a sign of virtue—would 
seem to mitigate the shame felt by a dishonorable speaker (such as Sappho’s abashed lover, or 
Socrates after his first speech in the Phaedrus), so long as he gained “victory”—whatever that 
might entail. The second premise would seem to justify such a speaker’s crude and unscrupulous 
efforts to exploit the particular cultural expectations of his audience for ends that may or may not 
contribute to their common advantage. (For an example known to Aristotle, take the demagogue 
Cleon, who—according to Thucydides and Aristophanes—appeals to the Athenian merchant 
class’s democratic sensibilities to goad them into a losing war with Sparta, denigrating his 
aristocratic detractors as feckless and effete.) Thus, while no one would doubt that victory—
including rhetorical victory—is desirable, nor would anyone dispute that it is decorous and 
advantageous to observe the customs of one’s hosts or interlocutors, the two premises introduced 
at here seem ripe for abuse by ambitious public speakers. What is to prevent Aristotle’s students 
from reading these premises as endorsements of the thesis of Thrasymachus and Callicles that 
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nomos has no basis in phusis, and that human customs exist only to serve the interests of the 
naturally strong? These two paragraphs thus provide a subtle transition from the empirical and 
theoretical treatment of to kalon that characterized the first half of the chapter, to the notoriously 
sophistic prescriptions of the latter half. 
If we read these prescriptions under the assumption that the Rhetoric is a training manual 
for speakers, or even a theoretical description of an art of speaking, then we cannot escape the 
conclusion that Aristotle is recommending unscrupulous tactics. He is teaching his students to 
make arguments that, by his own standards, are debased. For epideictic speeches, he says, “one 
should assume that qualities that are close to actual ones are much the same as regards both 
praise and blame.” He then gives examples of how an epideictic speaker should make his speech 
more effective by praising what is mediocre or vicious, or blaming what is virtuous or 
innocuous, as the case requires. In particular, “one should speak of whatever is honored among 
each people as actually existing [in the subject praised], for example, among the Scythians or 
Laconians or philosophers”; and, “since praise is based on actions and to act in accordance with 
deliberate purpose [kata proairesin] is characteristic of a worthy person [tou spoudaiou], one 
should try to show him acting in accordance with deliberate purpose.” To this end, “one should 
take coincidences and chance happenings as due to deliberate purpose; for if many similar 
examples are cited, they will seem to be a sign of virtue and purpose.” 
It is difficult to imagine a worse abuse of public address—again, by Aristotle’s own 
standards—than praising what one knows to be vicious, blaming what one knows to be virtuous, 
misrepresenting chance as deliberation and luck as prohairesis, or calling a fortunate but 
mediocre character a spoudaios.20 Such uses of language would seem to pervert the natural 
function of human language, which is to promote civil cooperation by inclining human beings 
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toward the good. Yet the use of prohairesis here should remind us of the claim in 1.1 that 
sophistry is not a matter of skill but of deliberate choice; and the Sappho poem, offered just 
before these recommendations, served as a reminder that speech can be noble or base, and 
reflective of one’s character, just as action can. Further, the succeeding passage—1.9.33-37—
discovers that “praise and deliberations are part of a common species,” since what one praises is 
also what one would recommend as advantageous. The difference between the two genres of 
speech turns out to be little more than a grammatical inflection: let us do what we ought to do 
becomes he did what he ought to have done. Deliberative and epideictic speeches are united in 
their dependence on a shared conception of the good; and an artistic epideictic speech depends 
on the special topics of deliberation—and their real-world, discipline-specific standards of 
truth—for its enthymemes’ unstated major premises. Aristotle has never claimed to be doing 
anything other than describing what constitutes good advice—what we should expect from 
someone seeking to advise well, or to praise or blame in a responsible and justified way; so it 
comes as a shock that his first normative recommendations for speakers are so blatantly debased. 
The attentive reader therefore realizes her responsibility, not to follow these prescriptions, but to 
interrogate them and to wonder whether they are conducive to the ends of persuasive speech. 
Does one celebrate to kalon by falsifying it? By the standards of “good advice” articulated in 
1.4-8, does one help or harm one’s audience by publicly perverting the meaning of “good”? For a 
student who fails to notice the problem, the revelation of 1.9.33-37—that epideictic propositions 
are actually deductive conclusions from deliberative premises—is an opportunity to correct the 
inartistic and unethical advice of 1.9.28 before commencing the study of judicial rhetoric.  
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That sophistic perversions of speech “will seem true to most people” does not mitigate 
the fact that they are fallacious enthymemes, which Aristotle acknowledges in a quick aside at 
1.9.29: 
For example, [one should call] an irascible and excitable person “straightforward” and an 
arrogant person “high-minded” and “imposing” and [speak of] those given to excess as 
actually in states of virtue, for example the rash one as “courageous,” the spendthrift as 
“liberal”; for this will seem true to most people and at the same time is a fallacious 
argument drawn from “cause”; for if a person meets danger unnecessarily he would be 
much more likely to do so where the danger is honorable, and if he is generous to those 
he meets, all the more to his friends; for to do good to everyone is overdoing virtue. 
Consider also the audience before whom the praise [is spoken]; for, as Socrates used to 
say, it is not difficult to praise Athenians in Athens.  
 
Thus, at the same time that Aristotle recommends calling vice virtue, he undermines that 
recommendation in two ways: by pointing out that it is a fallacy, and by drawing attention to the 
ease with which we believe fallacies if they accord with our biases in favor of our self-interested 
desire for victory or our cultural traditions.  
It is important not to oversimplify the fallacy of 1.9. A third-rate speech writer knows to 
call a rash man courageous if it would serve his turn. The fallacy under discussion here is more 
difficult to craft, and even more difficult to dismantle and refute, than mere euphemism. In the 
above passage, Aristotle seems to assume that both speaker and audience know the eulogized 
man. They know that he is not courageous, but rash; not liberal, but wasteful. Neither speaker 
nor audience is likely to mistake one for the other. In other words, a straightforward misnomer—
baldly calling rashness courage—would not be effective. To make the praise stick, so to speak, 
the sophistic speaker would need to insinuate the faulty premise that a habitual vice can be the 
cause of a situational virtue: that someone who is used to wasting money will be happy to help a 
friend in need, or that one who is used to taking unnecessary risks will be reliably courageous 
when the city depends on him.  
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This argument from false cause, like so many sophistries, depends on an equivocation. 
The audience is expected not to notice that courage is more than a willingness to face danger, 
liberality more than a willingness to spend money; that, as the Nicomachean Ethics articulates, 
the vices are counterfeits and corruptions of virtuous dispositions, not excesses of them. The 
speaker equivocates, then, not by calling any particular vice a virtue, but by conflating vice and 
virtue and by equating both of them with a kind of behavioral excess. To go to excess in facing 
danger—that is, to be rash—is not to be excessively courageous (as if there were such a thing). 
Courage requires facing danger with the right end in mind, in the right way, and for the right 
reasons; it requires that one do a substantive good in facing danger, a good that one would 
choose knowingly and rationally in a moment of leisure, and that one now chooses by second 
nature after a lifetime of disciplined and rational habituation. Courage is therefore always 
moderate and rational, and never excessive. But in the recommended sophistical argument, the 
speaker requires the audience to assume that rashness is an excess of courage, like adding two 
pinches of salt to a recipe instead of one.  
The equivocation would most likely occur in an unstated premise; the word “excess” may 
never occur in the speech. The speaker is merely praising rash behavior by associating it with the 
virtue of courage, and hoping that the audience will expect the virtue from a man who is 
thoroughly habituated to its corresponding vice. This is why Aristotle identifies the species of 
equivocation as “false cause.” The speaker who calls vice virtue is not hoping to convince his 
audience that rashness and wastefulness are the same as courage and liberality, or that the 
eulogized man (whom everyone knows is rash or wasteful) is actually courageous and generous. 
Rather, the speaker is hoping the audience will somehow expect rashness and wastefulness, 
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which make a person unpredictable, capricious, and unreliable, to cause courageous or generous 
behavior in a time of need.  
There are three possible responses to this sophistical advice. A student who finds the 
advice appealing and resolves to follow it has confirmed the dictum of Hesiod, quoted in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, that the man who neither knows what is good nor knows how to listen well 
is useless.21 By contrast, a student who recoils at such debased uses of language has gone as far 
as phronēsis can take her. She resists vicious speech, though as yet she may struggle to articulate 
what makes it vicious. Only the rhetorical artist can dismantle the argument, articulate the tacit 
premise, and lay bare the fallacy of false cause.  
Aristotle ends the paragraph with Socrates’ maxim that “it is not hard to praise Athenians 
in Athens,” which for the unscrupulous speaker might mean (as I have already indicated) that, to 
be successful, a speaker must play on the local prejudices of his audience. Yet Socrates himself 
would have used the maxim to encourage self-knowledge, reminding his students of their own 
susceptibility to fallacies and appeals to prejudice. If persuasive speech can be worthy of praise 
or blame, then the person who habitually praises vice or blames virtue for the sake of mere 
display (that is, epideixis in its sophistic sense) is neither to be trusted as an adviser nor extolled 
as a skillful speaker. Flattery may take as many forms as there are prejudices to extol. Athenians 
want to be told that their excesses make them virtuous, Spartans that their long hair makes them 
noble. Yet the extreme sophistries praised in 1.9 reveal that flattery and equivocation undermine 
public agreement about the common good. Athenians are as susceptible as Spartans to such 
tricks if they do not learn to recognize and refute enthymematic fallacies. 
To drive the point home, Aristotle builds logical bridges between 1.9 and 1.10, where he 
finally addresses the speech genre that his contemporaries would have considered archetypal: the 
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judicial accusation or defense. Because, as I have already shown, concepts of civil and natural 
justice depend ontologically on a concept of the noble, which in turn depends on a concept of the 
good, the very vices that the sophistic speaker praises in 1.9 turn out to be causes of crime and 
wrongdoing in 1.10:  
Vice and weakness are the reasons why people make the choice of harming and doing 
bad things; for if certain people have one depravity or more, it is in relation to this that 
they are in fact wicked and are wrongdoers; for example, one is ungenerous with money, 
another is indulgent in the pleasures of the body, another is soft in regard to exertions, 
another cowardly in dangers (they abandon comrades in danger through fear), another 
ambitious for honor, another short-tempered through anger, another fond of winning by 
victory, another embittered through vindictiveness, another foolish through 
misunderstanding of justice and injustice, another shameless through contempt for public 
opinion, and similarly each of the others in regard to each of their underlying vices.22 
 
The student who does not see this obvious connection at the beginning of 1.10 may see it later: 
for example, when Aristotle distinguishes between chance, luck, nature, habit, and reason as 
causes of human action, thus providing a ready refutation for the advice to call fortune 
prohairesis; or when he distinguishes between real and apparent goods, or real and apparent 
pleasures, both of which are chosen by volition—thus emphasizing the need to distinguish 
between (say) rashness and courage; or when he claims that persuasion is the means by which we 
achieve rational understanding of what we should desire or shun, thus implying that sophistical 
equivocations are dangers to the pursuit of one’s own advantage; or when he points out that it is 
pleasant to be flattered, but that flatterers are only apparent, and not real, friends—an observation 
that seems directly aimed at the sophistic speaker of 1.9.23 Successful speakers, he later claims, 
are often motivated by the pursuit of pleasure, both to win an argument and to seem wise. People 
who are particularly talented or accomplished, including those who are “skilled at speaking” or 
who take pleasure in eristic disputations, are often motivated by this skill to believe that they can 
do wrong with impunity.24  
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The chapters on special topics are replete with these moments when studious attention to 
the effectiveness of a premise or proposition provokes a reflection on the ethical or unethical 
qualities of speech itself: moments when the emerging rhetorical artist, who may have thought 
she was being schooled in techniques of persuasion, realizes that the moment she employs such 
techniques, she is potentially culpable—by the artistic standards of rhetoric, which are 
inextricably intertwined with the ethical standards of her own polis—for the good or bad habits 
of speech and thought that her speech inculcates in her listeners. In learning to give good advice, 
we learn what advice to trust and what to shun; in learning what to praise, we discern which 
epideictic speeches to believe, and which to ignore; and in learning to prosecute or defend, we 
learn how to judge speakers in all three genres as just or unjust actors. In surprising and salutary 
ways, the art of rhetoric turns its persuasive and judgmental powers on its own speeches and 
speakers, making every aspiring public speaker into a critical (and, we hope, a wise) listener.  
Like the deliberative and epideictic propositions, then, the judicial propositions offered in 
1.10-12 educate the rhetorical artist as a listener. Rather than providing propositions useful to 
predatory Athenian prosecutors or to logographers for hire, Aristotle poses substantive moral and 
political questions about human nature and the causes of criminality: “for what, and how many, 
purposes people do wrong,” “how these persons are disposed,” and “what kind of persons they 
wrong and what these persons are like.”25 Such propositions of accusation and defense, no less 
than those of praise and blame, are applicable not only to the actions that a speech addresses, but 
also to the speech itself. Thus, the propositions about criminal conduct in chapters 10-12 are as 
damning to the sophistic speaker of 1.9 as they are to a thief or murderer. To see the moral 
wrongness and deleterious civic consequences of sophistic speech is thus part of the rhetorical 
art. Similarly, the characteristics of those who are wronged, discussed in 1.12.17-31, are 
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applicable to the audiences or targets of sophistic discourse: people who “do not take 
precautions,” who are easygoing or timid, and therefore “not likely to make a fight.” (Recall that 
the study of rhetoric is a precaution against unjust accusation and unwise advice, just as military 
training is a precaution against violence.) Those who are wronged in this way—like those who 
are hated or despised or slandered—will not take their assailants to court, since they lack 
credibility and cannot speak persuasively on their own behalf. This, too, then, is part of the 
rhetorical art: vigilance about deceptive and slanderous speech, which, like theft and bodily 
harm, are a threat to oneself and one’s neighbors.  
Such vigilance requires rhetorical training, but rhetorical self-defense requires expertise 
that rhetoric itself cannot provide. The rhetorical artist discerns what kinds of knowledge a 
persuasive speaker requires to provide a credible argument; and the gradual attainment of such 
knowledge makes the rhetorical artist a competent judge of an ever-widening field of speeches, 
whose claims may be judged as true or false according to the standards internal to other, non-
rhetorical disciplines.  
Character, Affect, and Judgment (Rhetoric 2.1-11) 
Book 1 exercised the rhetorical artist’s critical faculties by asking what kinds of 
knowledge an audience should expect or require from a speaker. Book 2 turns the rhetorical 
artist’s scrutiny on the audience itself, asking how human beings come to be persuaded, and how 
they make judgments, rightly or wrongly. One of the goals of this inquiry is to explain why 
audiences “who are accustomed to deliberate among themselves,” and who for the most part hit 
on truth, should be persuaded by means other than logical demonstration. Book 1 claimed that 
we are most persuaded when we believe that something has been demonstrated, and claimed that 
enthymeme is the body of persuasion. Yet Aristotle soon qualified these claims with two other 
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observations: first, that “character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion”; 
and second, that “we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being 
friendly and hostile.”26 Such judgments are never completely untethered from logic, or from the 
discipline-specific propositions that Aristotle taught us to expect and evaluate in book 1. On the 
contrary, book 2 will reveal that character and affect are inextricably intertwined with logic and 
with the world as we find it. Our judgments of character and our emotional reactions imply and 
assume propositions about ethics and politics. We are angry when we believe we have been 
wronged, and any definition of “wrong” requires some underlying conception of justice. There 
are always reasons—though often implicit, imperfect, inchoate, or even mistaken—for our 
emotional states.  
Ethical proofs are similarly logical. In the opening paragraph of book 2, Aristotle points 
out that we trust people who display phronēsis and the other virtues; but, as book 1 has already 
shown, we come to understand the virtues, at least in part, by making and hearing propositions 
about them. Aristotle’s students would cite his ethical treatises as examples of how the study of 
such propositions might proceed. Yet even the untutored assemblyman will have spent ample 
time in his adult life discussing what makes a man or a city good. If someone were to ask why a 
given speaker was trustworthy, the assemblyman would need to give reasons for his trust; and 
those reasons, because of the natural structure of language and thought, would be organized as 
enthymemes. Thus, just as the section on the special topics invited the rhetorical artist to study 
disciplines other than rhetoric in order better to understand the means and ends of persuasion, so 
the sections on character and emotion will invite the rhetor to consider the pisteis that lie 
adjacent to logos: to enrich her understanding of logic by seeing the ways in which it is 
intertwined with the virtues and the emotions. 
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Here, too, there is a common misunderstanding about Aristotle’s purposes. Once again, 
the misunderstanding arises from the translation of to pithanon as “means of persuasion” and 
from the attendant presupposition that the art of rhetoric is an art of speaking. Consider 
Kennedy’s translation of a paragraph from the first chapter of book 2, which provides an 
introductory outline of how speakers gain or lose credibility.  
There are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive; for there are three things 
we trust other than logical demonstrations. These are practical wisdom [phronēsis] and 
virtue [aretē] and good will [eunoia]; for speakers make mistakes in what they say or 
advise through [failure to exhibit] either all or one of these; for either through lack of 
practical sense they do not form opinions rightly; or though forming opinions rightly they 
do not say what they think because of a bad character; or they are prudent and fair-
minded but lack good will, so that it is possible for people not to give the best advice 
although they know [what] it [is]. These are the only possibilities. Therefore, a person 
seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers.   
 
If we presume that this passage is meant to instruct speakers as to how they might be “persuasive 
to [their] hearers,” then we are likely to think Aristotle is advising such speakers merely to 
“seem” wise, virtuous, and benevolent—since these are the qualities that make audiences trust a 
speaker, even when the speaker fails to make a persuasive logical demonstration. Kennedy’s 
bracketed phrase seems to make this very assumption: speakers go wrong by failing to “exhibit” 
one or more of these qualities, whereas someone “seeming” wise, virtuous, and benevolent will 
necessarily be persuasive, regardless of his arguments’ logical validity. 
Such matter-of-fact realism may be useful for analyzing some rhetorical situations, but 
Aristotle is arguing something quite different. If we ignore the bracketed phrase “failure to 
exhibit” and assume a theoretical rather than a practical stance—we are trying to understand 
whom audiences are likely to believe, not how we might appeal to future audiences—and if, 
finally, we recall the distinction from book 1 between the persuasive and the apparently 
persuasive, then we may infer that the passage is not advising speakers how to “seem” prudent or 
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“exhibit” good will; it is, rather, naming and defining the characteristics that make a person 
actually trustworthy, whether in a public rhetorical situation or in a private conversation between 
friends. Notice the enthymematic structure: the final sentence, which is declarative (not 
imperative or hortatory), is the conclusion of a chain of reasoning about what kinds of people 
give good advice and what kinds of people “make mistakes” in what they say or advise. The 
major and minor premises are about actual prudence, virtue, and benevolence—not about an 
artistic speaker’s attempt to “exhibit” such characteristics. These are the requisite characteristics 
of an advisor; they are the qualities that we seek when we need help making practical decisions. 
We know—implicitly, if we are untutored, but consciously and rationally to the extent that we 
are rhetorical artists—that prudence, virtue, and benevolence are rather reliably the qualities of 
people who give good advice, because we have all received good and bad advice in the past, and 
have reflected on the source. Because these three qualities are the substantive moral prerequisites 
for neighborly cooperation, they are also the qualities that a speaker must seem to have to be 
persuasive. When Aristotle claims that speakers “make mistakes in what they say or advise 
through either all or one of these,” he is not describing a failure of persuasive efficaciousness, 
but a defect of character—and a substantive failure to give advice that is beneficial to the 
listener. 
The rhetorical situation, limited as it is by time and space, does not afford us the 
opportunity to examine anyone’s prudence or virtue at length. Like our judgment of a speaker’s 
logical and discipline-specific arguments, our judgment of her good character requires quick 
apprehension of qualities that either do or do not pass for the real thing. These limitations will of 
course lead to some errors in judgment, even for the most skilled and practiced rhetorical 
audiences. Nevertheless, it remains true that we seek the same qualities in a public speaker that 
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we would seek in a friend or trusted advisor. The sequence of gar clauses in this passage 
emphasizes the soundness, not the vulnerability, of such judgments. Even if an unethical speaker 
can manage to “seem” prudent, virtuous, or benevolent, the effectiveness of that speaker’s 
duplicity depends on the already-present assumption among listeners that such qualities make a 
person worthy of credence. Sophistical or duplicitous speech can succeed only by exploiting, and 
therefore by gradually undermining, these shared understandings, with the ultimate result that 
true persuasion is ever harder to achieve. By articulating the substantive moral underpinnings of 
persuasion through character, Aristotle seeks to save rhetorical persuasion as a means of 
achieving wise political decisions. He is not claiming that “seeming” is all that matters in 
rhetoric (as opposed, say, to dialectic or science, which deal with truth). He is claiming, rather, 
that the “seeming” prudence that wins the day in a rhetorical situation depends practically on the 
workings of actual prudence in the city. Audiences trust “seeming” prudence, virtue, and 
benevolence in rhetorical situations because they know the real thing, and know that it is 
trustworthy. 
Like these persuasive qualities of character, the emotions are for Aristotle logically 
grounded and ethically substantive givens. Their persuasive utility is an inference that Aristotle 
draws from their substantive grounding in humans’ moral nature. Just as he instructs his students 
to employ ethical appeals only after discerning what makes human beings credible, so he expects 
them to employ emotional appeals only after discerning how the passions affect and are affected 
by good judgment. Again, the logical structure of the opening passage is mimetically instructive: 
The emotions are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to 
differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, 
anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites. There is need to divide the 
discussion of each into three headings. I mean, for example, in speaking of anger, what is 
their state of mind when people are angry and against whom are they usually angry, and 
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for what sort of reasons; for if we understood one or two of these but not all, it would be 
impossible to create anger.27 
 
The emotions are not, for the rhetorical artist, a means to a persuasive end. They are structurally 
parallel, and maybe even identical, to the audience’s judgment about the common good. 
Judgments, like emotions, are directed at someone or something, for reasons that we can 
articulate. Every emotion implies a judgment, and every judgment includes emotion. We “come 
to differ” in our judgments through the emotions, not because a skilled speaker excites some 
passion that bypasses our reason, but because our emotional involvement with the case implies 
premises about what is good or just. I am not saying that every person’s emotions (according to 
Aristotle) are rationally justifiable. Rather, the emotions by their nature are open to rational 
scrutiny and ethical evaluation because they imply ethical judgments that are grounded in logic. 
We feel angry when we think we have been treated unjustly—which requires some conception of 
justice, however nascent or implicit. 
For a speaker to “create anger” (or some other emotion) in an audience, she must craft an 
argument so that both the offender and the victim are clearly identified, and so that the reasons 
why the harm was unjustified are either explicit or carefully implied. Thus, the persuasive utility 
of the emotions rests on the fact that emotions are intertwined with language and reason—they 
are described, expressed, excited, and quelled by nothing other than propositions—and are 
therefore oriented (just as language is oriented) toward the common good. Of course, reading this 
passage, the rhetorical artist discerns that she, too, makes judgments while undergoing change 
accompanied by pain or pleasure; and her analysis of persuasive techniques for the creation of 
such change will make her better able to judge whether or not her own emotional reactions are 
grounded in logical argument and sound ethical principles.  
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This interdependence of ēthos and pathos is reflected in a chiastic structure that links the 
three parts of each appeal. The three trustworthy qualities—phronēsis, aretē, and eunoia—
correspond, in reverse order, with the three aspects of human emotion: the psychological, the 
social, and the cognitive. Eunoia is a good state of mind (the psychological); aretē, a set of 
dispositions that benefit one’s neighbors (the social); and phronēsis, an ability to judge 
reasonably (the cognitive, or the reasons why one feels a particular passion). To direct an 
audience’s emotions in a persuasive way, then, the speaker must interweave her own 
psychological disposition toward the audience and the subject—that is, her ēthos—with the 
three-part emotional state that she hopes to create—that is, the audience’s pathē. The means of 
doing so is the speech’s logos: enthymematic argument, which requires audience participation 
(supplying tacit premises) to be persuasive. An audience will be more likely to experience the 
affect that the speaker intends, and to connect that affect to the formal enthymematic structure of 
persuasion, if the speaker can show that a wise, virtuous, and benevolent person would do so. 
Again, an audience that is aware of these parallels is both more persuadable by good arguments 
and less vulnerable to fallacious or crudely instrumental appeals to the passions. 
Like his treatment of the topics, then, this analysis of character and the emotions does not 
provide narrowly useful techniques for rhetorical effectiveness, but rather liberal and broadly 
applicable principles for artistic rhetorical noēsis and judgment. He remarks in the Politics that 
mastering grammar makes one able to learn everything else (by reading and listening) and to 
communicate everything else (by writing and speaking). One who studies the emotions and the 
ethical characteristics of speakers and audiences can use these propositions in any number of 
ways: to inspire favor or incite disfavor with the subject of praise or blame; to publicly analyze 
and lay bare the motivations of an accuser, defendant, or rival speaker; to show forth one’s own 
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ethical bona fides by displaying the proper emotional reaction to an event or argument; or to 
invite an audience to feel, along with the speaker, an emotion that is fitting, decorous, and 
salutary. Yet Aristotle’s treatment of the emotions—like his treatment of the special topics—also 
lays bare the speaker’s own techniques, inviting rhetorical audiences to judge the speaker him- or 
herself as ethical or unethical, justifiably or unjustifiably moved.28  
Consider, for example, Aristotle’s extended treatment of anger and calmness, friendliness 
and enmity, in 2.2-4. Perhaps a speaker would benefit from knowing that his audience will 
experience “a kind of pleasure” in their anger, especially “from the hope of getting retaliation.” 
An audience, too, would benefit from this knowledge, since the experience of pleasure may or 
may not be entirely justified—and of course anger always implies some notion of justification.29 
Listeners might want to keep in mind that all people, not just they, “think they are entitled to be 
treated with respect” by their perceived inferiors; that one’s health and fortune might contribute 
to one’s irascibility or calmness, thus warping one’s judgment; and that audiences in dire straits 
have often “prepared a path for [their] own anger because of some underlying emotion” that has 
nothing to do with the case at hand.30 (Recall that this susceptibility to off-topic appeals was one 
of the weaknesses that Aristotle identified in 1.1.) One who is aware of these propositions about 
anger—propositions that reveal the implicit premises underlying any experience of anger, for 
good or ill—may be more reflective about his or her own emotions, less susceptible to the pain 
caused by a perceived slight, and less enthralled by the craven pleasures of a revenge fantasy. It 
may help, too, to know that “time makes anger cease”; that an awareness of one’s own 
complicity in evil, or the memory of one’s past indiscretions, might temper one’s anger; that 
often, the experience of hatred rests on a supposition about someone’s character and not on any 
thoroughly justified understanding of it; that the excitement of anger in the audience is a 
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common goal for speakers in agonistic settings; and that one’s anger can easily be calmed by a 
contrary speaker who claims that the object of one’s anger is powerful, worthy of respect, an 
involuntary actor, a benefactor, or a suppliant.31 Again, these propositions are offered from the 
theoretical stance of one studying the emotions in themselves, so that they may be employed by 
speakers or by audiences as needed.  
Two moments in these chapters on anger seem to be aimed directly at Aristotle’s 
students, or at ambitious Athenian orators more generally, demonstrating that the study of 
emotions has utility for rhetorical listening as well as for speaking. The first such moment takes 
aim at those who study rhetoric to gain political power—a legitimate aim, if we are to believe the 
claims of book 1. In Athens, defending oneself or one’s friends, or accomplishing some great 
work, often requires verbal rather than martial potency. In book 2, though, Aristotle observes that 
those who are strongest in the city—those with wealth, power, and good breeding—are actually 
more susceptible to anger (and, by implication, to inflammatory speeches) because they feel 
dishonor more acutely than do people of humbler origins or more meager means. Aristotle cites 
the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon as the best-known example of such anger: a 
tyrant and a great warrior enraged at one another after each perceived a slight to his honor. Yet 
surprisingly, Aristotle lists the rhetorikos—the one skilled at rhetoric—among those who are 
inclined to such irascibility. This rare reference to a rhetorikos may be meant in contrast to 
Aristotle’s preferred terms (such as “one who is giving advice”). Whereas the true rhetorical 
artist does not put on airs as a kind of public official who deserves honor, the rhetorikos—the 
well-known orator—is likely to act like Agamemnon at Troy. The political efficacy of a self-
important public speaker is something like a despot’s dubious right to rule his betters. 
The cause of pleasure to those who give insult is that they think they themselves become 
more superior by ill-treating others. That is why the young and the rich are given to 
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insults; for by insulting they think they are superior. Dishonor is a feature of insult, and 
one who dishonors belittles; for what is worthless has no repute, neither for good nor evil. 
Thus, Achilles, when angered, says, “[Agamemnon] dishonored me; for taking my prize, 
he keeps it himself.” And, as a reason for his anger, “[He treats me] like a dishonored 
vagrant.”  
And people think they are entitled to be treated with respect by those inferior in 
birth, in power, in virtue, and generally in whatever they themselves have much of; for 
example, in regard to money a rich man [thinks himself] superior to a poor man and in 
regard to speech an eloquent one [rhetorikos] to one unable to express himself, and a 
ruler to one who is ruled, and one thinking himself worthy to rule to one worthy to be 
ruled. Thus, it has been said, “Great is the rage of Zeus-nurtured kings,” and “But still, 
even afterward, he has resentment.” For they are vexed by their sense of ignored 
superiority.32  
 
How should a wealthy and ambitious Athenian youth make use of these observations and 
insights? He might grow in self-awareness and avoid the vain strut of a Polus or the knowing 
condescension of a Callicles. He might restrain himself from insulting his audience or his 
neighbors, knowing that his wealth and youth incline him toward supercilious speech. He may 
also particularly avoid insulting wealthy and powerful Athenians, who will take special offense 
because of their status. The comparison to Achilles, whose rage and pride were his undoing, is 
instructive on both counts. Then again, our ambitious Athenian might store these maxims about 
youth and wealth in his memory for use against a self-important opponent at court, whose 
bombast he can easily deflate with a well-placed remark about the impetuousness of youth or the 
arrogance of the wealthy. (Recall Socrates’ playful use of Polus’ name—“the colt”—to imply 
that his speech is rushing out ahead of its argument and of Polus’ own competence.) In these and 
in countless other possible applications, the emerging rhetorical artist acts as both listener and 
speaker in seeing and selecting the best argument, refutation, or judgment for any given case. 
Yet the Homeric citations also raise a host of theoretical questions about the relation of 
speech to force, of persuasion to fraud, of the orator to the ruler, and of the rhetorical listener to 
the one who presumes to rule him by speech. The first two quotations evoke Achilles’ rage when 
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he is insulted by Agamemnon, a man preeminent in political standing, but by merit mediocre. In 
the lines Aristotle quotes, it is Achilles himself who explains the injury: The irascibility of youth 
speaks in its own voice; and, as I explain above, when the emerging rhetorical artist hears this 
speech, she may reflect on her own inclination to insult others or take offense to her own 
detriment. The latter two quotations, however, which characterize Agamemnon, are spoken by 
the cautious prophet Calchas and the wily orator Odysseus. Their subject is the wrath of 
Agamemnon, who is enraged with his army for retreating and with Calchas for delivering bad 
news. Calchas and Odysseus are acting both as speakers and as listeners. They have heard 
Agamemnon’s speech—in the one case, counseling the army to retreat, and in the other, asking 
Calchas to explain Apollo’s wrath—yet both Odysseus and Calchas see through Agamemnon’s 
stated wishes to discern a trap that he is laying for his subordinates. When the Achaeans take 
Agamemnon at his word and flee to the ships, Odysseus has the unenviable task of persuading 
them to return to the fray: to please their commander by disobeying him, to honor his wishes by 
treating him like a liar. The king’s “rage,” Odysseus fears, will be kindled if the Achaeans are 
persuaded that he actually wants them to save their lives and return to their families. Calchas’ 
line—“But still, even afterward, he has resentment”—addresses the same problem, but in a 
different situation. It is Calchas himself who may incur the king’s wrath through obedience. 
Enjoined to find a way to lift Apollo’s plague, and knowing that Apollo was provoked by 
Agamemnon’s own sacrilege, Calchas hesitates to speak; for, he says, kings often command 
what they do not really want. The truth about Apollo may excite the king’s rage and turn out 
badly for the soothsayer; and even if Agamemnon were to restrain his anger for the moment, his 
resentment would burn long after.  
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These scenes from the Iliad dramatize fundamental problems of politics: the clash 
between merit and power, between honor and hierarchy, between the hero’s desire for greatness 
and his duty to the common good. In Aristotle’s treatise, the allusion to Homer reminds us that 
the fundamental problems of politics can be either exacerbated or ameliorated by public speech, 
and that a critical listener and effective speaker can be a safeguard against both an overweening 
ruler and an unscrupulous orator. They also reveal the deleterious effects of a speaker who 
pursues his own crass ambition at the expense of the public trust: Odysseus mollifies 
Agamemnon’s rage, but only for the moment—and his attempt to inspire reverence for 
Agamemnon’s power can only undermine the commander’s credibility. The Achaeans now know 
that they must always guess at Agamemnon’s real intentions rather than merely obeying his 
orders or weighing his advice. Calchas’ remark, though it comes chronologically earlier in the 
Iliad, seems to have been placed after the quotation from Odysseus because it reveals the 
consequences of a powerful speaker’s repeated duplicity. Calchas says what the Achaeans must 
later think: that, because one can never tell what Agamemnon is thinking, one must always 
assume the worst. His speeches often serve some selfish and short-term goal, with little or no 
long-term deliberation about the common good. Even if following his advice turns out well for 
the moment, that advice may hide some seething anger that will surface much later. As the Iliad 
will bear out, Agamemnon’s request to Calchas contains no more prudence, virtue, or good will 
than does his sham retreat order to the Achaeans. 
Thus, Odysseus and Calchas serve as examples of stochastic rhetorical artists who can 
see and judge the corrupt character, the invalid logic, and the unjustified rage of their king, and 
who minimize the resulting damage to the public trust by turning both his mercurial passions and 
unscrupulous uses of language toward the best available outcome. This rhetorical artistry stands 
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in contrast to the power of the rhetorikos, whom Aristotle places in grammatical parallel with 
“the ruler” and to “one thinking himself worthy to rule.” One wonders if, like the tyrant, the one 
skilled at producing “seeming” persuasion has a politically deleterious motive behind his 
supposedly beneficent calls to action. Like a tyrant, such an orator’s power is always tenuous, 
and often volatile; publicly extolled, but privately doubted. His verbal commands are both 
forceful and fraudulent.  
Not every ruler is a rhetor, nor every rhetor a ruler; but in 2.2, Aristotle acknowledges a 
deep similarity of character between the rhetorikos—the publicly acknowledged persuasive 
speaker, whose very office Aristotle has been interrogating and undermining throughout the 
treatise—and the “one thinking himself worthy to rule,” especially (as Aristotle will later say) if 
he suspects privately that he does not really have the capacity to do so.33 The true rhetorical artist 
ought to know that such false rhetors can be identified by their susceptibility to anger due to 
injured pride. She may also reflect on her own ambitions and rhetorical practices, imagining 
what it must be like for her fellow citizens to listen to her speeches and to wonder whether or not 
her powers of persuasion serve mean and undisclosed motives. The power of seeing what is 
persuasive is a power of seeing sophistry in a self-important but privately insecure orator—
whether that orator is a rival or oneself. 
The effects of this shifting perspective persist throughout 2.4-11. The chapter on 
friendliness, for example, shifts back and forth between first and third person, so that the reader 
alternates between imagining how to create friendly feeling in others and how it would feel for 
someone to appeal to her own sense of amity.34 The closing paragraph of every chapter, rather 
than calling on us to use the techniques that Aristotle has provided, reminds us that a speaker—
always in third person—might do so, and that we must be ready to refute or counteract that 
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speaker’s appeals.35 Moreover, the moral grounding of the emotions is a consistent theme in 
these chapters, so that an examination of any given emotion turns out also to be an education in 
the moral precepts that undergird one’s own reactions to words and events. We are friendly to 
those “who are disposed to do good to others,” to “generous and brave people,” to “those who 
are just,” and toward those whom we may “join in doing good.”36  We feel pity for those whom 
we think are “among the good people of the world,” and who are therefore suffering unjustly; 
whereas we feel indignation toward those who have “undeserved good fortune.” Thus, pity and 
indignation arise “from the same moral character, and both emotions are characteristic of a good 
character”—that is, one who cares about justice.37 A person with little or no sense of justice 
cannot feel indignation but may often feel envy, or unjustified grievance against a neighbor 
whose fortune is better than one’s own.  
This moral distinction between indignation and envy may be useful to a morally serious 
speaker who is delivering a speech of accusation against someone who has committed an 
injustice. Given a petty or small-souled audience, she may need to appeal to envy rather than 
indignation to gain victory over a bad actor. It is also a helpful distinction, though, for a morally 
serious but young and incompletely formed listener, who will now see every appeal to envy as an 
implied insult to her character. People who are “virtuous and serious” are prone to indignation 
more than to envy, since they “make sound judgments and hate unjust things”; but only the small 
of soul feel envy, and every appeal to envy is an attempt to exploit an audience’s base 
pettiness.38 Aristotle ends the section on emotions by offering such a listener a salutary 
alternative to envy: that is, the desire to emulate. A listener who seeks to eschew envy but to 
emulate goodness will find herself wondering whether each fortunate person is or is not worthy 
of her praise and imitation. She will exercise the very moral judgment that will later make it 
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possible for her to feel justified indignation, rather than mere envy, at undeserved achievements, 
and to be a true emulator (or later a true friend) of the wise and the virtuous. 
Aristotle’s treatment of this group of three passions—indignation, envy, emulation—is 
therefore mimetic of the moral paideia that Aristotle identifies in the Nicomachean Ethics as 
foundational for learning to listen to political discourse.39 The student begins by seeing an 
example of how a great person responds to undeserved good fortune (indignation); then begins 
imitating that response, but finds his capacity for moral feeling too small to get the reaction quite 
right—and slips into envy, which cares nothing for the justice of the case. The teacher is ready 
with a more virtuous, yet still attainable, state of mind—emulation—and encourages the student 
to focus again on good examples rather than bad ones. Emulation is “a good thing and 
characteristic of good people, while envy is bad and characteristic of the bad.”40 Rhetorical 
education, then, if undertaken with serious moral purpose, can help a student attain what Hesiod 
identified as the middle moral state between worthlessness and perfection: the state of one who is 
developing virtue and good sense by listening well to wise advice and by shunning what is 
debased.41 
These chapters also continue to turn the tools of rhetoric against professional and 
unscrupulous orators by helping the rhetorical artist to distinguish between ethically grounded 
appeals and frivolous ones. An analysis of the best sort of audiences—here, as in the Politics—
reveals that they consider people worthy of their friendship only if those people “do not live at 
the expense of others,” but rather “live by their own efforts.” (The busybodies and rabble-rousers 
of the Athenian marketplace are unlikely to meet this standard.) Audiences are also friendly to 
“those who praise the presence of good qualities” in others—but only “those who are not 
deceitful.” The flatterer of 1.9 cannot win such amity, since flattery is universally recognized as 
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shameful; and in the chapter on shame, Aristotle lists precisely the same practices from 1.9 as 
characteristics of a shameful flatterer. Friendly honesty, by contrast, makes us willing to confront 
one another’s faults and weaknesses—not merely to praise Athenians while in Athens. 
Paradoxically, we are friends with people whose moral character is serious enough to inspire 
shame when our faults are revealed; but these are the same people whom we expect to reveal 
those faults rather than to flatter us. Like Socrates, who insisted that Pericles was no great rhetor 
because he flattered the Athenians and left them morally worse than he found them, Aristotle 
insists that his students should expect salutary rebukes—not flattery—from public speakers who 
presume to appeal to their friendly feeling.42 It is important to notice that, as Aristotle knows, 
demagogues regularly do just the opposite, ingratiating themselves to vulgar audiences by means 
of flattery. His observations about friendly feeling, then, are meant to clarify the distinction 
between true and false persuasion by causing his students to reflect on their experience of 
friendship.  
Other passages seem designed to help us weigh a speaker’s appeal to a given emotion 
against the facts of the case, so that we can determine whether or not the emotion is fitting—and, 
by inference, whether or not the corresponding judgment is wise. For example, Aristotle claims 
that people feel confident when they have “a supply of money and live bodies and friends and 
territory and preparations for war, either all these or the greatest.” This list echoes Aristotle’s 
remarks in 1.4 about the importance of political, economic, and martial expertise among 
deliberative speakers. People who know what they are talking about give better advice than 
people who do not. Yet it is surely true that some audiences feel confident about an action 
without actually examining those facts or hearing such expertise from a speaker. One can 
imagine (and indeed, Aristotle is sure to have seen) audiences whose false sense of confidence 
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led them to approve losing ventures—like the merchants who followed Cleon into a losing war 
with Sparta. Yet Aristotle seems to suggest that, just as there is a difference between persuasion 
and seeming persuasion, there is a difference between true confidence, grounded in facts and 
reason, and the false confidence that comes from a stirring but shallow emotional appeal to 
patriotism or honor. The chapter on confidence helps speakers and listeners to tell the difference. 
The chapter on fear does the same, yet it is more explicit in its reference to deceptive speakers—
who, Aristotle says, ought to be feared even more than bombastic ones: “It is not the quick-
tempered and outspoken [who are to be feared] but the calm and those who dissemble and the 
unscrupulous; for with these it is unclear if they are close [to acting], with the result that it is 
never evident that they are far from doing so.”43 In this context, one wonders if the famous 
passage expressing Aristotle’s disdain for people in general might be especially applicable to 
public speakers who make rhetoric and politics matters of constant fear and suspicion: “Since 
most people are rather bad, slaves of profitmaking, and cowardly in danger, being at the mercy 
of another is in most cases a cause of fear, […] and those able to do wrong [are a cause of fear] 
to those able to be wronged; for human beings usually do wrong when they can.” 
The Composite Audience (2.12-17) 
The remaining chapters of this section, which address the characters of various kinds of 
audience, seem designed to inculcate a hopeful and generous posture in rhetorical artists—an 
attitude that might counteract the fear and suspicion that so often characterize rhetorical 
exchanges. The Aristotelian rhetorical artist can and should contribute to the political cohesion 
that human language enables by its very nature. Aristotle presents the character of each political 
sector only in outline, and many of the portrayals (of the young, for example, and of the wealthy) 
are unflattering. An unscrupulous speaker would find many character traits here that seem ready-
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made for manipulation—if only he could ensure that his audience would be composed of people 
from only one age bracket and socioeconomic status. Yet if we continue to remember that both 
speakers and audiences are potential rhetorical artists, and if we recall that Aristotle has already 
begun training his students to resist the urge both to flatter and to be flattered, then we may see 
these chapters as an attempt to build friendly feeling and mutual understanding between his 
student-auditors and the people they will encounter in future rhetorical situations. His treatment 
of rhetorical ethos claimed that the reasons for trusting a public speaker are the same as the 
reasons for trusting a friend, family member, or private advisor; and that “seeming” to be prudent 
is persuasive in rhetorical situations only because of the audience’s shared knowledge that real 
prudence is trustworthy. Similarly, his analysis of the emotions made his students aware of the 
moral and logical underpinnings of their pleasures and pains, and suggested that there are healthy 
and unhealthy ways of using speech to move the affections of one’s neighbors. With this moral 
foundation in place, now that Aristotle’s students have begun to appreciate the contribution of 
affect to the common good, they are ready to study the characteristics of various classes of 
neighbors whose emotional reactions and ethical priorities differ because of their different 
stations in life and politics. These differences, I suggest, are part of the political constitution that 
Aristotle has claimed is worth preserving. While the rhetorical artist cannot ensure such 
preservation, she can contribute to it by observing and honoring the morally grounded and 
cognitively substantive opinions of her diverse audience. 
It is significant that Aristotle begins with the character of the young: that is, with his 
students’ own characteristics. We may forgive Aristotle, at this stage of his discourse, for being 
something of a scold, since his students are supposed to be learning to hear uncomfortable truths 
about themselves from wiser and older friends. Young people, he says, are “inclined to do 
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whatever they desire” and are “unable to resist their impulses.” “Youth longs for superiority,” 
and is therefore covetous of victory; and, for good or ill, it is always “filled with good hopes”—a 
state of mind that Aristotle compares to drunkenness. Young people’s sensitivity to shame, he 
says, comes not from any heightened moral sensitivity, but from the fact that they are educated 
only by convention and have no appreciation of fine things. That is, they cannot judge beauty for 
themselves, so they must rely on something akin to vanity—imagining what others would say 
about their words and actions—to make judgments about whether those actions are noble or 
base. (This observation explains Aristotle’s choice in 1.9 to associate to kalon with what is 
honored. It was no concession to the comparative ignobility of rhetoric; it was, rather, a 
condescension to the comparative callowness of his students.) These and other observations in 
the chapter, I hardly need to point out, are at least as useful for a youthful rhetorical listener as 
they are for an orator who must address such a crowd. The chapter on youth must inspire 
reflection in the emerging rhetorical artist about his or her own ignorance, inexperience, and 
impetuousness, and a resolution to temper such qualities through deliberation and self-discipline. 
The concluding sentence of the chapter, which defines youthful wit as “cultured insolence,” is 
surely a barb aimed at a class clown (who, by this time in the lecture, is playfully mimicking 
Aristotle’s sternness), and at those who flatter him with their laughter. For a man like Aristotle, a 
class of future rhetoricians can be a hard thing to manage. 
Chapters 13-17, which address old age, prime of life, good birth, wealth, and power, help 
those students to discern the good and the bad inclinations of each group, and to learn how best 
to deliberate publicly with such people. Some philologists, searching these chapters in vain for 
clues as to how a public speaker might use such knowledge to her advantage, conclude that they 
“were almost certainly written in a different—nonrhetorical—context and only added to the 
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Rhetoric at a later stage, without adequate revision to integrate them into the objectives of the 
treatise.”44 Yet again, it is important to realize that the treatise is theoretical as well as practical—
and that it is liberal, not narrowly technical. Rhetorical audiences are morally, cognitively, and 
emotionally active citizens; they are not so much raw material that will passively receive a 
speaker’s impression. Each chapter discusses how people from that class are likely to deliberate: 
what they think is good, and why; whom they are likely to trust, and why. Each class of people 
will understand prudence, virtue, and good will somewhat differently; each will expect 
somewhat different kinds of knowledge or expertise from a speaker. These chapters are therefore 
a dialectical review of Aristotle’s observations about the special topics, the speaker’s ēthos, and 
the audience’s pathē, which he can now examine from the perspective of each sector of the city. 
With ever-greater precision, Aristotle is exploring the ways that propositions and proofs 
converge in the souls of human beings, working with their active states of mind to produce the 
artifact of persuasion.   
The common good, it turns out, is composed of the habits, opinions, and expectations of 
all the city’s demographic parts—both because the habits and traditions of a particular people 
help to constitute their good, and because human beings for the most part hit on truth, so that the 
truth about the good is discerned in part by each group or each individual. Aristotle claims in the 
Politics that we deliberate better as a large group than as individuals, not because small- or large-
group discussions lead dialectically to better conclusions than any individual could achieve 
alone, but because each person in an audience sees part of the common good, so that a judgment 
rendered by a diverse coalition is often wiser than the best judgment of a single expert. It is a 
salutary fact of democratic governance that, in a democracy, a speaker’s audience is likely to be 
composed of more than one group: of the well born and the common, the educated and the naïve, 
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the old and the young. A speaker who hopes to appeal to multiple age groups or to multiple 
social classes needs to imagine how each of these segments would hear and judge his or her 
speech: to see ahead of time, through artistic noēsis, how true persuasion would be constituted by 
each demographic sector’s opinions about the good. Chapters 12-17 exercise that faculty of 
imaginative listening, empowering an artistic speaker to see the closely interwoven interests, 
habits, and opinions of a diverse audience and to deliver a speech that reinforces these opinions’ 
mutual dependence. Such a speech would point toward justice and beauty, rendering in speech 
the end for which the city exists: not merely living, but living well. Rhetorically artistic audience 
members would similarly see, not only their own interests, but the interests and opinions of their 
neighbors, reflected in such a speech’s reasoning, and would also be better able to expose or 
refute demagogic appeals to one group’s narrow interests or prejudices. One hopes that the 
occasional merchant might recognize and resent Cleon’s flattery. 
Yet such rhetorical artistry, whether deployed in speech or used in judgment, would 
require something more than the disciplinary expertise outlined in 1.4-14 or the theoretical 
knowledge of ethics, emotions, and demographics that are provided by 2.1-11. The material 
cause of persuasion is the audience’s endoxa, which we are now prepared to identify as 
propositions—whether stated or tacit—about what is advantageous, noble, or just. Such 
propositions arise from the common conviction that good advice is given by people who are 
wise, and that such people either possess or at least seek to possess true and substantive 
knowledge about the topic under discussion. Such people are also benevolently disposed toward 
their audience and the city as a whole, with the result that they share (or must at least seem to 
share) that audience’s passions and affections about public concerns. 
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Knowledge of form is the defining characteristic of the artist. The shipwright knows 
about lumber and pitch; but he also knows how a rudder is shaped, and why—and, in the action 
of efficient causality, his knowledge of matter is always practically subordinate to his knowledge 
of form and end. He saws or chisels a given plank—with all its idiosyncrasies of density, grain, 
and warp—to achieve the form that will best suit a given ship’s purposes. A good pilot is no less 
artistic in his use of that rudder than was the shipwright in his production of it; but his use 
involves a much more precise knowledge of form, since he has seen how a variety of rudder 
designs have performed under a wide variety of conditions.  
The body of persuasion, says Aristotle, is enthymeme—which must mean (as he suggests 
in the Physics) that the material cause of persuasion is a series of propositions, and the formal 
cause is the inductive or deductive logic that yokes those propositions together to imply a 
conclusion or judgment. Aristotle has repeatedly employed but not yet analyzed this logical 
form, apparently because he wanted first to show how to distinguish the solid materials of true 
persuasion from the flimsy, counterfeit materials of seeming persuasion. His treatment of the 
special topics showed that audiences always expect true knowledge or expertise, outlining some 
ways that artistic speakers and listeners might differentiate such expertise from its counterfeits. 
His treatment of the speaker’s ēthos revealed that real persuasion can be achieved through 
“seeming” prudence, virtue, or good will—but only because an audience knows the real thing 
and has learned to trust it. This awareness, I have suggested, makes persuasion ontologically 
dependent on truth, since no one trusts a speaker without first believing that real wisdom and 
truth exist and are knowable. Aristotle’s treatment of pathetic appeals similarly claimed that the 
persuasive utility of any given emotion depends on the audience’s conviction that that emotion is 
a response to a substantive good or evil. However, the link between this proposition about the 
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good and the emotion that it undergirds has not yet been explored. This link—the way that one 
proposition relates to another, or the rules by which a given emotion or ethical judgment can be 




FORMAL CAUSES: LOGIC, ARRANGEMENT, AND STYLE (2.18 – 3.19) 
The last sentence of the Rhetoric is abrupt and jarring, bringing to a sudden halt 
Aristotle’s rather meandering survey of enthymeme, arrangement, and style. Having just 
explained that asyndeton is a device well suited to a speech’s conclusion, Aristotle suddenly 
closes his own treatise with a famous asyndeton from Lysias: “I have spoken, you have listened, 
you have [the facts], you judge.” The quotation does double duty. It is both an example and an 
enactment of Aristotle’s stated preference for brief perorations, and it thus creates a structural 
analogy between this theoretical treatise and the persuasive speeches that it purports to study. By 
ending his treatise rhetorically, Aristotle suggests that we ought to read it rhetorically. We must 
judge the Rhetoric as a work of rhetoric.1  
The abruptness of this ending seems pedagogically deliberate, or at least useful, given the 
important methodological change that characterizes these final chapters. Unlike Aristotle’s 
treatment of special topics, passions, and ethical dispositions, the chapters on enthymeme, 
arrangement, and style are full of rhetorical exemplars. Fables, maxims, enthymemes, and 
figures fill every page. As an objective rhetorical theorist, Aristotle has (except for a couple of 
notable exceptions) kept persuasive techniques at arm’s length; but suddenly, he is at pains to 
illustrate how each species of trope, scheme, or enthymeme has been used, for good or for ill, in 
extant poetry and oratory. This shift in method seems to arise from a change in subject. Aristotle 
treated the material causes of persuasion as inexorable features of human nature and thought. 
Audiences are moral and political beings in their own right, regardless of speakers’ persuasive 
goals; and speeches draw their propositions from audiences’ already at-work deliberations about 
politics. The Aristotelian rhetorical artist, noticing the givenness of this raw material and 
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recognizing the speaker’s limited power to manipulate it, conceives of a rhetorical exigency as 
an opportunity for neighbors to unite their deliberations around a shared conception of the good. 
The dearth of rhetorical examples in these early chapters diverts the student’s mind from the 
quasi-professional techniques that sophists assume are central to rhetorical study. Aristotle 
focuses the student’s mind instead on shared human understandings about what constitutes good 
advice, and insists that what is credible or persuasive in rhetorical contexts derives from these 
hard-won common understandings. The sophist, who seeks to reduce human thought and feeling 
to mere instruments, can thus produce only “seeming persuasion”; his artifact is made of hollow, 
insubstantial materials that may pass for the real thing, but only with a particularly callow 
audience and only (one hopes) for the moment. By studying persuasion’s material causes, then, 
the rhetorical artist learns to discriminate between real materials and false ones, whether he is 
inventing arguments or judging them.2 In any art, such discrimination is a requisite skill for the 
artistic study of form, which of course requires examples of artistic production. 
This shift from material to form is hazardous, though, especially for an ambitious and 
goal-oriented student. Absent any salutary reminders of her artistic task, an aspiring rhetor might 
slip into sophistic habits, dutifully logging away maxims and metaphors for use in future 
speeches while forgetting to exercise rhetorical judgment and the practical imagination. The 
abrupt ending is a kind of wake-up call to such a conscientious imitator, a reminder that the 
artistic speaker’s persuasive choices result from a prior judgment about which arguments are best 
for the rhetorical situation.  
Given this pedagogical purpose, Aristotle’s seemingly artless presentation of example 
sentences—they are usually introduced, simply, with an “and this” or simply “and”—seems, 
again, to be deliberate. The examples are not models for imitation, except insofar as the 
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rhetorical artist judges them to be artistic or persuasive in an imagined context. For each 
enthymeme or trope, we are meant to ask such questions as Aristotle taught us to ask in book 2: 
What subject is being debated, and to what end? What would a person need to know about that 
subject to give good advice? What composite audience is likely to hear the speech, and what is 
their emotional disposition toward the subject? How might this particular audience understand 
wisdom or good will—and what kinds of propositions would they treat as credible?  
The persuasiveness or ethical seriousness of a given enthymeme or technique depends 
almost entirely on the answers to these questions. It is for this reason that Aristotle begins his 
transitional chapter, 2.18, with such a long and complex review of what makes speeches 
“ethical.” A speech is ethical, in Aristotle’s view, to the extent that its material is chosen and 
arranged to mimic or engage the knowledge, opinions, traditions, habits, and deliberations that 
constitute a given audience’s character (ēthos). Enthymeme is the body of persuasion; but 
“character is, so to speak, almost the controlling factor in persuasion.”3 Because Aristotle offers 
enthymemes and figures without political context, they function more like found artifacts—pots 
for an aspiring potter, spires for an apprentice architect—than like curated exemplars for 
imitation. The emerging rhetorical artist must juxtapose each argument or turn of phrase with 
others like it, and must judge its persuasiveness in a variety of historical or imagined contexts, in 
order for the exemplar to be useful.  
Chapters 18-26, which examine the formal cause of argumentative persuasion, encourage 
such imaginative judgment in three ways. First, as usual, Aristotle’s transitional statements and 
chapter headings treat speakers and speeches as phenomena to be studied objectively. Speakers 
and speeches are discussed in the third person, while first-person plural verbs are used almost 
always to place the reader in the position of an audience or judge. Even Aristotle’s 
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recommendations for speakers are usually stated in the passive voice, or using an impersonal 
form of deō (it is necessary)—never as a straightforward imperative or as a first-person statement 
(such as “we should say thus and such”).4 Second, as always, the rhetorical artist—acting as a 
judge of the Rhetoric, not only of rhetorical speeches—must often revise old taxonomies in light 
of new discoveries. Chapter 18 offers a new and slightly revised understanding of krisis, as well 
as a new way of dividing the pisteis; and chapters 22-26 gradually shift the structural distinctions 
between paradigm and enthymeme, and between various kinds of enthymeme, that Aristotle 
announced in book 1. These disciplinary lines shift as the student examines individual exemplars 
in light of Aristotle’s definitions and divisions, and then discovers those definitions’ 
imperfection. Third and finally, Aristotle creates dialectical opposition between various species 
of enthymeme—not only between real and “apparent” enthymemes, but also between exemplars 
of the “real” kind—requiring students to judge those enthymemes’ demonstrative or refutative 
utility in a variety of imagined contexts. As always, these pedagogical techniques turn the 
powers of rhetoric against famous speakers and speeches, and against the students’ own 
rhetorical ambitions, so that each student’s growth in persuasive power is accompanied by (and, 
indeed, indistinguishable from) growth in artistic and ethical judgment.  
Matter and Form: Propositions, Enthymemes, and Persuasion 
First, then, let us consider the transitional statement at 2.19, which closes the study of 
ēthos and pathos and introduces the section on paradigm and enthymeme. This introduction 
seems strange and out of place, since its review of the pisteis seems to ignore pathos altogether, 
and it reintroduces the notion of krisis after a long period when judgment was not mentioned. To 
see the purpose of this passage, then, it might be useful to compare it with other dialectical 
moments that serve similar purposes: book 1, chapter 2, which offered Aristotle’s definition of 
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rhetoric and his tripartite division of proofs, and book 2, chapter 1, which reprised the three 
proofs and emphasized the importance of krisis to rhetorical theory. In light of the dialectical 
progress made between 1.2 and 2.1, we may more clearly see the purposes of 2.19. 
In 1.2.3-6, and again in 2.1.1-4, Aristotle claimed that there were three parts of the 
rhetorical situation, each with its own corresponding pistis: the speaker (ēthos), the audience 
(pathos), and the speech (logos). Yet even in 1.2, and certainly in the chapters that follow 2.1, 
Aristotle suggests the inadequacy of this formulation: the speaker’s ethical credibility depends on 
his adaptation to the audience’s political constitution and demographic characteristics, and would 
therefore seem to be something like “persuasion through the hearer”; the speaker’s public 
expressions of emotion, if such emotions are judged to be appropriate, go a long way toward 
establishing his wisdom and good will, and therefore seem indistinguishable from ēthos; and 
both the speaker’s ethical credibility and emotional affect depend on the speaker’s use of 
enthymeme, the body of persuasion, which somehow unites all three proofs. The tripartite 
division into ēthos, logos, and pathos, then, is not Aristotle’s final word on the sources or kinds 
of rhetorical proof. It is, rather, an early dialectical step that ultimately points toward enthymeme 
as “the body of persuasion,” or the union of logical form with persuasion’s material causes. 
If we ignore this dialectical progress, we might expect 2.18-20 to announce that Aristotle 
is ready to discuss logic, having already treated ethics and the passions; or, perhaps, that he will 
now discuss how speeches themselves are persuasive, having already discussed persuasion 
through hearers and speakers. But book 2 has revealed that ethical and affective dispositions are 
interwoven with one another, both for the audience and for the speaker; and it remains to be seen 
how the taxonomy of pisteis in 1.2 can be incorporated into the theoretically superior view of the 
rhetorical situation that Aristotle presented in 1.3. It should come as no surprise, then, that after 
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the long enthymematic review of how speeches are made “ethical”—that is, how they are 
adapted to the characters (including the passions) of their audiences, thus serving the natural 
ends of language—Aristotle introduces the last kind of proof, not as logos, but rather as koina 
and koinai pisteis—topics and proofs that permeate all persuasive speech, giving form to the 
ethical and affective propositions that we have discovered in the special topics and in our study 
of human opinion.  
Later rhetorical theorists, commenting on Aristotle, would hold on to logos as a separate 
field of study from ēthos and pathos, and treat the “common topics” and “special topics” as lists 
of arguments and terms that are useful in crafting enthymemes and propositions. Perhaps this 
division is a useful approximation of what Aristotle calls “the original plan,” or at least the plan 
of the Rhetoric in its earliest formulation. By 2.18, however, we have discovered that the idia 
(so-called “special topis”), like the ethical and affective dispositions of audiences, are features of 
the world as we find it, and are therefore persuasion’s material cause; that the koina (so-called 
“common topics”) are features of language, which (along with the rules of grammar) give form 
to individual propositions, regardless of discipline or subject; and that paradigm and enthymeme 
give form to persuasive argumentation as a whole by yoking together premises, examples, and 
conclusions according to emergent and necessary patterns of human thought. Paradigm and 
enthymeme are called koinai pisteis because they are the artificial form taken by all persuasive 
speech, necessitated by speech’s natural disposition toward truth and by the ends of politics (the 
advantageous, the just, and the noble—that is, living well).  
An analogy and an example may be helpful. Recall Aristotle’s explanation of the 
hierarchy of causes in the builder’s art. A house’s final cause, shelter and comfort, necessitates 
what form the house must take; but the available materials, which are (in another way) necessary 
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and given, require a certain arrangement to achieve the formal and final causes that the builder 
has discerned. The properties of the materials serve the final end best if heavier materials support 
lighter ones, so that a stone foundation supports earthen walls and a wooden roof. One might also 
say (though Aristotle does not) that each individual element of a house—a pillar or shingle or 
nail—is also a product of art, and therefore has its own material, formal, and final causes. For 
each smaller artifact, like the house as a whole, the final cause governs form and matter. If 
persuasion is the artifact analogous to the house, and enthymeme is the “body” (that is, the 
matter and form) of persuasion, then propositions are persuasion’s material cause (stone, wood, 
thatch), and logical conclusions are its formal cause (the shape that the house takes when those 
materials are arranged to provide shelter). Yet individual propositions are also products of art, 
and have their own material and formal causes, as do nails, shingles, and pillars.  
We are now in a position to see how individual rhetorical propositions, oriented toward 
the goods of human life, may be composed of ethical and affective materials—that is, terms and 
phrases that originate in the traditions, disciplines, and ethical dispositions of a city or an 
audience. Their form, I have argued, arises from the rules of grammar (semantics and syntax) 
and from the koina. By semantics, I mean (quite simply and roughly) an account of words’ 
signifying power: how individual words and phrases serve as signs of things that we know or 
seek to know. Such signification is of course inherited; it is a given feature of a community or 
city; but it is also susceptible to change by each successive generation of speakers. Syntax is the 
study of words working together to create knowledge of truth. It is the study of predication, 
which makes definition, description, and narration possible. The idia and the pisteis are 
particular classes of semantic and syntactic structures that make propositions rhetorical: “His 
actions were imprudent” carries less rhetorical force than “That man is a child and a fool.” The 
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koina are widely useful syntactic structures that amplify the rhetorical force of such propositions, 
regardless of the subject matter: “The most childish and irresponsible man ever to hold this 
office.” Take an example from Shakespeare. It would be grammatical but not rhetorical to say of 
a suspicious person, “He looks thoughtful, as though he wanted something; what do you think is 
going on?” Add a claim about the greater and the less, an implied probable future fact, and a 
couple of idia about your target, and you get something more forceful: “Yond Cassius has a lean 
and hungry look; he thinks too much. Such men are dangerous.”  
Yet I still have not illustrated how material and formal causes work in an individual 
proposition. It is clear that propositions about human action, arranged syllogistically, make 
enthymemes; it is equally clear that a speaker’s explicit propositions combine with tacit ones 
(supplied by the audience) to create persuasion. We can see how the house is constructed. But 
what about the columns, shingles, nails? How do the koina and the rules of grammar bring form 
to bear on idia, passions, and ethical dispositions to create individual propositions?  
To illustrate this important feature of rhetorical premises, I propose to examine a 
rhetorical situation from act 3 of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet: the moment when Tybalt 
accosts his enemy Romeo on the streets of Verona, challenging him to a duel. Tybalt does not 
know that Romeo has secretly wed his cousin Juliet and is therefore a member of his family. 
TYBALT  
Romeo, the love I bear thee can afford 
No better term than this: thou art a villain. 
 
ROMEO 
Tybalt, the reason that I have to love thee 
Doth much excuse the appertaining rage 
To such a greeting. Villain am I none. 
Therefore farewell. I see thou knowest me not. 
 
TYBALT  
Boy, this shall not excuse the injuries 
185 
That thou hast done me. Therefore turn and draw. 
 
ROMEO  
I do protest I never injured thee 
But love thee better than thou canst devise 
Till thou shalt know the reason of my love. 
And so, good Capulet, which name I tender 
As dearly as mine own, be satisfied.5 
 
For Romeo, the secret wedding entails an end to his mortal feud with the Capulets and a 
cancellation of all debts, whether moral or material; but for Tybalt, every Montague is a living 
reminder of past insults and injuries that must be avenged. This difference in knowledge of the 
specifics of the case accounts for Tybalt’s failure of persuasion. Romeo is not who Tybalt takes 
him to be. Nevertheless, the two men share an ethical disposition (the love of honor, rooted in 
loyalty to blood and clan), and the material causes of Tybalt’s challenge—the ethical terms—are 
arranged to compel Romeo by his own ethical standards to fight to the death. The challenge takes 
the form of a single proposition, though (as I will show) it is a grammatically complex one that 
achieves both an accusation and a provocation through a single predication. “Romeo,” Tybalt 
says, “the love I bear thee can afford / No better term than this: Thou art a villain.”  
The material causes here are a proper name (Romeo), an invocation of “love” or 
friendliness (spoken sarcastically, with an adolescent’s cultured insolence), the special topic of 
the good (“no better”), and a term of judicial accusation (“villain”). The formal cause is a 
nuanced grammatical and stylistic arrangement, calculated to maximize both the insult and the 
mortal threat. The proposition has two parts, separated by a colon; and each part begins with a 
direct address. In the first part, the direct address is followed by a sarcastic and grammatically 
circuitous proclamation of friendship. Love is personified as one who “afford[s]” (i.e. provides, 
furnishes) terms of speech; but the main clause is interrupted by a subordinate adjective clause 
(“I bear thee”), and it ends with a statement that makes use of two koina—a claim about the 
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possible and impossible, and about the greater and the less (“can afford no better term”). Such 
obfuscation amplifies the force of the succeeding full stop, which is a simple and direct 
predication: “Thou art a villain.” Tybalt’s use of the informal pronoun “thou” further accentuates 
the contrast between the two clauses. “The love I bear thee” feigns familiar affection, while 
“thou art a villain” adds an insulting informality and condescension to the substantive ethical 
charge and to the open challenge. Tybalt’s cultured insolence is all the greater for his use of a 
fiduciary metaphor, “afford no better term,” which suggests that the “term” of his predication is 
also the terms of a contract. The claim “thou art a villain,” then, is meant to bind Romeo by a 
shared code of transactional justice, by which code the insulted party must make ready for a duel. 
(The transactional language continues throughout the scene; though Romeo declines the terms, 
Mercutio accepts them and soon falls by Tybalt’s sword. Romeo then kills Tybalt in reparation 
for Mercutio’s death.)  
This provocation, while hotheaded and politically deleterious, nevertheless illustrates the 
nature of rhetorical artistry at the level of the proposition—and might even help us to see more 
clearly what Aristotle means when he claims that speeches can be “ethical.” It turns out that even 
a proposition offered with evil motives must be stated in ethical terms. To persuade someone to 
do evil, one must try to show that the act is (in some way) good. In this case, Tybalt is trying to 
persuade Romeo to do something illegal and risky, and almost certainly disadvantageous to 
himself and his family; but to do so, he draws on a code of honor that, even more than 
promulgated law or calculations of advantage, governs the behavior of friends, family members, 
neighbors, enemies, and business associates in the city of Verona. The very terms of the 
accusation depend on the existence of this shared understanding of what is noble and what is 
base; it is base to receive insult without redress, and it is noble to show contempt for death in 
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defending one’s good name. The proposition is therefore built out of ethical, political, and 
affective terms—Romeo, love, thee, afford, better, term, villain—arranged grammatically and 
stylistically to achieve the proximate ends of accusation and provocation, as well as the ultimate 
end of justice (as Tybalt and Romeo understand it). The study of special topics, affect, and 
ethical dispositions (in this case, the impetuousness of youth) helps us to identify and explain the 
proposition’s material causes, while the study of grammar, style, and the koina reveal the 
proposition’s form. This form serves and is determined by the end, but it is also in some ways 
necessitated by the material. Romeo, Tybalt thinks, is who he is; Verona is what it is; their 
shared opinions and traditions are ineradicable givens.  
Romeo and Mercutio’s respective responses illustrate the difference between artless and 
artful listening. Romeo answers Tybalt in the same terms as the accusation, thus preserving the 
shared endoxa about love and justice. He loves Tybalt better than Tybalt can know, until he 
knows the cause of that love—another use of the same koina, the possible and impossible, and 
the greater and less. The cultured insolence of Tybalt’s feigned “love” is a silly parody of 
Romeo’s own love for his new wife Juliet, and by extension for all Capulets. Hence, he “tenders” 
the name of Capulet “as dearly as [his] own.” Notice how the lexis of this line mimetically 
reconciles Capulet with Montague, Tybalt with Romeo, and the friendly with the transactional: 
“tender” and “dear” are fiduciary terms, but also terms of affection; and the name “Romeo,” with 
which Tybalt accosted him, is now valued equally—in terms both transactional and familial—
with the name Capulet. Where Tybalt had hoped to bind Romeo in a contract requiring death, 
Romeo pays his debt in terms of love. He protests, moreover, that he has done Tybalt no injury 
(that is, no injustice), and that he is therefore no villain. In Aristotle’s terms, we might say that 
Romeo has none of the characteristics of those who do wrong. His response confirms that he 
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shares Tybalt’s endoxa about love, honor, and the transactional nature of justice; but he knows 
that Tybalt has misapprehended the facts of the case (Romeo’s familial identity), and he 
therefore judges the formal cause of Tybalt’s proposition to be unsuited to the material. 
Nevertheless, Romeo’s artistic response demonstrates the possibility of future persuasion, and 
therefore of reconciliation, between himself and Tybalt, if only the two can live long enough for 
Romeo’s marriage to Juliet to become safely known. For all their impetuousness, these two may 
yet deliberate together about the just, the noble, and their common advantage. 
The material, formal, and final causes of this deliberate rhetorical engagement stand in 
sharp contrast with Mercutio’s unthinking, bellicose, and vainglorious reaction:  
MERCUTIO  
O calm, dishonorable, vile submission! 
Alla stoccato carries it away.   (He draws.) 
Tybalt, you ratcatcher, will you walk? 
 
TYBALT  
What wouldst thou have with me? 
 
MERCUTIO  
Good king of cats, nothing but one of your 
nine lives, that I mean to make bold withal, and, as 
you shall use me hereafter, dry-beat the rest of the 
eight. Will you pluck your sword out of his pilcher 
by the ears? Make haste, lest mine be about your 
ears ere it be out. 
 
TYBALT  
I am for you.     (He draws.) 
 
The terms of Tybalt’s original challenge are of no importance to the mercurial man; he has taken 
offense, and will act. Unlike Romeo, he has been moved; he reacts just as Tybalt intended; but he 
has not been persuaded of anything. His crude and ethically vacuous taunts—calling Tybalt a cat 
and a rat-catcher, advising him to grab his sword “by the ears” before Mercutio’s sword cuts off 
his ears—are the spoken equivalent of Mercutio’s artless listening. Mercutio shatters the 
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tentative but genteel truce that Romeo and Tybalt had fashioned together out of their shared 
ethos, and jumps straight into unthinking action. For Mercutio, language is only instrumental. 
When we read Rhetoric 2.19, then, which rather nonchalantly lists the koina, we should 
not expect merely to find turns of phrase or forms of thought that are universally useful for 
rhetorical invention. We ought, rather, to wonder what arrangements of words give persuasive 
form to propositions, regardless of the subject, so that it is possible for people of different ages, 
statuses, and levels of expertise—even people who seem not to share political interests—to speak 
and listen to one another with mutual understanding and mutual benefit. Such matters as greater 
and less, past and future fact, possible and impossible are useful for speakers, of course, but they 
are no less useful for audiences who seek to discriminate between truth and falsehood, or the 
persuasive and the apparently persuasive; and they create the possibility of consensus between 
our disparate deliberations about what is just, noble, or advantageous.  
In similar fashion, when we read Aristotle’s treatment of paradigm (that is, rhetorical 
induction) in 2.20, we ought not merely to look for ways to convince someone of a proposition 
whose truth he doubts, or to shore up the conclusion of a persuasive enthymeme with well-
chosen examples—though of course these are good uses of paradigm in a persuasive speech. We 
should wonder, in addition, how similarities between present circumstances and historical events 
or fables make it possible for us to discover shared ends and deliberate about them together. The 
transition from the koina to the koinai pisteis (and, eventually, to the “topics” or “elements” of 
enthymemes) is therefore a transition from the formal causes of individual propositions to the 
formal causes of rhetorically inferential thinking. Having outlined the house, and then analyzed 
each of its constitutive elements, we are ready to erect its frame. 
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Seeing and Judging Rhetorical Induction  
Consistent with earlier taxonomies, chapter 20 divides the koinai pisteis into two broad 
kinds, paradigm and enthymeme, and then adds a new stipulation: enthymemes are composed of 
a particular kind of proposition, the maxim, which (we will later learn) is a generalization about 
human action. The maxim, then, is “part of the enthymeme.” Yet it turns out that paradigms, too, 
make use of maxims, at least tacitly: each paradigm is composed of concrete examples, either 
historical or invented, that illustrate just such a general conclusion. Consider the example of 
Persian imperial expansion:  
It is necessary to make preparations against the king [of Persia] and not allow Egypt to be 
subdued; for in the past Darius did not invade [Greece] until he had taken Egypt, but after 
taking it, he invaded; and again, Xerxes did not attack [Greece] until he took [Egypt], but 
having taken it, he invaded; thus if he [the present king] takes Egypt, he will invade 
[Greece]; as a result it must not be allowed. 
 
The unstated maxim is that a Persian army in Egypt will soon come to Greece—or, perhaps, that 
for an imperial power, every territorial acquisition is a staging ground for further expansion. Yet 
these tacit generalizations, which are about probable future fact, do not by themselves imply the 
speaker’s final claim about what must be done in the present. “As a result it must not be 
allowed” is inferred syllogistically, not inductively; it depends logically on myriad unstated 
minor premises that connect the maxim (a major premise) to the call to action (the conclusion). 
To be persuaded, one must also believe, first, that Persian conquest of Greece is undesirable, and 
second, that it is preventable. (In an actual oration, it is likely that each of these minor premises 
would be addressed and defended at some length, also by means of induction: the abuses of 
Darius and Xerxes would be rehearsed, and the likelihood of success commended, by citing 
historical examples or by inventing analogous fictions and fables.) 
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Hearing the paradigm above, an unreflective audience will perhaps respond “that was 
then, this is now,” or “what could we really do to prevent it?”—or, if the speaker is more 
effective, “we can’t stand for that happening again.” The tacit premises will remain unstated, for 
all their necessity; it is possible, Aristotle teaches, for a person to reason paradigmatically 
without consciously knowing the implicit maxim that justifies the analogy between examples. 
The danger, of course, is that one may believe falsely that an irrelevant example (say, a false 
analogy) provides rational justification for a course of action. This fallacious reasoning is one 
kind of “seeming” persuasion.  
The artistic listener, by contrast, will silently think of other supporting examples or 
counterexamples; she will try, within the limits of time and place, to puzzle out the sequence of 
deductive arguments that leads from this paradigm to a credible call to action; and she will take 
care to make a judgment that is as logically grounded as possible, given the rhetorical situation. 
She will see that the paradigm does not do its own persuasive work. Enthymeme, it turns out, is 
necessary for persuasion; an induction can prove a generalization, but cannot justify a judgment. 
Thus, while the distinction between enthymeme and paradigm is useful for an introductory 
passage, Aristotle’s later exemplum illustrates the interdependence of these two modes of 
reasoning; and the attentive student, by now a practiced rhetorical artist, discovers this 
interdependence as an inherent feature of her own reasoning.  
Aristotle will later say that philosophic studies are useful for those who want to invent 
paradigms, since the philosopher knows how to recognize similarities among members of a 
genus or class and can therefore generate multiple examples or analogies that illustrate a general 
observation. Yet it is also true, as book 1 claimed, that the dialectician is “enthymematic”: She is 
able to see how conclusions are drawn deductively from the maxims that our inductions provide. 
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It turns out that speeches are more persuasive when they state an enthymeme first, and then use 
paradigmatic examples as “witnesses” for the deduction. This technique would seem particularly 
effective for the demonstrative enthymeme, which builds on an audience’s endoxa about the 
subject, requiring little or no revision of opinions that they already hold. An artistic speaker who 
recognizes congruence between the audience’s opinions and his desired persuasive outcome may 
therefore safely state one or two compelling maxims, trusting the endoxa to supply the unstated 
premises, and then reinforce that unstated connection by means of memorable and evocative 
examples. (The king of Persia must be stopped, and I for one would rather stop him at the mouth 
of the Nile than wait until he reaches Sicily. The last thing we need is another Darius or Xerxes 
on our shores!) But an artistic listener, consciously examining the tacit premises, will expect the 
speaker to show some knowledge of the particulars of Persian troop movements and Egyptian 
defenses; and he will also check any unjustified appeals to fear or confidence, or to Athenian 
greatness or virtue, that accompany this call to action. His judgment, informed by philosophic 
studies, will be consciously “enthymematic”—and therefore considerably stronger and more 
enduring, both in matter and in form, than the judgment of an audience that merely votes for 
action after being induced to feel a vague fear or thumotic patriotism. 
This interdependence of induction and deduction, an essential element of real persuasion, 
can be discerned (as I show above) by analyzing the examples that Aristotle provides in 2.20; but 
it can also be observed in Aristotle’s own shifting treatment of these two logical structures. 
Chapter 20 showed that paradigm can provide either the major premise of an enthymeme, if it 
comes before, or a supporting “witness” for the enthymeme’s conclusion, if it is offered after; 
but chapter 23 goes as far as to admit that induction is actually one of the enthymeme’s 
“elements,” and that several of the common topics rely on induction for their major premises. 
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The tenth enthymematic topic is “from induction” (ex epagōgēs), and the examples offered are 
straightforward analogies, presented as paradigmatic “witnesses” for ethical maxims. The 
eleventh topic is “from a [previous] judgment about the same or a similar or opposite matter, 
especially if all always [make this judgment]—but if not, at least most people, or the wise (either 
all of them or most) or the good.” There is only a slight difference between these two topics: 
enthymemes “from induction” cite known examples of events that turned out well or badly, or 
that illustrate some truth, whereas enthymemes “from judgment” cite the opinions of respected 
people about analogous situations. In both cases, then, paradigm turns out to be a kind of 
enthymematic reasoning, or at least an aid to it, and not a separate logical form. These “topics” in 
chapter 23 state explicitly what the Darius and Xerxes induction revealed tacitly in chapter 20. 
Ultimately, Aristotle revises his taxonomy so that paradigm stands alongside eikos, tekmērion, 
and sēmeion, which were named in 1.214-18 as the sources of enthymeme. He saves this new 
division for chapter 25, which discusses methods of “loosening” or unravelling an opponent’s 
enthymemes—the chapter where the skills of listening and judging are most explicitly taught. 
Notice that the new taxonomy has been revealed progressively and dialectically over the course 
of several chapters, and that it is justified only by the careful reader’s use of rhetorical reasoning 
to judge Aristotle’s exempli. We might also note that each of the rhetorical exempli is itself a 
kind of paradigm, and that Aristotle’s own presentation of enthymeme is paradigmatic. For each 
class of deduction, he states a form or definition and then provides several examples from poetry 
and oratory. These examples are linked by analogy, and therefore require us to judge whether 
they do or do not illustrate the rhetorical principles and practices that Aristotle claims they do. 
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“The Possibility of False Reasoning”: Judging Paradigms and Enthymemes 
Rhetoric 2.22, at long last, introduces Aristotle’s detailed treatment of enthymeme, “the 
body of persuasion.” Yet again, however, Aristotle must revise his taxonomy of proofs. A new 
source of propositions has become evident, ta huparkhonta, the facts specific to a current 
rhetorical exigency. There is plenty of overlap between this set of propositions and the idia 
(propositions specific to each kind of speech), which Aristotle analyzed beginning at 1.4. Here in 
2.22, he remarks that one cannot advise Athenians about war policy without knowing about 
Athens’ military readiness or its history of victories and losses, an admonition is echoes his 
advice in 1.4-6. Yet this new class of propositions also includes “relevant facts” about particular 
people one is praising or blaming, or about a specific course of action that one is advocating, 
whereas the idia had addressed the subjects of politics, war, or virtue more generally. In 1.4-12, 
Aristotle advised us to study history and law because they are relevant to the advantageous and 
the just; here, he advises us to look “not to the undefined but to what inherently belongs to the 
subject of the discourse.”6  
There seem to be two reasons why this new kind of proposition arises at this moment in 
the discourse. First, although Aristotle has claimed that artistry deals in generalities and not in 
specifics, it is nevertheless the mark of a master craftsman that he can make fine distinctions 
between classes of material, form, and artifact. Beginning with the broad categories of pisteis 
and speech genre, Aristotle has over the course of book 2 shown that the particular makeup of a 
given audience or the particular facts of a given case have great bearing on the logical structures, 
ethical dispositions, and kinds of emotional engagement that will turn out to be persuasive. This 
chapter is in some ways a culmination of that discussion: One does not merely learn the subject 
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of “ethical appeal”; one learns to make ever better judgments about the dispositions of speakers 
and audiences toward particular events and questions.  
Second, the study of paradigm revealed that there are helpful and persuasive analogies 
between and among history, fables, and current circumstances; but these analogies are persuasive 
only if their correspondence to current circumstances is clear. The specifics of the case justify the 
use of paradigm and supply a necessary link to enthymeme. “One should grasp that on whatever 
subject there is need to speak or reason, it is necessary to have the facts belonging to that subject 
[…] for if you had none, you would have nothing from which to draw a conclusion.”7  
On the one hand, Aristotle seems to be warning speakers not to speak only in generalities, 
lest they fail to persuade. On the other hand, he seems to want his students to be able to detect 
and reject such vagueness from persuasive speakers, realizing that speakers who speak in 
generalities are obfuscating, and that any conclusion drawn from such premises is invalid or 
irrelevant. In the chapter on fallacious enthymemes, he will point out that it is common for 
speakers to amplify or exaggerate a claim without establishing that it is factually accurate, or to 
fail to account for the specific circumstances under which an action was (or is to be) done. These 
are called “argument by exaggeration” and “omission of the when and how,” respectively.8 Book 
22 is therefore a kind of link between the study of paradigm and the study of enthymeme. 
Whether we are planning to speak or to listen, we should study the facts that belong to the case—
including the idia of 1.4-12, but also whatever we can gather from present circumstances—so 
that we will be ready to reject or refute fallacious claims that show lack of attention to the 
nuances and concrete particulars about which we are speaking and reasoning.  
This discovery also changes the status of maxims, which Aristotle claimed were the 
propositions that make up an enthymeme. It turns out that one cannot “draw a conclusion” from 
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maxims alone. One needs predications about concrete examples, what later logicians would call 
minor premises. Induction and deduction, we see yet again, are entangled and complementary in 
human practical reasoning. We might now say that paradigms combine analogous facts to infer 
maxims, and that enthymemes use such maxims, combined with relevant facts, to infer a course 
of action. Conversely, having inferred a course of action from a maxim and a relevant fact, one 
can confirm or strengthen the chain of reasoning by providing paradigmatic “witnesses.” 
The other taxonomical revision in chapter 22, which justifies my division between the 
material and the formal causes of enthymeme (and, therefore, of persuasion), is Aristotle’s 
choice to bring emotions and ethical dispositions—both of the speaker and the audience—under 
the general heading of “topics”: 
Now the topics concerned with each of the species that are useful and necessary are more 
or less understood by us; for the propositions concerned with each have been selected and 
as a result the topics that are sources of enthymemes about good or evil, or honorable or 
shameful, or just or unjust [are known], and topics concerned with characters and 
emotions and moral habits, having been elected in a similar way, are already at hand.9 
 
Gone is the old division between topics and proofs; now, Aristotle treats them as part of the same 
topical inquiry. The new division, I would argue, distinguishes between (1) the material and 
formal causes of persuasive predication, which include all the “topics” listed above, and (2) the 
material and formal causes of persuasive argumentation—that is, the elements of enthymeme. In 
Rhetoric 1.4-2.19, we saw how nails and shingles are built; our study of enthymeme will show 
how the house is built. 
The koinai topoi are organized to reveal the difference between real and apparent 
enthymemes, which is to say the difference between real and apparent persuasion. False 
enthymemes “are not really syllogisms.”10 Among true enthymemes, some are “demonstrative,” 
some “refutative”; but the latter class, he will later claim, is no different from the former either in 
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matter or in form. Any enthymeme (so far as its logical structure is concerned) can be used either 
refutatively or demonstratively, depending on whether or not the audience agrees with its 
conclusion, or depending on whether or not the opposing conclusion has already been stated. The 
distinction between real and apparent enthymemes, on the other hand, is internal to the syllogism 
itself: in an apparent enthymeme, there is a flaw in either the material or the formal cause. To 
read about the koinoi pisteis is to learn to see such flaws. 
The first topos is instructive, even paradigmatic, for the whole project: 
One topos of demonstrative [enthymemes] is that from opposites [ek tōn enantiōn]; for 
one should look to see if the opposite [predicate] is true of the opposite [subject], [thus] 
refuting the argument if it is not, confirming it if it is, for example [saying] that to be 
temperate is a good thing, for to lack self-control is harmful.11 
 
I hardly need to point out the observational, theoretical activity that Aristotle here recommends: 
we must “look to see” (skopein) before affirming or denying. Yet the discernment of truth or 
falsehood in this topic is not reducible to an easy rule. We cannot say simply that every time S is 
P, not-S is also not-P. To practice the rhetoric artistically, then, we must weigh each iteration of 
this formula against known facts. To aid us in such reflection, Aristotle offers four examples of 
this topos, each more logically and syntactically complex than the last, so that by the end of the 
paragraph, we are considering (and imaginatively inventing) syntactic oppositions that go far 
beyond what Aristotle suggested in his initial definition. The first, “To be temperate is a good 
thing, for to lack self-control is harmful,” is a pair of simple predications. The second, “If the 
war is the cause of present evils, things should be set right by making peace,” is also a pair of 
predications, this time about efficient causality. In the third example, though, there are four terms 
on each side of the “opposites” being discussed. It is an excellent exemplar of the kind of 




For since it is unjust to fall into anger  
At those who have unwillingly done wrong, 
It is not appropriate for thanks to be owed 
If someone benefits another perforce. 
 
This argument yokes together two contrary instantiations of the same moral principle: that we are 
worthy of praise or blame only for actions done willingly. It assumes that the former instance 
(anger at an unwilling offender) is the more common experience, and perhaps yields a more 
obvious judgment; the latter judgment, that we ought not thank someone for an enforced 
kindness, is inferred from the first.  
Yet by what rules of logic do we judge this claim to be true or false, persuasive or not? 
We could perhaps create a chain of syllogisms connecting justice to anger, and then anger to 
wrong, and then wrong to willingness, and so on; but this would be tedious. As rhetorical 
listeners, we see that the statement is consistent with Aristotle’s phenomenology of the passions: 
anger requires justification, and is only reasonable when the offender is malicious or negligent. 
But there seems to be no way logically to justify this original premise, except perhaps 
paradigmatically. (We have known people who committed wrongs unintentionally; we have done 
so ourselves; we judged anger to be wrong in those cases, and wise people have told us as much.) 
It turns out, though that these commonsense notions about the emotions do the work of practical 
first principles, which the orator may use and the audience (or opponent) may question. The peril 
of this state of affairs, and the need for careful training in rhetorical listening and judgment, is 
illustrated by Aristotle’s fourth example, which he gets from Euripides. It is simpler than the 
third, but more reflective; and it provides the kind of reflexive commentary on rhetoric and 
persuasion that we have come to expect from Aristotle’s treatment of topics.  
But since, old man, false statements are persuasive  
Among mortals, you should believe the opposite too:  
That many truths turn out to be incredible to mortals. 
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Yet again, an example of a rhetorical topic prompts reflection about the practice of rhetoric itself, 
reinforcing for Aristotle’s students the need to be humble about their presuppositions and 
vigilant against deception. 
Topic 1 therefore sets the parameters for our inquiry into enthymeme: We must “look and 
see” whether a given topic or structure is true or persuasive in a given case, exercising our 
practical imagination to place it in a known or invented context. We must also juxtapose 
enthymemes that are similar, analogous, or structurally opposite to one another to judge which 
examples are persuasive, and which are only apparently so—remembering that human 
understanding is incomplete and therefore vulnerable.  
The most playful example of this exercise is topic 4, where Aristotle shows how to attach 
the same predication to the more and the less. If something is true where it would be least 
expected (the argument goes), then all the more is it true where it would be more expected. For 
example: Even the gods, who are immortal, make mistakes; how much more will you, O mortal, 
fall headlong by your own folly? But Aristotle claims that this same topic can be used for equals: 
If your father wept for his lost children, then is not Oeneus also pitiable for his loss? After 
running through a few such commonsense proofs, he begins to insinuate a wry irony that by the 
end of the paragraph has rendered the topic absurd and macabre. The first such example—“If 
Theseus did no wrong [in abducting Helen], neither did Alexander”—seems to be an allusion to 
Isocrates’ Encomium of Helen, but with a twist: Isocrates had praised Helen as the most 
desirable of women, since two such great men sought her; Aristotle’s example defends one of 
those men on the grounds that the other has not been blamed. Like Isocrates’ strange speech, 
which commends a woman for being abducted, Aristotle’s terse tu quoque manages to excuse 
kidnapping, adultery, and provocation to war, all in two clauses. (Isocrates’ mentor Gorgias did 
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the same, of course, in his Encomium’s question-begging narratio; but he at least had the 
decency to absolve the victim rather than congratulating her.)  
This backhanded swipe at Aristotle’s chief rival soon gives way to bathos and self-
deprecation: “And if other professionals are not contemptible, neither are philosophers”—a bit of 
half-hearted protestation, and a non sequitur if ever there was one. It is also a petitio principii, 
since it assumes the equality of philosophers and (say) soldiers or farmers or shoemakers, which 
is presumably the very question at issue. Presumably, too, this highest and most useless of 
professions was as difficult to defend in Aristotle’s day as it is in ours; but I would not 
recommend claiming mere normality and then denying, on those grounds, that one is 
contemptible. We ought to chuckle, then, at the final example, which tacitly assumes that 
sophists and military generals enjoy equal honor in the city, arguing that sophists suffer no great 
dishonor in being condemned to death in large numbers—since, after all, we’ve executed a few 
generals, too. In context of Aristotle’s half-hearted apology for philosophers, I wonder if there is 
a quiet suggestion that we ought to be willing to suffer contempt, so long as we do not suffer the 
fate of Protagoras and Antiphon. Aristotle’s students would also think of Socrates’ condemnation 
after the grand persuasive failure recounted in the Apology. 
The ghost of Socrates haunts topics 13 and 14, too, where Aristotle ponders the 
paradoxical fact that both good and bad results can come from a single choice. (Socrates is newly 
on our minds, since Aristotle named him as an explicit example in topic 12.) Topic 13 shows 
how to advise for or against a given choice by pointing to its likely effects, either for good or for 
ill. We can advise the young to seek education to achieve wisdom, or advise against it lest they 
incur their neighbors’ envy. These options seem to represent the Socratic and the sophistic ways 
of reasoning: the former seeks wisdom for its own sake; the latter seek it only insofar as wisdom 
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is likely to be materially advantageous. The sophistic argument is not as frivolous as it may 
seem: There are particular kinds of education, like proficiency in public speaking, that make one 
a prominent target for lawsuits and defamation. The fate of the sophists discussed above—and 
perhaps the fate of Socrates, though we should attribute it more to suspicion than to envy—
illustrate the urgency of the question. Topic 14 complicates matters even more: 
Another [topos is employed] when there is need to exhort or dissuade on two matters that 
are contrasted [peri duoin antikeimenoin] and [one needs] to use the method mentioned in 
both; but there is the difference that in the previous case any two things are contrasted, 
while here they are opposites. For example, a priestess did not allow her son to engage in 
public debate: “For,” she said, “if you say what is just, the people will hate you; but if 
what is unjust, the gods will. You should then engage in public debate; for if you speak 
what is just, the gods will love you, if what is unjust, the people will.” This is the same as 
what is said about buying the marsh with the salt. This “twist” occurs whenever good and 
evil follow either of two opposites.12 
 
The son’s dilemma is twofold: first, whether or not to make public speeches; and second, if he 
does speak in the assembly, whether to speak justly or unjustly. The mother, painfully aware of 
“the faults of our hearers,” bifurcates the many possible effects in a rather pessimistic way: the 
assembly hates those who speak justly and loves those who speak unjustly; the gods do the 
opposite. Topics 13 and 14 therefore confront the very dilemma faced by Aristotle’s own 
students. First, should they attend lectures on rhetoric (or any other subject), which may make 
them wise, but are sure to earn them the opprobrium of their neighbors? Second, if they do 
become wise, should they go public with their wisdom, speaking justly and in the fear of the 
gods, and risk incurring the fate of Socrates? Or should they speak unjustly, jettisoning their 
ethical training for the sake of a long and successful career like that of Gorgias? It would seem 
that even if they take the latter route, they are not safe; sophists are put to death as often as 
generals, after all.  
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We could of course create countless other juxtapositions between topics, or between the 
examples of a single topic, to illustrate Aristotle’s method of engaging his students in the art of 
rhetorical listening. The art of rhetoric, perhaps here most of all, is imaginative, introspective, 
and dialectical. Yet Aristotle’s most explicit training in the art of rhetorical listening comes in 
Chapter 24, where he lists the fallacious topics. The fallacies he identifies are well known, and 
he has already engaged us dialectically in detecting these fallacies as we read his chapters on the 
material and formal causes of persuasion. I list them below, in figure 12, for easy reference.  
Here, even more than in earlier chapters, it is obvious that Aristotle wants his students 
thinking like audiences. They are to read or hear each definition, and then compare or contrast it 
with valid syllogistic reasoning; then hear an example, seeing how and why that example is 
fallacious; and only then to decide how best to refute it. What is most remarkable, however, is 
that in this chapter Aristotle consistently treats rhetorical audiences in general—not only his 
students—as active creators of arguments: the audience does not passively receive a fallacious 
enthymeme, like clay under a potter’s hand; listeners are actively reasoning, whether validly or 
invalidly, and are therefore said to “commit fallacies” just as speakers do. When discussing topic 
2, for example—combining what is divided, or dividing what is combined—Aristotle first offers 
an impersonal statement of what (the sophists assume) is most serviceable: “Since what is not the 
same often seems to be the same, whichever is more useful should be done” (hopoteron 
chrēsimōteron, touto dei poiein). Then, adopting the stance of a judge, he claims that “this whole 
topic is contrary to logic”—holos de ho topos paralogistikos. He uses similar language when 
discussing the third fallacy, but this time uses an active verb. Notice now that it is the audience 
who reasons falsely, who commits a fallacy: when the speaker uses hyperbole to prop up a 
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baseless accusation, “there is no enthymeme, for the hearer falsely reckons that he did it or did 
not, although this has not been shown.”13 (The Greek is paralogizetai gar ho akroatēs.)  
Figure 12. Topics of fallacious enthymemes. 
1. Verbal fallacy The use of clever style (asyndeton, homonym, etc.) to create the 
appearance of logical connection between terms when in fact no 
such connection exists. 
 




Ignoring circumstances (where, when, why, by whom) to make 
an event or action part of a class, or not part of a class, as the 
case may demand: Justifying Orestes’ matricide by claiming that 
it is right to avenge one’s father (and ignoring that it is also 
wrong to kill one’s mother). 
 
3. Exaggeration Using techniques of amplification—usually stylistic techniques 
or histrionics—to make it seem as though one’s premises have 





Claiming that a maxim is universally valid because of a given 
example, though the example establishes only an incidental 
relationship between the two terms. Lovers benefit cities, for 
[these people, who were lovers] benefitted a city [in this way]. 
 




A fallacy of omission, in which the definitional quality of a class 
is imputed to a concrete example without because of an 
incidental similarity. Paris was high-minded; for, like high-
minded people, he passed his time high on Mount Ida. 
 
7. Taking a 
noncause as a cause 
 
Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. 
8. Omission of 
consideration of 
when and how 
The (often tacit) minor premise of the syllogism creates a 
connection between a moral principle and a specific action, by 
omitting the circumstances. Helen’s father gave her the choice of 
her husband, so she was justified in going with Paris. 
 
9. Confusing the 
general with the 
particular. 
 
The famous arguments of Corax and Tisias: that a large man is 
likely to have committed assault, because he was able to do so 
and proud of his strength; or, was unlikely to have done so, 





Notice the logic of the gar clause: Aristotle is not arguing that there is no enthymeme because 
the speaker has failed to provide one; he is arguing that there is no enthymeme because the 
audience reasons falsely. The audience commits the fallacy. Learning to reason truly—to hear 
the hyperbole or the histrionics, and to judge them to be vacuous—is part of the rhetorical art, 
part of that “same capacity” that Aristotle identified in 1.1, whereby we distinguish what is 
persuasive from what only seems to be persuasive. It is this capacity for reasoning rightly about 
persuasion that justifies the study of rhetoric: not only so that we may argue well in defense of 
ourselves and our allies, but also so that we may judge well for the good of our neighbors and 
cities. “Rhetoric is useful,” Aristotle claimed, “because the true and the just are by nature 
stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way, they are 
defeated—and this is worthy of censure.”14 We study the art to learn judgment, not only 
persuasive effectiveness. 
The difficulty of this enterprise is illustrated by Aristotle’s treatment of lysis, or 
“unravelling” of enthymemes, in chapter 25. One might expect this chapter, like chapter 24, to 
train aspiring orators in the skill of exposing fallacies; yet Aristotle claims that the techniques of 
lysis are capable of incapacitating any enthymeme at all, whether valid or invalid: “an opposite 
syllogism can [always] be made from the same topics; for the syllogisms are derived from 
commonly held opinions, and many opinions are opposed to each other.”15 This is another 
passage that has led some to assume that the art of rhetoric (precisely because it is an art) is 
morally neutral. Yet Aristotle seems troubled by this state of affairs, not because ethically good 
speakers might be defeated by rhetorically artistic means, but because there is always a 
possibility that audiences, hearing clever refutations, will reason falsely: “the refutation [itself] 
may be an apparent one, not always valid.” In law courts, for example, accusers argue (as they 
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must) from probability. There is no such thing as a perfect, scientific, necessary proof that any 
person has committed a crime and deserves punishment. Jurors often do not understand this 
indeterminacy, Aristotle says, so the defendant always has an advantage: he may always object 
to an argument from probability with counterexamples, either real or invented. “When a 
refutation is made in this way,” Aristotle says, 
…the judge thinks either that the thing is not probable or that it is not for him to decide, 
reasoning falsely as we said: because he should not only judge from necessary arguments 
but from probable ones, too; for this is to judge in accordance with the best 
understanding. Therefore, it is not sufficient if one attacks an argument as “not 
necessary”; and one must refute it as “not probable.”16 
 
I am not here concerned with the relative merits of American criminal courts, which presume 
innocence on principle and restrict the use of conjecture, and ancient Athenian courts, which 
sought judgments of guilt or innocence “in accordance with the best understanding” and placed 
few limits on speakers’ techniques. Instead, I want to ponder a curious fact about the purpose of 
this passage in the structure of Aristotle’s argument.  These observations about false reasoning 
are offered as objections to the techniques of lysis that Aristotle himself has catalogued. He has 
just detailed four different ways of unravelling an enthymeme, each of which casts doubt on a 
probable truth by showing that there are possible or imaginable exceptions to a maxim. That is, 
he has shown us how to argue that a claim is improbable simply because it has not been 
demonstrated scientifically (that is, necessarily). This is an obvious categorical mistake, which 
Aristotle himself points out. It is a violation of his principle from the Nicomachean Ethics that 
we should seek probable arguments from rhetors and necessary demonstrations from 
geometricians. The facts of rhetorical cases do not allow for proofs from logical necessity. Thus, 
the techniques of “unravelling” enthymemes demonstrate the same sophistical overreach that has 
troubled Aristotle since the beginning of book 1.  
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Aristotle sought to expose and counteract this overreach in four ways. First, he defined 
the subject-matter of rhetoric as persuasive speech, and not as any particular discipline (much 
less, all disciplines). Second, he defined the subject-matter of persuasion as “the given”—that is, 
the facts of a particular case, and the endoxa of a particular audience—so that no orator in the 
Aristotelian tradition could claim to know everything, as the sophists do. Third, he differentiated 
between epistemic deductions, which deal with immutable premises and necessary conclusions, 
and rhetorical or dialectical deductions, which must deal in signs and probabilities. Fourth, he 
drew boundaries between rhetoric and its neighbor disciplines, which the rhetorician may visit or 
view (so to speak) by means of the idia, but which he learns thoroughly only by submitting to 
those disciplines’ standards of truth and inquiry.  
The techniques of lysis described in 2.25 claim for rhetoric an unlimited power of 
demonstration and refutation, so that the facts of the case and the logical validity of any given 
enthymeme are irrelevant to the speaker’s victory. When a speaker offers a probable conclusion 
from endoxa grounded in tradition and common sense, she is attempting to persuade in the only 
way that it is possible to persuade. When an opponent objects that this probable argument should 
not be accepted because it is not necessarily true, he is implying that necessary conclusions are 
possible and desirable in rhetorical discourse—and that the opposing party ought to have offered 
a scientific demonstration of her thesis. This claim is destructive of the entire rhetorical 
enterprise. The techniques of lysis, then, even more than the enthymemes themselves, are 
susceptible to sophistical manipulation. They are the means by which unscrupulous orators 
disjoint the body of persuasion.  
Aristotle seems to have written chapter 25 both to help future speakers to respond to such 
techniques and to help future judges not to be taken in by them. He gives specific advice to 
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judges, interpreting the Athenian maxim that one should “judge in accordance with the best 
understanding” as an injunction “not only [to] judge from necessary arguments but from 
probable ones, too.” He reminds judges that “it is not sufficient if [an orator] attacks an argument 
as ‘not necessary,’” but that “one must [also] refute it as ‘not probable.’” That this advice is 
offered to judges, and not to speakers, can be inferred from the previous sentence (and, indeed, 
the whole paragraph), which laments the false reasoning that leads judges to accept fallacious 
objections. To remedy this state of affairs, Aristotle instructs future judges to remember that not 
every “unraveled” enthymeme is invalid, nor every clever rejoinder reasonable.  
If enthymeme is the body of persuasion, and if the rhetorical artist is the one who can 
“see” what is persuasive, then the careful study of enthymematic structures and examples is the 
means of acquiring the rhetorical art. Such study requires, however, that we first learn to think 
theoretically about the rhetorical situation (1.2-3) to identify persuasion’s ends. We must also 
study the subject-matter of propositions (1.4-2.17), which are to be found among neighbors and 
friends—and which are given qualities of the world, whose properties are more or less malleable 
but not endlessly subject to our power. Learning the matter of persuasion prepares us to examine 
its form (2.18-25)—both the forms of individual propositions, and the forms taken by inductions 
and deductions—to discern the difference between persuasion that is true, and persuasion that is 
false or apparent. 
Yet even this study of matter, form, and ends, which seems by Aristotle’s stated 
standards to be a complete account of rhetorical artistry, has left a couple of loose ends that 
Aristotle himself will soon acknowledge. The first fallacy—Aristotle’s “verbal” fallacy—is the 
use of semantics and syntax to make connections that falsely mimic syllogistic reasoning. The 
third—exaggeration—is the use of style and delivery to pretend that a claim has been established 
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when in fact it has not even been properly stated. One might have expected him to treat style and 
arrangement during any of the three moments when he discussed techniques of amplification; 
but, as 2.26 finally admits, amplification is not a topic. Book 3, which has often been treated as a 
late and grudging appendage to the treatise, seems actually to be necessitated by the discovery of 
these two logical fallacies, and by Aristotle’s three incomplete attempts to describe how speakers 
amplify a subject. Perhaps Aristotle holds his nose, so to speak, when writing about such matters; 
but the third book should come as no surprise to readers who attend to Aristotle’s dialectical 
method. Like his countless other taxonomical revisions, this one is the result of a theoretical 
discovery. Like the topics of invention, the canons of style, arrangement, and delivery must be 
treated theoretically—that is, as training for both speakers and audiences. 
Making the Matter Credible (3.7.4): Judging Clarity and Appropriateness of Style 
Aristotle begins book 3, as he began book 1, by complaining about audiences. The study 
of arrangement, style, and delivery is a concession to their moral and intellectual weakness; he 
would prefer (it seems) to have assemblies where orators spoke like geometers. Yet my 
explication of books 1 and 2 should shed some light on his reasons for including these subjects in 
rhetorical study. He is not merely conceding that students of oratory must master techniques of 
style and delivery because those techniques work on bad audiences. When he claims that “the 
whole business of rhetoric is with opinion,” he is not complaining about the fact that orators 
must persuade rather than teaching, or that persuasion can aim at no higher effect than directing 
audiences’ opinions toward some political or judicial end. He is making a theoretical claim about 
the scope of his inquiry. The syllogism is straightforward: Rhetoric studies opinions (and the 
ways that speech affects those opinions). Opinions are affected by style, arrangement, and 
delivery. Hence, rhetoric must attend to those three canons. 
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Aristotle also intends, I will argue, to teach his students to listen better: to recognize the 
difference between good and bad style, to judge whether the arrangement of a speech serves its 
argument, and to stop awarding prizes to “orators” who are really no more than actors. When 
Aristotle denigrates style and arrangement as unfortunately necessary subjects of rhetorical 
study, he is not so much claiming that his student-orators ought to grit their teeth and master 
these vulgar skills to win future contests against demagogues. Rather, he is hoping that his 
student-artists will understand these canons so as to be in complete possession of the rhetorical 
art, and so that they can render better judgments of speeches. For Aristotle, style, arrangement, 
and delivery ought to serve the purposes of artistic persuasion, which is materially and formally 
caused by propositions. Style and arrangement, as I have already shown, can contribute to the 
clarity and logic of those propositions, and can therefore help to constitute persuasion. The 
Aristotelian rhetorical artist can see when they do, and when they do not. 
Like in book 1, a few rather austere pronouncements govern the opening chapter. First, 
he offers a reminder of the original taxonomy of proofs, followed by a statement of the centrality 
of judgment to rhetorical study: 
All people are persuaded either because as judges they themselves are affected in some 
way or because they suppose the speakers have certain qualities or because something 
has been logically demonstrated.17  
 
Then, he offers a revision to that taxonomy, claiming that, as it turns out, style, arrangement, and 
delivery affect judgment. (Recall his grudging admission in 1.1-2 about the passions.) He 
dispenses with delivery rather quickly, not because he thinks that delivery is unimportant, but 
because he has already articulated a hierarchy of persuasive ends, whereby all of a speaker’s 
tactics may be judged (both ethically and artistically) for their service to the just, the 
advantageous, and the noble. Justice, he claims, “seeks nothing more in a speech than neither to 
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offend nor to entertain; for to contend by means of the facts themselves is just, with the result 
that everything except demonstration is incidental.”18 (Another similarity to 1.1: Aristotle 
assumes that judicial speaking is paradigmatic for all of rhetoric.) We may accept Aristotle’s 
claim that “delivery seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood,” along with the complaint 
that “the sad state of governments” is to blame for the fact that good actors win “political 
contests,” while also noticing that one who hears these claims and considers them will be a more 
discriminating judge of hupokrisis in the future. He may observe and study the techniques of 
delivery, not to imitate them, but to understand their power. If the claims of Gorgias are to be 
credited, then the sophists’ study of style and delivery was meant to bypass conscious thought, so 
that words could work like enchantment, like Circe turning men to pigs. We may defeat this 
enchantment if we know that she is a witch, and if the god Hermes helps us to interpret (and 
thereby overcome) her tricks. 
There seems to be a similar purpose in Aristotle’s treatment of style. Whereas our 
judgments of hupokrisis are a matter of justice, we judge lexis by what is noble or beautiful; and 
Aristotle is quick to distinguish the opinions of “the uneducated,” who think that the poetic style 
of Gorgias is “most beautiful,” from those who have good taste—who identify the virtue of prose 
style as clarity with appropriateness. To the extent that prose style is artificial, he says, it ought to 
hide its artificiality by mimicking the straightforward and natural deliberations of human 
beings.19 Well-chosen metaphors and uncommon words may be used to good effect, but only 
with moderation; the originality of the sentiment should “escape notice.” One should not use 
stylistic frigidities, like the sophist Alcidamas, who “impart[s]…lack of clarity [by his] 
verbiage,” nor should one use excessive conjunctions or circumlocutions; for “if the interval is 
long” between the subject and the most important predication, “the result is unclear.”20  
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It should be clear that all this advice—indeed, all of the advice in book 3—is intended to 
clarify for rhetorical theorists not only what is likely to be effective, but also what ought to be 
effective; not only what may move an audience, but also what will persuade. Plain style that 
mimics human thought is “persuasive”; ornamental artifice, though the vulgar may like it, is “the 
opposite.” An example simile stands out for its reflexive commentary on rhetoric, and the 
difference between a capable audience and an infantile one: “Democritus,” says Aristotle, 
“likened orators to nannies who, after swallowing the pabulum, moisten the baby’s lips with their 
spit.”21 There is a clear difference between a listener who has worked through books 1 and 2 of 
the Rhetoric, and is therefore able to dine on hearty discursive fare, and an audience that needs a 
nanny to pre-chew and then regurgitate arguments for easier digestion. Artistic speakers need to 
be able to see and predict what is necessary for audiences who need pabulum; but the truly 
artistic speaker will also know when an audience is ready for solid food. Exercising his practical 
imagination, such a developing orator may avoid seeming like a know-it-all to a vulgar audience, 
but may also learn how to avoid offending an audience that is more discerning. In both cases, 
style should serve substance; book 3 is offered in service of book 2. “The lexis will be 
appropriate if it expresses emotion and character and is proportional to the subject matter.”22 
Such style, we infer, is most beautiful and most just. Yet the Aristotelian rhetorical artist should 
beware even of speakers who have mastered this skill:  
The proper lexis also makes the matter credible: the mind [of the listener] draws a false 
inference of the truth of what a speaker says because they [in the audience] feel the same 
about such things, so they think the facts to be so, even if they are not as the speaker 
represents them; and the hearer suffers along with the pathetic speaker, even if what he 
says amounts to nothing. As a result, many overwhelm their hearers by making noise.23 
 
Notice the subtle shift in point of view: The first claim from 3.7 describes how to make style 
appropriate; the second explains how not to be taken in by it. This same shift is noticeable in 
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Aristotle’s condemnation of amphibolies (that is, blatant equivocations) and other kinds of 
oracular vagueness: 
[Do not] use amphibolies—unless the opposite effect [obscurity] is being sought. People 
do this when they have nothing to say but are pretending to say something. Such are 
those who speak in poetry, Empedocles, for example. When there is much going around 
in a circle, it cheats the listeners and they feel the way many do about oracles. […] Since 
there is generally less chance of a mistake, oracles speak of any matter in generalities. In 
the game of knucklebones one can win more often by calling odd or even than by 
specifying a particular number of counters, and the same is true about what will be in 
contrast to when it will happen, which is why soothsayers do not specify the time. All 
these things are alike, so they should be avoided except for the reason mentioned.24 
 
The two analogies illustrate Aristotle’s dual purpose here. We know what it is to hear an oracle 
or prophecy that sounds profound and wise only if we do not examine it. There are no specifics 
to examine, so a moment’s reflection causes the aura of mystery to dissipate. (This analogy 
places us in the position of a listener.) We also know what it is to play it safe: to find shrewd 
ways of making the rules of a game work for us, by never committing to anything too definite. 
(This analogy places us in the position of a speaker.) In both cases, though, we can imagine 
ourselves on the other side of the table, as it were: offering vaguely proverbial interpretations of 
the flight of birds, or realizing that our opponent has been playing the odds or counting cards. 
Amphibole is a quintessentially sophistic trick; it is one of the stylistic devices by which most, 
perhaps all, of the false enthymemes are created. It is a link between books 2 and 3, a reason why 
the study of style is necessary for an understanding of enthymeme. Aristotle pauses over this 
particular device and offers two analogies that help us imagine what it is like to be the audience 
for such obscure sayings. On the one hand, he wants us to know that we should not use 
amphibolies in speeches, because some skeptical listeners will shrug them off as insubstantial. 
On the other hand, he wants us to maintain our theoretical stance toward acts of persuasion, and 
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to train ourselves as judges of word choice and image, not only of logical argument. The two 
skills are interdependent. 
Perhaps the most surprising discovery of book 3, however, is Aristotle’s claim that 
persuasive speech can induce learning: orators can be teachers. Book 1 claimed that most 
audiences are unteachable because they cannot follow long demonstrations; the persuasive 
speaker must make do with whatever endoxa he can find. The investigations of book 2 
moderated these claims by examining the ethical seriousness of the traditions and dispositions 
that make politics possible. Book 3 begins in similar fashion, decrying the bad state of 
governments and the bad taste of listeners who applaud Gorgias for alliteration and give 
Thrasymachus political power for his acting talent. Yet Aristotle hints at 3.9.8 that balanced coda 
using opposite terms are pleasing and effective because “opposites are knowable”—and because 
this syntactic pattern resembles a refutative enthymeme. This admission, that style can mimic 
and thereby clarify what is most “knowable,” begins Aristotle’s long and surprisingly cheerful 
analysis of metaphor, “bringing-before-the-eyes,” and stylistic energeia. 
Chapter 10 begins with an echo of the Metaphysics: “To learn easily is naturally pleasant 
to all people, and words signify something, so whatever words create knowledge in us are the 
pleasantest.” Soon, Aristotle specifies that “metaphor most brings about learning,” because it 
helps the audience to see relationships between genus and species. (Recall that this was one of 
the advantages of studying philosophy, and that this same skill made orators better at forming 
paradigms. Metaphor, as the stylistic analogue of inductive reasoning, can therefore lead 
audiences toward truth.) Aristotle justifies the urbane use of metaphor—perhaps a late corrective 
to the young man’s cultured insolence?—by comparing it, too, to enthymeme—and by revising 
his earlier claim (from 1.2) that enthymemes are effective because most audiences cannot follow 
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long demonstrations, and therefore cannot be taught. It turns out that enthymemes are most 
effective precisely when they do teach: 
Those things are necessarily urbane, both in lexis and in enthymemes, which create quick 
learning in our minds. That is why superficial enthymemes are not popular [with 
audiences] (by superficial I mean those that are altogether clear and which here is no 
need to ponder), nor [are] those which, when stated, are unintelligible, but those [are 
popular] of which there is either immediate understanding when they are spoken, even if 
that was not previously existing, or the thought follows soon after; for [then] some kind 
of learning takes place.25 
 
The artistic speaker studies the audience’s traditions and opinions, not only to avoid arguments 
that are lengthy or boring or offensive, but also to craft arguments that are instructive (and, 
because instructive, pleasing). There is a kind of Aristotelian mean that we discover only here, 
near the end of the treatise, between the supercilious dialectician who scorns rhetoric for being 
unserious, and the practitioner of rhetorical realpolitik who chooses whatever methods are most 
likely simply to get the job done. The artistic speaker who knows his audience will craft 
enthymemes meant to engage the audience’s mind not only in the building of persuasion, but 
also in the acquisition of knowledge. For Aristotle’s students, so attuned by now to the workings 
of syllogistic, it must be quite a surprise to learn that a stylistic device can teach, and that the best 
enthymemes work like metaphors. For us, there is perhaps a more startling discovery—especially 
if we expect to find in Aristotle an anticipation of the Ciceronian conceit that fine language 
makes wisdom winsome. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, knowledge sweetens persuasion, and not vice 
versa. 
The little that Aristotle has to say about arrangement is appropriately pragmatic. Yet 
again, he urges speakers to adapt their techniques to the speech’s end, which relates to the 
audience and the common goods of politics;26 yet again, he insists that the speech’s form should 
serve its function, so that all that is needed from taxis is a statement of the subject, a proof, and a 
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terse conclusion. Yet again, Aristotle offers a kind of critical apparatus for audiences wary of 
artificiality. There are circumlocutions in taxis as well as in lexis; by now we are more than 
prepared to recognize when a speaker is trying to hide his weak case by “spend[ing] words on 
anything other than the subject.”27 Here, too, then, Aristotle offers nothing like an ideal of the 
citizen-orator, no sketch of the professional public intellectual; but he helps his students develop 
the theoretical power necessary to distinguish between what is true and just, and what is merely 
moving or instrumentally effective.  
Yet there is a change of perspective in book 3 that affects Aristotle’s own lexical 
choices—a change that illustrates, by contrast, what I take to be his greatest achievement in 
books 1-2. There, Aristotle consistently treated persuasion, and not the speech (whether written 
or performed), as the artifact that rhetoric studies and explains. He guided his students through a 
careful and dialectical exploration of that artifact’s material and formal causes, discovering an 
intricately woven pattern of logic and ethics, of moral reasoning and calculation. I have argued 
that a speech that is unethical, either in its aims or in its methods, fails artistically precisely 
because the ends of persuasive speech are the just, the noble, and the advantageous. This overlap 
of art and ethics is unique to the verbal arts, since language by its very nature discloses the good, 
making possible our cooperative pursuit of the ultimate ends of civic life. As long as one treats 
persuasion as an artifact—remembering that no artifact exists for its own sake, but always for 
some other purpose—these ethical ends are close at hand as criteria for artistic excellence. An 
unjust speech is like a house with no roof. 
But book 3 takes a step back in the chain of efficient causes, focusing not on persuasion 
but on the speech. This is a good and necessary step, as I have noted; it is necessitated by the 
discovery that style makes substance clear. What is more important, Aristotle’s extensive 
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treatment of metaphor and energeia, with its joyful discovery of rhetoric’s educative capacity, 
moderates his earlier claims about faulty listeners and the sad state of governments—just as his 
elegant and substantive treatment of the passions in book 2 moderated his strictures against 
emotional appeal in book 1. Nevertheless, this focus on the speech comes at some loss for the 
coherence of rhetorical theory, and for the coherence of artistry with ethics. Treating the speech 
as its own artifact, we examine words, sentences, and paragraphs instead of endoxa, propositions, 
and enthymemes. Words are the material cause of sentences, stylistic devices their form; 
sentences are the material cause of a speech, and the speech’s form is its arrangement. Suddenly, 
it seems possible to craft a speech artistically—using clear and appropriate words, elegantly 
balanced clauses, metaphors that bring activity “before the eyes” of a listener, and a pattern of 
arrangement that lends grace and gravitas and even grandeur to a case that in another artist’s 
hands would have shriveled. To a logographer, whose artifact is a speech and whose only goal is 
to move an audience, such a speech is artistically made; and in book 3, Aristotle is willing to use 
technē this way. Yet the choice to do so opens a gap between artistry and ethics, between an 
artifact’s goodness and the goodness of the artisan; and the gap widens as the artist grows in 
proficiency. There is artificiality here, not craftsmanship. The enthymeme of book 2 is 
persuasive and artistic to the extent that it is valid and ethical, and known to be so by the 
audience. The techniques of the logographer hide themselves; they succeed by seeming natural 
and unaffected. It is little wonder that, for Aristotle, the technique of arrangement that is “most 
artificial” (or perhaps, most artistic) is also “most unjust.”28 An expert in taxis and lexis lends 
credibility to falsehood—the very definition of seeming persuasion. It is no accident of history, 
then, that Aristotle treats style and arrangement last; nor that he spends twice as much time and 
space studying persuasion as he spends studying speeches. The orator who thinks about her 
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audience’s good is artistic with respect to persuasion; the orator who strives for artistry in a 
speech may forget the good altogether. Book 3 thus returns us to the dialectical beginning of the 












USES OF RHĒTOR IN ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC1 
Book 1 
 
In the case of rhetoric, however, there is the difference that one person will be [called] rhetor on 
the basis of his knowledge and another on the basis of his deliberate choice. (1.1.1355b 18-20) 
 
I call a rhetorical syllogism an enthymeme, a rhetorical induction a paradigm […] And it is also 
apparent that either species of rhetoric has merit […] for some rhetorical utterances are 
paradigmatic, some enthymematic; and some orators are paradigmatic, some enthymematic… 




What persons are emulated is also evident; for they are those who have acquired these things and 
things like them. These things are those mentioned, for example, bravery, wisdom, public office; 
for public officials, including generals, orators, [and] all having this kind of power, can benefit 




As a result, prizes go to those who are skilled at it [i.e. delivery], just as they do to orators on the 
basis of their delivery… (3.1.1404a 18) 
 
Democritus likened orators to nannies who, after swallowing the pabulum, moisten the baby’s 
lips with their spit. (3.4.1407a 7) 
 
The Attic orators especially use this. (3.11.1413b 1) 
 
On comparison, some written works seem thin when spoken, while some speeches of orators 
seem amateurish when examined in written form. […] For example, asyndeta and constant 
repetition are rightly criticized in writing but not in speaking, and the orators use them; for they 
lend themselves to oral delivery. (3.12.1413b 16, 21)  
 
As a result, the same orators are not successful in all these kinds of speeches. Where there is 
most need of performance, the least exactness is present. (1414a 15)  
 
Therefore, one should do this [only] when at a loss for something to say, as the orators at Athens 





USES OF “ART” (TECHNĒ) IN THE RHETORIC 
 
 
Arts in general 
The ergon of a technē is theōria (1354a 11) 
 “Chance is the cause of some things that can also be created by the arts” (1362a 2, 4). 
Art is named among the things productive of good (1362b 26). 
“Not to work at a vulgar trade” is honorable (1367a 31). 
Proverb in relation to arts: There is no advantage to being smarter than the doctor (1375b 21). 
“Where sciences or arts exist, it is possible for the subject of those studies both to exist and to 
have existed” (1392a 26). 
“If something is possible without art . . . all the more is it possible with art” (1392b 5, 6). 
“If other professionals [technitai] are not contemptible, neither are philosophers” (1397b 23). 
“An Art concerned with [delivery] has not yet been composed, since even consideration of lexis 
was late in developing, and delivery seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood” 
(1403b 35). 
“Acting is a matter of natural talend and largely not reducible to artistic rule” (1404a 22). 
The “parasites of Dionysius” call themselves “artists” (1405a 24). 
 
The art of rhetoric 
 “Artistic method is concerned with pisteis” (1355a) 
“None of the other arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this” 
(1355a 34) 
It is like the other arts, in that “it is a function of one and the same at to see the persuasive and [to 
see] the apparently persuasive” (1355b 12, 28). 
Other than rhetoric and dialectic, each art “is instructive and persuasive about its own subject” 
(1355b 32, 35). 
“No art examines the particular” (1356b 29). 
Rhetoric is “concerned with the sort of things. . . for which we do not have other arts” (1357a 2). 
Some enthymemes are formed according to the methods of arts other than rhetoric (1358a 6). 
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An exhaustive enumeration and definition of the subjects of deliberation “is not a matter for the 
rhetorical art” (1359b 6). 
“Such [speakers] are most artful and most unjust” (1416b 6). 
The epideictic narratio is “composed partly from what is nonartistic . . . and partly from art” 
(1416b 20). 
 
The Arts of Speech  
“have worked on a small part of the subject” (1354a 12) 
describe “matters eternal to the subject . . . as an art” (1354b17) 
“have nothing to say about” deliberative speaking, but “try to describe the art of speaking in a 
lawcourt” (1354b26) 
“It is not the case, as some of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-
mindedness [epieikeia] on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to 
persuasiveness” (1356a 11) 
“To this and only this [i.e. pathos] we said contemporary technical writers try to give ther 
attention” (1356a 17) 
“This topos [encouragement and deterrence] is the whole Art of Pamphilus and Callippus” 
(1400a 4).  
Accusation and defense based on the probability of having made a mistake “is the whole art 
before Theodorus” (1400b 16). 
“The Art of Corax is made up of this topic,” i.e. accusation and defense based on the probability 
of having committed a wrong willingly (1402a 17). 






ARTS, VIRTUES, AND POWERS 
Aristotle seems to use the word dunamis (power, ability, capacity) equivocally. In the 
Rhetoric, both virtues and arts are called powers: Rhetoric is an ability to see to pithanon, and 
virtues are capacities for doing good.2 Yet in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that there 
are three kinds of things that come to be present in the soul: passions (pathē), powers 
(dunameis), and active conditions (hexeis), and each class excludes members of the other two. 
Precisely because virtues are neither passions nor powers, Aristotle says, we can conclude that 
they are active conditions (1105b20 – 1106a5). Aristotle later clarifies that arts, too, are active 
conditions of the soul (1140a5), which would seem to preclude their being called powers.  
Moreover, Aristotle seems at times to be at pains to distinguish art from virtue: Arts are 
desirable only in relation to artifacts, which in turn are (for the most part) desirable only for their 
external ends. We want a house more for shelter and comfort than for the house itself. (There are, 
of course, exceptions, such as health, which we desire for its own sake, and some artifacts that 
we enjoy in times of leisure for their beauty.) Virtues, unlike arts, are desirable for their own 
sakes as well as for the good effects they produce. We admire courage, even without military 
victory; we praise the physician’s skill only to the extent that it promotes health. Virtues and arts, 
then, would seem to be separate categories. Yet by calling art a rational hexis, and by placing it 
in a list with sophia and phronēsis, Aristotle seems to be associating it with the intellectual 
virtues—and maybe even classing it as one of them.  
How are we to understand these apparent equivocations? 
First, we will have to note that at NE 2.5, Aristotle is using the word dunamis in a very 
narrow sense. It is the faculty “in accordance with which we are said to be apt to feel [passions], 
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such as those by which we are predisposed to be annoyed or feel pity.” In accordance with this 
limited class of faculties, Sachs translates dunamis here as “predisposition.” These 
predispositions, Aristotle later says, never lead to praise or blame, nor do they make us good or 
bad at anything. “We are predisposed by nature,” he says. The distinction here is not between 
(say) the hexis of phronēsis and a dunamis such as quickness of apprehension, but rather between 
(say) the vice of irascibility and a predisposition to be easily annoyed. One can have the latter 
predisposition and still be a patient, kind, virtuous person by developing the hexis of gentleness. 
The three classes of psychic faculties distinguished at NE 2.5 thus make no problem for the 
Rhetoric’s definition of arts and virtues as powers. Indeed, it would be strange if Aristotle were 
to deny that virtuous active conditions of the soul give the human being powers or potentialities. 
Practical judgment, for example, would seem to make us more able to acquire prosperity and 
happiness for ourselves and our families—an ability that in the more general sense employed in 
the Rhetoric is a dunamis. 
Is art one of the intellectual virtues? Aristotle never says so, but may be taken to imply 
it—depending on how we translate a key sentence in NE 6. The five faculties of soul that enable 
us to see the truth are art (technē), science (epistēmē), practical judgment (phronēsis), wisdom 
(sophia), and intellect (nous). There are two “thinking parts of the soul,” and “those active 
conditions by which each of them will most of all disclose truth are the virtues that belong to 
them jointly.” Thus, it will not be as simple as saying that each part (the calculating and the 
contemplating) has its own virtue. Yet Aristotle will not call each of the above faculties virtues: 
He seems to want to save that name for practical judgment and wisdom. Nevertheless, there is a 
distinction between art and practical judgment that incline me to believe that the former is not a 
virtue, while the latter is. “While there is a virtue that belongs to art,” Aristotle says, “there is 
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none that belongs to practical judgment”; meaning, I take it, that practical judgment is itself a 
virtue, while an art is a domain of making and theorizing in which human beings can develop 
virtues. Virtues “belong to” arts; arts are not themselves virtues. Moreover, “in art, someone who 
makes an error willingly is preferable, while in connection with practical judgment this is worse, 
as it is in connection with the virtues.” The willing mistake may be for the sake of style, grace, or 
decorum, as a sentence fragment or anacoluthon in a poem or dramatic utterance, or it may even 
be for nefarious motives—making a sword that will break in the hands of one’s enemy. In either 
case, the knowing mistake is preferable to the unintentional one. Even if the mistake is an artistic 
failure, it is better (by the standards of artistry) to have failed knowingly than to have lacked 
skill. Virtues do not work this way: To fall short intentionally is to be vicious. Vice is an evil 
active condition, in which inferior human actions are chosen for their own sakes. 
The sentence that follows this one in the Ethics may be translated one of two ways. Sachs 
writes, “It is clear, then, that practical judgment is a virtue and that art is not.” The grammar of 
the sentence would also justify “It is clear, then, that practical judgment is a virtue and not an 
art.” (Dēlon oun hoti aretē tis esti kai ou technē.) I find the former translation preferable, 
especially because it seems to lead more logically to the next: “But since there are two parts of 
the soul that have reason, this would be the virtue of one of them, the part that forms opinions, 
since both opinion and practical judgment concern what is capable of being otherwise” 
(1140b20-30). It would seem that, in looking for the virtue of the part of the soul that forms 
opinions, Aristotle considered both of the faculties of soul that deal with “what is capable of 
being otherwise”—art and practical judgment—and settled on the latter, since it deals with action 
and not making; since it shares characteristics with the other virtues (such as its intolerance for 
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intentional error); and since art seems to be a domain of human activity in which virtues can be 









1 George A. Kennedy, trans., Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 1.3.1 (1358a). Here and throughout, I cite the Rhetoric by book, 
chapter, and paragraph, following George of Trebizond and J. T. Buhle. (These chapter and 
paragraph numbers are standard headings in most translations, including Kennedy’s, and even in 
many Greek editions of the Rhetoric.) I hope thereby to keep in view the place of each quotation 
in the structure of the Rhetoric as a whole. Other works by Aristotle, which I quote more 
sparingly, I will cite by Bekker number. 
2 Rhetoric 1.2.11.  
3 The term “rhetorical situation,” which I use to refer to the basic elements of any persuasive 
moment, was coined by Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 
(1968): 1-14. In the (mostly American) field of communication theory, the many “models” of 
communicative interaction can be broadly grouped into “action,” “transaction,” and 
“interaction,” each with its own attendant diagrams. See M. E. Holmes and H. L. Hundley, 
“Visualizing Communication for the Basic Course: Narrative and Conceptual Patterns in 
Textbook Communication Diagrams,” Annual Conference of the Western States Communication 
Association, Denver, Colorado, 1998. The (mostly continental) field of poststructuralist 
rhetorical theory, from Derrida and Foucault to Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas, figures all 
persuasion as an exercise of more or less oppressive political power. Habermas’s critique of 
poststructuralist self-referentiality is nevertheless interesting and useful in that it recapitulates the 
Aristotelian critique of sophistry. These two approaches to rhetoric are analogous to the 
“versions of moral enquiry” that Alasdair Macintyre calls “encyclopedia” and “genealogy.” A 
revival of Aristotelian rhetorical theory may do for rhetoric what Macintyre has done for 
ethics—but only, in my view, if we treat rhetoric as a practice in Macintyre’s sense; and doing 
so would mean learning to listen rhetorically. This dissertation is one small contribution to that 
much larger project. See Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, 
and Tradition (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).  
4 The term “sophistic revival” comes from Sharon Crowley’s article “A Plea for the Revival of 
Sophistry,” Rhetoric Review 7, no. 2 (Spring, 1989): 318-34. Some historians and philologists 
have merely sought to add historical context and documentary evidence to the record, so that 
Plato’s critique of the sophists can be understood as a response to real human beings and not to 
straw men. In Anglophone scholarship, this effort began with W.K.C. Guthrie’s The Sophists 
(Cambridge, 1971). Others have sought to qualify or even refute the Platonic critique by 
claiming that Plato and Aristotle misrepresented the sophists, or that Socrates himself was a 
sophist, or that the men known now as “sophists” were rival thinkers (and Plato is in no 
discernible way their superior). See G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981); 
Scott Consigny, Gorgias: Sophist and Artist (University of South Carolina Press, 2001); Susan 
C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured (Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1991); Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, “The Sophists,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Presocratic Philosophy, edited by Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (Oxford, 2008), 365-82; 
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and Rachel Barney, “Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen,” in Ten Neglected Classics of Philosophy, 
edited by Eric Schliesser (Oxford, 2017), 1-25. I confess I find little in their work, whether 
factual or interpretive, that I could not have found in the dialogues of Plato; their historical 
accounts of the sophists are derivative of Plato’s, and their critiques of Platonism (of whatever 
version) tend to be rehearsals of the arguments that Plato himself preserved by giving voice to 
the opinions of Protagoras, Gorgias, Callicles, Thrasymachus, and others. Finally, there is a tribe 
of late-20th-century rhetoricians, going by the term Neosophists, who believe that rhetorical 
instruction in secondary and postsecondary classrooms should be thoroughly and intentionally 
sophistic. In addition to the works by Crowley and Jarrett cited above, see Scott McComiskey, 
Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric (Southern Illinois UP, 2002). Edward Schiappa, himself 
a genealogist (in MacIntyre’s sense) whose historiography is guided by Foucault, nevertheless 
takes the Neosophists to task for their too-easy and anachronistic appropriation of sophistic 
rhetorical theory. In my judgment, Jacqueline DeRomilly’s appreciation of the sophists’ 
contribution is more instructive and even handed; see The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 
translated by Janet Lloyd (Clarendon, 1992). Daniel W. Graham has done the field a great 
service by editing the extant pre-Socratic and sophistic fragments; the latter, as I have indicated, 
are largely derived from Plato’s dialogues. See The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy, 2 
vols.(Cambridge, 2010). 
 
5 See Kennedy, Introduction to Rhetoric, 7. For the historical circumstances that led to the 
development of rhetoric as a public practice, see Richard Leo Enos, Greek Rhetoric before 
Aristotle (Parlor Press, 2011).  
6 For Aristotle’s part in “disciplining” rhetoric—limiting its disciplinary boundaries, and 
therefore subordinating it to other allegedly non-rhetorical disciplines like ethics and politics—
see Edward Schiappa, The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1999). For the sophists’ proverbial overreach, see Nicomachean Ethics 
1181a 10-20. 
7 Rhetoric 3.8.2, 3.14.6.  
8 Kennedy, Introduction to Rhetoric, 10-12. For Aristotle’s contribution to the study of emotions 
in persuasion and practical reasoning, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1975), 9-18 and 45-52. Bryan Garsten provides a helpful analysis of emotions, 
political constitutions, and the importance of “situated judgment” as an Aristotelian concept in 
Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2006). See especially pages 121-9. Richard Ruderman anticipates some parts of Garsten’s 
project in “Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment,” American Political Science 
Review 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 409-420, though Ruderman is more concerned with political 
theory than with rhetoric. Scott Crider coins the term “socio-orationality” for the use of 
persuasive discourse (both speaking and listening) in the service of shared civic ends. See “An 
Art of Gathering Scattered Humanity: Ciceronian Civic Humanism and the Defense of 
Responsible Rhetoric in De Oratore,” Ramify 2 (2011): 67-92.  
9 In addition to the forthcoming example from Eugene Garver, I note many places where Larry 
Arnhart bends his treatment of Aristotle’s Rhetoric away from audience education and toward 
speaker effectiveness. He is always at pains to remind his readers, after explicating a long 
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passage that has obvious application for jurists or thoughtful people generally (and no obvious 
application for speakers), that Aristotle’s real purpose is to make speakers better at finding and 
articulating proofs. See Aristotle on Political Reasoning (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1981), 93, 100, 129, 134. Jonathan Barnes, Harvey Yunis, and Robert C. Bartlett provide 
three additional examples: Each is a leading commentator on Aristotle’s Rhetoric; each has his 
own distinct hermeneutic, and his own philosophical project; but all three agree that, for 
Aristotle, the art of rhetoric is an art of finding ways to persuade others. See Bartlett and Yunis’s 
interpretive essays, appended to their respective translations of the Rhetoric, and Barnes’s essay 
“Rhetoric and Poetics” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge, 1995), 259-86. 
10 “In the Physics the builder’s engaging in the act of building and the building’s being built are 
identical. In rhetoric, the speaker persuading and the audience being persuaded will be identical 
(Physics III.3.202b5; Metaphysics IX.8.1049b24-26). […]  If artful activities succeed through the 
transmission of form and the identity of agent acting and material being acted upon, then it is 
perfectly plausible for Aristotle to say that the sophists neglected the most important thing of all, 
proofs (pisteis), the only part of rhetoric that can be treated by an art (hai gar pisteis entechnon 
esti monon) (1354a13). A proof is an energeia.” Eugene Garver, Aristotle’s “Rhetoric”: An Art 
of Character (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 35.  
11 Garver, An Art of Character, 23. 
12 “Deliberative Rhetoric and Ethical Deliberation,” Polis 30, no. 2 (2013): 189-209. 
13 See Rhetoric 1.1.5, 12; 1.2.11; 1.8.6; 2.19.13; 3.1.7. Garver treats this as one of Aristotle’s 
most dubious inferences—a claim that I accept, though I think he is inviting us to consider its 
fallaciousness in light of what follows (a common feature of his pedagogy).  
14 Rhetoric 2.20.9 – 2.21.9. 
15 See, for example, Rhetoric, 1.4.13; 1.6.1, 30; 1.7.41; and especially 1.14.5. It is significant that 
these reminders happen frequently at the beginning of book 1 and at transitional or introductory 
statements for each book (and for many chapters). Aristotle entices his reading audience to forget 
about the instrumental uses of rhetoric and to begin pondering the subjects and arguments of 
speeches, the way an audience should. 
16 See Appendix 2, below. Notice that for “arts” in general, and for the rhetorical art in particular, 
“the activity of an art is observation”; whereas “art of speech” is a phrase reserved for the 
sophistic handbooks.  
 
17 Rhetoric, 2.19.25. Unless I indicate otherwise, all bracketed phrases within quotations from the 
Rhetoric are Kennedy’s explanatory notes and not mine. 
18 Robin Smith, “Logic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes 
(Cambridge, 1995), 64-5. He quotes Sophistical Refutations 184b 2-8. 
 
19 While explications of Aristotle’s dialectical pedagogy abound, most of them focus on the 
Nicomachean Ethics rather than the Rhetoric. Charles Sears Baldwin claims that the Rhetoric is 
meant to be read “progressively,” not systematically, by which he means that the very terms and 
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categories introduced at the beginning of the treatise are revised repeatedly as new 
considerations arise. See Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: MacMillan, 1924). For 
attempts to chart and explicate the dialectical structure of the Ethics, see May Sim, ed., From 
Puzzles to Principles?: Essays on Aristotle’s Dialectic (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 1999); 
Thomas W. Smith, Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle’s Dialectical Pedagogy (SUNY, Oct 2001); and 
Aristide Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics: Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political Philosophy (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1996). 
  
20 Rhetoric 1.1.12, 1.8.1-2, 3.1.5. 
21 “In an ideal world, the good man and the good citizen would be the same, and phronesis would 
be identical to the art of rhetoric too, but in neither case should we be seduced by the ideal. 
Arisottle called his best city the city of our prayers0-we could pray that such a place could come 
about, but there is nothing we can do to get there, no pathway from actual conditions to that 
ideal. The standard for good citizens and artful rhetoricians must be lower than that of the good 
person, except for rulers under the best constitution. People can function as good citizens and 
good rhetoricians without being virtuous phronimoi.” “Deliberative Rhetoric and Ethical 
Deliberation,” 209. 
  
22 See especially 1.13.1-3; 2.18.1; and 3.7.1-5. I will also show that Aristotle’s treatment of 
emotions (2.2-11) is thoroughly ethical: every emotion arises concurrently with a moral 
judgment, and both audience and speaker are morally culpable for the emotions so aroused. See 
also Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 19-55. 
23 George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece (Princeton University Press, 1963), 
123. A more recent treatment of this problem, which reviews the relevant literature on both sides, 
is Forbes Hill’s “The Amorality of Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” in Greek, Roman, and Byzantine 
Studies 22 (2011), 133-47. 
24 See Politics 1.1-2. The development of an individual human being provides an instructive 
analogue. By nature, a human child has the ability to develop either virtue or vice; but the 
development of virtue requires intentional and careful rearing (habituation to love what is noble 
and shun what is base), followed by repeated and consistent choices in concert with that training, 
until the human soul is not only habituated to good action but also reliably able to choose the 
good for its own sake. Absent such training and choice, the human being is likely to develop an 
active condition of vice. Thus, in one way, vice seems to be the natural state of the human being; 
without paideia, we are vicious (or, at best, self-restrained for the sake of utility). Yet happiness, 
which requires virtue, is the end of human life—and every end is something natural. It would 
seem that reason, which is ours by nature, makes our natural ends different from the natural ends 
of other living things. Some artificiality or intentionality is required for human beings to attain 
the ends that our ours by nature; or, to put it another way, nature has endowed human beings 
with capacities that enable us to transcend nature’s own powers—either falling short of our 
natural ends by submitting to merely natural processes of development and decay, or achieving 
our natural ends by supra-natural means. 
 
25 Rhetoric, 1.5-8; 2.1; 3.7.1-10.  
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26 This part of my argument has been anticipated, though with some differences of emphasis, by 
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Christine Oravec, and Iris Murdoch. Rorty’s helpful term “practical 
imagination” refers to the capacity by which human beings think about past, future, and 
counterfactual situations that involve moral choice and that may affect the well being of others. 
Such imaginative deliberations, she argues, are an essential part of Aristotle’s thought generally, 
and his rhetorical thought in particular. See “Aristotle on the Virtues of Rhetoric,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 64, no. 4 (2011): 715-33. Iris Murdoch argues that such imaginative moral 
reasoning permeates all practical thought, demonstrating that human beings are always thinking 
and acting as though some notion of the good were fundamental and determinative for all other 
considerations. Her account of a mean-spirited mother-in-law’s imaginative deliberations is 
particularly instructive. See The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 1970; reprint 2014), 
16-19. Christine Oravec draws a parallel between “seeing” and listening to epideictic speeches: 
noticing that the epideictic audience is described in 1.3 as spectators rather than judges, she reads 
the whole of 1.9 as an attempt to account for how audiences theorize about what is noble or 
beautiful in ethical or political action. “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory of Epideictic,” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 9, no. 3 (1976): 162-74. 
 
27 Rhetoric 1.1.12-13. 
Chapter 1 
1 Rhetoric 1.2.1, 6. 
2 See his introduction to chapter 1, notably pages 25-8. Footnotes throughout his translation point 
to contradictions between early passages and late ones. See, for example, notes on 31 and 34.  
3 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Joe Sachs (Focus, 2002), 1094a. 
4 1177a10-20. 
5 The notion of psychagogy, or “soul-leading,” originates in Plato’s Phaedrus and is aptly 
described in Crider’s “An Art of Gathering a Scattered Humanity.”  
6  dēlon hoti ho malista touto dunamenos theōrein (Rhet 1.1.11): by using forms of dunamis and 
theoria, Aristotle here parallels his later definition of rhetoric as an “ability in each case to see 
the available means of persuasion” (1.2.1). The Topics begins thus: “Those opinions are 
reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise.” It is possible, 
though, for a dialectician (or, presumably, a rhetorician) to make a mistake when discerning 
which opinions are reputable: “A deduction is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to 
be reputable, but are not really such […] Not every opinion that seems to be reputable actually is 
reputable.” See Topics 100b20-5.  
7 NE 1095b 5. 
8 Edward W. Clayton, “The Audience for Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” Rhetorica 22, no. 2 (Spring 
2004): 183-203. 
 
9 Rhetoric 1.1.12. 
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10 Rhetoric 1.2.1. I will later dispute the use of the word “means” in this standard English 
translation of to pithanon. For enthymemes, see 1.2.10-14; and for the ends of speeches, see 
1.3.1-2. 
11 Gorgias 527c. 
12 See George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 11-50. Unfortunately, 
Kennedy’s evenhanded history is now sometimes treated as naive. Though historians of rhetoric 
often accuse Plato and Aristotle of misrepresenting the sophists for their own purposes, it is 
important to note how often the sophists’ advocates rely on Plato and Aristotle’s reportage to 
support or confirm their alleged discoveries about the sophists’ wisdom and influence. For three 
prominent examples, see Barney, “Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen”; Gagarin and Woodruff, “The 
Sophists”; and Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement. I would argue that no one did more to preserve 
Gorgias or Protagoras’s thought, or to immortalize their respective reputations as important 
thinkers in fifth-century B.C.E. Greece, than Plato and Aristotle. 
13 Terrence Irwin argues that the Gorgias is organized to reveal that ethics is inextricable from 
rhetoric: that every act of persuasion is inherently ethical or unethical, and that one cannot 
evaluate persuasion apart from moral considerations. See the introduction to his translation of the 
Gorgias (Oxford, 1980). 
 
14 The Phaedrus imagines an art of rhetoric that would rise to the dignity of dialectic by crafting 
speeches that lead individual souls toward virtue. Such an art would require the artist to assess 
the unique idiosyncrasies of a single soul, to diagnose that soul’s moral and noetic deficiencies, 
and to prescribe a medicine of words to cure its ills. The Gorgias wonders whether there might 
be an art of rhetoric for the assembly, bringing a similar cure to the city as a whole. However, it 
is not clear in either dialogue why rhetoric is particularly necessary: The antistrophos to 
medicine, for the city, is politics—legislation and education; and the antistrophos to medicine for 
the individual soul is philosophy, not rhetoric. 
 
15 So, too, do most contemporary readers: See, for example, R. E. Houser, Logic as a Liberal Art 
(Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2020), 20.  




1 Aristotle will later acknowledge this ethical grounding of the emotions in Rhetoric 2.1.8. 
2 From E.M. Cope: “krinein…is here used with a double reference to judicial decision and 
legislative deliberation; in both cases there is a judgment or decision: to oikaion being the object 
of the former, to sumpheron of the latter. This is confirmed by the introduction of ekklesiastes in 
the next sentence. Compare [1.1.10]. Also 1.3.2, and 2.18.1 where it is shown how the decision 
of the krites may be extended to all the three kinds of rhetoric. In the epideictic branch his 
judgment becomes criticism, and he is a critic.” An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric With 
Analysis Notes and Appendices (London: MacMillan, 1867), 135-7. I would add that 3.1.1 
assumes this broader, non-legal definition of krisis as foundational to an understanding of 
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persuasion. Aristotle is concerned with the procedures of the Athenian court and assembly only 
to the extent that they sometimes interfere with this substantive exercise of judgment by 
imposing strict time limits and equating krisis with the legal decision. He also seems to be 
concerned that the authors of the Arts of Speech encourage this hasty decision-making by their 
methods of composition. 
 
3 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 124-9. 
4 Nicomachean Ethics 1137b 28-32. Note that Aristotle treats epieikeia as the distinguishing 
mark of the ethical speaker at Rhetoric 1.1.4: “We believe fair-minded people to a greater extend 
and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where 
there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not 
from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some 
of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness [epieikeia] on 
the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to 
speak, the controlling factor in persuasion.”  
5 For a popular treatment of this ethical principle, see Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe, 
Practical Wisdom: The Right Way to Do the Right Thing (New York: Riverhead, 2011). As the 
title suggests, Schwartz and Sharpe’s book is actually about the virtue of phronēsis, not 
epieikeia, but they take the flexible measuring rod as a synecdoche for Aristotle’s repeated 
refrain that the virtuous person acts in the right way, at the right time, for the right reasons, and 
that such ethical practice is not easily reducible to rules for action. 
 
6 I follow Robert Sokolowski in attributing to Aristotle an “identity theory of truth.” In other 
words, Aristotle teaches that the human mind is in some way identified with the things that it 
perceives (and does not, as Kant would later suggest, merely apprehend a phenomenal 
representation of those things). Passages in Aristotle that seem to indicate a representational 
theory of truth are actually about language, not about knowledge. Words are signs (or 
representations) of things; the syntax of human language represents the relationships between 
things, and makes it possible for us to apprehend their essences and properties. Hence, language 
is a representation of the world that enables the human mind to apprehend the world itself. 
Because we can state predications, we can know properties; because we can know properties, our 
minds can achieve a formal identity with the thing known. See The Phenomenology of the 
Human Person, 273-85. I have not yet sufficiently worked out how this description of identity 
theory relates to moral or rhetorical judgments. Colin Johnston points to some problems in 
“Judgment and the Identity Theory of Truth,” Philosophical Studies 166 (2013): 281-397. 
7 See, for example, note 108 on page 174 of Kennedy’s translation of the Rhetoric.  
8 Aristotle says that persuasive speaking is like generalship, an honorable art, in the first chapter 
of the Nicomachean Ethics; he makes a similar claim at Rhetoric 1.1.12-13. 
9 This perversion of artistry is not “inartistic” in the sense that the sophistic Arts of Speech are 
inartistic. The handbooks fail as “arts” by seeing too little about the causes of persuasion, and by 
attributing persuasive success to false causes like organizational templates. They are therefore 
both artistically incompetent and ethically vacuous; they sanction unethical self-promotion 
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through prohairesis, and promote crudely instrumental uses of language through lack of 
understanding. Here, though, Aristotle seems to be imagining a sophist who has transcended the 
handbooks’ nostrums and has gained the theoretical power of the rhetorical art. For such a 
person, the choice to “persuade what is debased” is akin to a dishonest builder’s choice to use 
inferior materials or to hide structural defects under a good-looking veneer. Recall that, within 
the internal standards of excellence supplied by an art, Aristotle thinks that making a mistake 
intentionally is better than making it unintentionally—by which I take him to mean that the 
builder who knows better, but chooses to build poorly, is a better builder than one who commits 
the same errors through lack of skill. The sophist can be “artful” in this corrupted sense by 




1 NE 1181a 10-20; Rhetoric 1.2.7.  
2 Rhetoric 1.1.12. 
3 See Appendix I for uses of rhetōr and Appendix II for technē.  
4 See especially the discussion of rhetorical genres at 1.3; but the habit continues throughout 1.4-
26. Surprisingly, in book 2, Aristotle finds little or no reason to refer to speakers at all, except as 
examples of people who are envious or vainglorious.  
5 NE 1103b 1; but compare 1140a 10-15. 
6 Politics 1282a 20. 
7 Rhetoric 1.2.7-8, 11, 13. 
8 NE 1140a 10. I am aware that there is some tension between the Ethics and the Rhetoric on the 
distinction between arts, virtues, and powers. In the Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes power 
(dunamis) from active condition (hexis); arts and virtues are active conditions, not powers. In the 
Rhetoric, by contrast, Aristotle defines virtue as an ability (dumamis) to do good, and defines 
rhetoric as an ability to see to pithanon. Susan K. Allard-Nelson has attempted to defend 
Aristotle against the charge of inconsistency, arguing that within the scope of rhetoric, it makes 
sense to call virtues powers; see “Virtue in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Metaphysical and Ethical 
Capacity,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 34, no. 3 (2001), 245-259. I discuss the distinctions between 
these terms at some length in Appendix III below.  
9 Carnes Lord, for example, offers this definition of “art” in the Glossary to his translation of the 
Politics: “any practical or productive activity based on a body of communicable knowledge or 
expertise” (273). 
10 Rhetoric 1.2.1. The translation is Kennedy’s; I have added the bracketed Greek terms. 
11 Metaphysics 981b 1-10. 
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12 “Means of persuasion” is a phrase used by Baldwin, Kennedy, and Waterfield, and picked up 
by innumerable textbooks on logic and rhetoric, including Houser’s excellent Logic as a Liberal 
Art. Joe Sachs offers this more accurate but clunkier translation: “Let rhetoric, then, be a power 
of seeing what is capable of being persuasive on each subject.” Bartlett’s is less clunky but more 
stilted: “Let rhetoric, then, be a capacity to observe what admits of being persuasive in each 
case.” These two valiant attempts to render to pithanon demonstrate both that “means of 
persuasion” is not quite right, and that any attempt to do away with it is likely to produce 
something more awkward, less memorable, and frankly less clear to an English reader. Cope’s 
rather expansive note may be helpful: “Rhetoric may be defined, not as heretofore the ‘art of 
persuading’, because as we have already seen the result is not necessarily included in the 
meaning of the term ‘art’, but ‘the faculty of discerning or finding in any question presented to it 
that which is adapted to produce persuasion, or the possible means of persuasion’: the ‘art’ of 
rhetoric being here regarded in its practical application by the individual orator.” Notice that 
Cope maintains a distinction between the art and its “application.” His exposition of Aristotle’s 
treatment of arts in the Metapysics is instructive. See Cope, Introduction, 19-24, 149. 
13 NE 1112b 12-20; see also Rhetoric 1.6.1. 
14 Daniela Cammack, “Aristotle’s Denial of Deliberation about Ends,” Polis 30, no. 2 (2013): 
228-50. 
15 NE 1112b 10-15. 
 
16 As I have already noted, Aristotle makes a similar claim in Topics 1.1.1-2. In Rhetoric 1.2, 
Aristotle distinguishes between arguments that fail to move an audience and arguments that fail 
to persuade. Long chains of syllogisms are hard for people to follow and understand; but 
Aristotle never says they are unpersuasive. An argument based on premises that are not endoxa, 
however—no matter how effective the argument might be—is unpersuasive because it is invalid 
(1.2.13). A similar distinction is made between enthymeme and paradigm: “Speeches using 
paradigms are not less persuasive, but those with enthymemes excite more favorable audience 
reaction” (1.2.10). Favorable audience reactions are not the same as persuasion, and that one may 
achieve one without the other—though I suspect it is easier to get the good reaction without 
persuading than vice versa. 
17 “One who is truly good and sensible will bear all fortunes gracefully and will always act in the 
most beautiful way the circumstances permit, just as a good general will make the best use for 
war of the terrain that is at hand and a shoemaker will make the most beautiful shoe out of the 
leather that is given, and the same way with all other artisans as well” (NE 1101a 2-3). 
18 See Garver, An Art of Character, 193-7. 
 
19 Physics 192b 8-10, translated by Joe Sachs (Rutgers University Press, 2001), 49. 
 
20 The Metaphysics will later clarify that some things come about by aptitude gained through 
experience, which is not exactly art, or from thinking (dianoia), which can be part of an art but 
need not be. 
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21 Physics 192b 25. 
22 There is another problem here, which Aristotle does not address at this moment in the Physics. 
For any given thing, the material cause possesses the formal cause potentially. (Michelangelo 
sees David in the rough-hewn marble; the acorn and surrounding soil are in some sense waiting 
to become an oak tree.) But it is not the case that dead wood possesses the form of a tree 
potentially, so Aristotle likely does not think that a bed and the tree are made of the same 
material. Dead wood is different, materially, from living wood. This distinction will be important 
in my later discussion of endoxa as the material cause of persuasion. The audience’s opinions 
potentially possess the form of particular arguments: the speaker’s enthymeme provides that 
form when the speaker discerns the latent potential for persuasion in those endoxa. Yet there are 
two ways in which the audience is active, and potentially artistic, in this making of persuasion. 
First, the form of the enthymeme must be not only received but affirmed for persuasion to occur. 
The audience judges the argument to be persuasive; judgment is active. Whereas Michelangelo 
chisels away everything that is not David—he is the agent, the marble the patient—a speaker has 
no such power to effect change on an audience, whatever Gorgias might claim. Second, a 
rhetorically trained and self-aware listener can hold the speaker’s enthymeme at arm’s length, as 
it were, considering its premises in light of her own endoxa and wondering whether the two are 
really so compatible as the speaker implies. This judgment is artistic. 
 
23 195b 28-30. 
24 195b 5. 
25 NE 1103b. 
26 Physics 195b 15-20.  
27 Metaphysics 1032a 30 – 1032b 20. Like so many Aristotelian divisions, this one will later 
break down, when Aristotle describes how thought (noēsis) can be artistic. In other words, not all 
thinking is artistic, but all artistry is thoughtful. I would argue that the same categorical revision 
should be applied to this distinction between art and dunamis: Clearly, not all powers are artistic, 
but every art either is or at least includes a power of seeing. Compare the division at NE 2.5 
between feelings, powers, and active conditions: It will turn out later that every hexis includes 
certain powers and feelings, and Aristotle will even claim that the virtues (which are active 
conditions) make one “able” to perform certain actions that one would not otherwise have the 
power to perform. 
28 Metaphysics 1032b. Notice, here, that the initial distinction between art and power has broken 
down: The artist, too, makes things apo dunameōs. 
29 Meaphysics 981a. Sachs’s translation uses the phrase “universal judgment” here, which is 
accurate in itself, but would be misleading in context of my argument: the word is hupolepsis, 
not krisis. 
30 NE 1140a 10. 
 
31 I try to disentangle dunamis from hexis and technē from aretē in Appendix III. 
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32 Politics 3.11.1282a 17-24. 




35 Physics 200a 10. 
36 Other artifacts, with different purposes, require the opposite arrangement. A booby trap might 
put the heaviest materials at the top and the lightest ones on bottom, since the structure’s purpose 
is to collapse; the head of an axe is heavier than its handle, since the mechanical advantage of the 
fulcrum increases with the heaviness of the head; etc.  
37 Physics 200a 15. 
38 1033b 10-20. 
39 199a 15. 
40 Harvey Yunis, review of Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises from the Roman Empire (edited by 
George Kennedy and Mervin R. Dilts), Bryn Mawr Classical Review 1998. Online. 
41 See also my summary of Garver’s distinction between given (external) ends and guiding 
(internal) ends in the Introduction above. 
42 The conflation of practical wisdom with artistic skill is one of the more jejune features of the 
late twentieth century’s revival of sophistry. See Crowley, “A Plea for the Revival of Sophistry,” 
318-34. Subtler and more responsible readers have made the mistake, too, however: Rorty insists 
that wisdom and virtue belong to rhetoric because the Aristotelian orator, by exercising the 
practical and moral imagination, honors his home constitution and his neighbors. I would argue 
that this is a possible, even probable, effect of studying rhetoric, but only under a dialectical 
pedagogy like Aristotle’s; and that, in any case, the study of persuasion is distinct from the 
acquisition of virtuous habits, though the study of rhetoric reveals what is praiseworthy about 
those habits. See Rorty, “Arisotle on the Virtues of Rhetoric,” 730-33. 
Chapter 4 
1 There may be some relationship or similarity between the inartistic proofs that should be 
“used” and the “arts that govern using” identified in the Physics. The rhetorical artist cannot 
make these proofs, but must use them artistically, either speaking about them or judging them. 
Even the inartistic proofs must be explained artistically if they are to be persuasive. 
2 Jamie Dow, Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
3 I will analyze these interdependencies in chapter 5, below. 
4 Rhetoric 1.2.5. 
236 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Recall that krisis is now being used in its more general sense of evaluating an argument, rather 
than in its legal sense as the vote of a dicast or assemblyman—and that, consequentially, the 
realm of rhetoric has been expanded from those two specific fora to include all situations in 
which human beings try to persuade one another about “the given.” 
6 Rhetoric 1.2.7. 
7 F. M. Burnyeat argues (and I agree) that tacit or suppressed premises are not essential features 
of an enthymeme, and should not be mentioned in its definition. An enthymeme is a rhetorical 
syllogism; it is composed of signs and probabilities, often stated as maxims; it makes use of the 
audience’s opinions, and does not deal in necessary premises; it brings about persuasion, not 
knowledge. These are its definitional traits. The suppressed proposition is a useful tactic for 
speakers, and is an incidental feature of most enthymemes because of the constraints of 
rhetorical situations. See “Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion,” in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, edited by Furley and Nehamas (Princeton, 1994), 3-55. 
 
8 Aristotle claims in the Physics that the conclusion is the formal cause of the premises in a 
syllogism (195a 20). 
9 Rhetoric 1.2.8. The Loeb translation says “orators produce persuasion,” but the Greek says that 
“we” produce persuasion. Also notice that “produce” is a form of the verb poiein, confirming my 
claim that persuasion is rhetoric’s artifact; but there’s no indication that this production is always 
or exclusively the speaker’s activity. 
10 Aristotle maintains this distinction throughout the treatise. Book 2 speaks of a “different end 
for each genus of speech,” not for each genre of rhetoric (2.18.2, 2.19.26). 
11 There is an important moment in book 3, however, when Aristotle claims that a particular 
stylistic technique is “most artful and most unjust” (3.15.10)—a claim that may cast doubt on my 
interpretation here. I will address this phrase at some length in chapter 6 below. 
 
12 Some readers of Aristotle persist in referring to art as an “intellectual virtue.” From what I can 
see, this is a misnomer. An art may include or inculcate virtues, as the virtue of style is clarity, or 
as working with iron makes one strong and patient. But neither the blacksmith’s art nor the 
rhetorical art is itself a virtue, intellectual or otherwise. See Appendix III. 
13 Nicomachean Ethics 1094b. Notice that in this passage, he calls rhetoric, military strategy, and 
household management “powers” (dunameos). 
 
14 NE 1094b 20. The passage I quote ends at 1095a 12. 
15 NE 1096b 32. 
16 See Christopher Mirus, “Aristotle’s ‘Agathon,’” The Review of Metaphysics 57.3 (March 
2004): 515-36. 
17 NE 1101b 5 – 1102a 3. I add the grammatically necessary “who,” which is present in the 
Greek, but which seems to have been omitted in Sachs’s translation. Notice that the translation 
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obscures the obvious reference to a rhetorical term of art—a reference that, for example, 
Rackham cites in the notes to his much older translation. Translating engkomion as “honorific 
speech” also obscures the distinction that this passage draws between praise, encomium, and 
honor. Aristotle is not saying (as the translation implies) that encomia are speeches that honor, 
rather than praise, their subjects. Rather, here and in the Rhetoric, he is saying that “praise” is for 
virtue, “encomium” for deeds, and “honor” for the highest goods (that is, ends). It is not clear 
from either treatise whether any kind of epideictic speech would be sufficient for purposes of 
honor (timē). In the Rhetoric, though, Aristotle eventually admits that these distinctions are not 
so neat, since people compose speeches in praise even of the gods (who properly ought only to 
be honored). For Rackham’s notes, see Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19 (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1934).  
18 Rhetoric 1.9.33. 
19 NE 1095a 20. 
 
20 NE 1098a 5-6. 
 
21 NE 1102b 15, 1102b 30 – 1103a.  
22 NE 1149b 25-30. 
23 Aristotle is indebted to Plato for these insights about the effects of music on character. See 
Republic 376e – 404e, and Laws 654c – 655c. 
 
24 NE 1170a 9-11; 1173b 30-32; 1175a 15; 1175b 5-7; 1181a 10-25. 
 
25 Sophistical Refutations 165a 24-7; cf. 174b 19-23. Quoted in Grimaldi, Commentary, volume 
2, page 337. See also Eudemian Ethics 1216b 20 – 1217a 10. 
 
26 Politics 7.17, 1336a 15 – b 20. 
27 1338a 10-30. 
28 In the Republic, for example, Socrates begins his discourse about music by asking, “You 
include speeches in music, don’t you?” to which his interlocutor replies, “I do,” without 
hesitation or qualification (376e). 
 
29 1340a 15-20. 
30 1252b 30. 
31 1253a 10-20. 
Chapter 5 
1 Sometimes the discipline-specific topics are called topoi; other times, idia. Later, idia will be 
arguments drawn from the specifics of the case, and not from a specific discipline; koina will be 
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common ways of using language; and koinai topoi (or even just topoi) will be the elements or 
kinds of enthymeme. Chapter 6 works out the purpose of this terminological change. Here, I 
accept the conventional distinction between special and common topics, with some difference of 
emphasis and definition (as will be made clear). 
2 Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, 15-16. 
3 This is why we have needed so many outlines, adaptations, and commentaries over the years 
that disentangle such matters. Kennedy provides one at the beginning of his translation, as do 
Sachs and Bartlett. Kennedy provides a revised outline in Classical Rhetoric and its Christian 
and Secular Tradition, 85, which tries to make sense of the overlapping categories. Crider’s 
arrangement in The Art of Persuasion, 39-75, is clear and useful. 
4 Note, for example, Aristotle’s example of the greater and the lesser harm (1.4.13). In 
attempting to show that it is possible to argue both that the original cause of an act is greater, and 
that the end of an act is greater, he cites contrary arguments from the trial of those who betrayed 
Oropus to the Thebans in 366 B.C.E. Aristotle’s chapter is allegedly about propositions useful in 
deliberative speeches; and he has shown that the topics of greater and lesser good are useful 
there; but the examples come from judicial speeches. It is, moreover, easy to see how these 
topics could be used both to exalt or to defame someone’s character; to excite emotions; to make 
a logical argument about the nature of betrayal; or for any other purpose. 
5 Rhetoric 2.22. 
6 In this chapter, I will focus primarily on the sophistical recommendations of 1.9.28-38; 
fallacious enthymemes will be taken up in the next chapter. 
7 Aristotle on Political Reasoning, 70-71. 
8 “Recognizing that the work, like most of Aristotle’s treatises, was written at different times, we 
should not impose an artificial consistency on it.” Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian 
and Secular Tradition, 79. 
9 For Aristotle’s “identity theory of truth,” and the place of semantics and syntax in avoiding 
merely phenomenal representationalism, see Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person, 
282-5. 
10 The transitional statements quoted in this paragraph come from Rhetoric 1.4.1, 7, and 12; 
1.6.1; 1.8.1; 1.9.1; and 1.10.1. 
 
11 Rhetoric 1.8.1-2. 
12 Here, I differ from Bartlett, who emphasizes the “low ceiling” of the Rhetoric’s discussion of 
happiness, compared to that of the Ethics. (See Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric, 235.) I acknowledge 
that none of the subjects mentioned here is treated as carefully as Aristotle would treat it if he 
had time and space to give an account of his own judgment. One might also point out that the 
Ethics gives a rather shallow account of the soul, compared to De Anima; or that the Politics 
gives an incomplete account of causality, compared to the Physics. The difference is not between 
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the imprecision of rhetoric and the precision of (say) dialectic, but rather between treatises on 
different subjects. A more appropriate comparison, in my view, would be between Aristotle’s 
account of what the deliberative speaker must know, and (say) Gorgias or Isocrates’ answer to 
that same question. 
13 Rhetoric 1.9.32. 
14 Rhetoric 1.4.8. 
15 NE 1181a 10-25, Rhetoric 1.2.7. 
16 At NE 1095b, Aristotle explains that one may either reason from first principles to conclusions 
(if first principles are known), or from known facts and endoxa toward first principles. This 
back-and-forth working of the human mind seems to me to be foundational to Aristotle’s 
epistemology and to his pedagogy; it is roughly equivalent to the interplay between inductive and 
deductive reasoning that characterizes the chapters on paradigm and enthymeme, which I will 
discuss in chapter 6. 
17 Rhetoric 1.7.20-22. 
18 It may be tempting to view this statement as an endoxon for rhetors to exploit, since a selfish 
audience is likely to care only about things that may be beneficial to them. However, this isn’t 
what Aristotle says: he says that everyone agrees that benefits to others are better than benefits to 
oneself. He is continuing to assume that a common-good morality will obtain between citizens 
and neighbors. 
19 Rhetoric 1.9.25-26. 
 
20 My friend Michael Unruh raises an objection to my severity about works that praise and honor 
imperfect citizens. A monument, he counters, is meant to praise an ideal; a speech in praise of 
Hector is an occasion to celebrate martial valor and civic piety. We do not praise Hector because 
he is perfectly heroic, but rather because he is an instantiation, however imperfect, of some 
heroic virtues. Perhaps I am wrong and the recommendations of Rhetoric 1.9 are, in Aristotle’s 
estimation, politically salutary—not because citizens should believe that rashness causes 
courage, but because a celebration of courage is itself good, whatever the shortcomings of the 
speech’s putative subject. 
21 NE 1095b 10. 
 
22 Rhetoric 1.10.4. 
23 1.10.12, 18; 1.11.5, 18. 





                                                                                                                                                             
27 2.1.8. 
28 Kennedy finds “these famous chapters on the emotions” to be “only partially adapted to the 
specific needs of a speaker,” and he concludes that they must have “originated in some other 
context,” since “the examples given are not drawn from rhetorical situations” and some of them 
“do not at all fit a deliberative, judicial, or epideictic audience.”  Yet if the Rhetoric is, as I have 
suggested, a treatise meant to exercise our theoretical capacities, making us into rhetorical artists 
who are expert speakers and listeners, then this apparent loss of focus poses no problem for the 
unity of the treatise. 
29 Implicit in this definition, Aristotle will later clarify, is the converse claim that people will 
become calm “if they think they themselves have done wrong and suffered justly; for anger does 
not arise against justice nor against what people think they have appropriately suffered” (2.3.15).  
30 Rhetoric 2.1.7-9. 
31 2.3.13, 15; 2.4.31; 2.2.27; 2.4.32; 2.3.17.  
32 Rhetoric 2.2.6-7. Aristotle quotes Iliad 1.356ff, 2.196, and 1.82. The bracketed rhetorikos is 
my addition to the English translation (to indicate what is present in the Greek). 
33 Paragraph 12. 
34 Rhetoric 2.4. The shifts are at paragraphs 11, 22, and 27. 
35 Take, for example, the closing paragraph about enmity: “From this, then, it is evident that it is 
possible both to demonstrate that people are enemies and friends and to make them so when they 
are not and to refute those claiming to be and to bring those who through anger or enmity are on 
the other side of the case over to whatever feeling he chooses.” This is an objective, even cold 
observation about what speakers are able to do, and about what they are likely to try. Surely, as 
judges, we should take this statement as a warning about our vulnerability to insinuations of 
friendliness or hostility. See also 2.2.27, 2.3.17, 2.4.32, and 2.5.15. 
36 Rhetoric 2.4.11, 25. 
37 2.8.7, 2.9.1. 
38 2.9.13. 
39 NE 1095a 1-12; see also the dictum from Hesiod’s Works and Days 293-7, at 1095b 10.  
40 Rhetoric 2.11.1. 
41 See note 40 above. 
 
42The passages on friendly feeling come from 2.4.8-10, 14, 23, 27. For the passage on flattery 
and what is shameful, see 2.6.8. 
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43 Rhetoric 2.5.11 (fear) and 2.5.20 (confidence). 
44 Kennedy’s introduction to 2.12 (164).  
1 The Rhetoric as a whole seems to be arranged like a classical oration: Exordium (1.1), Narratio 
and Divisio (1.2-3), Confirmatio (1.4-2.26), Refutatio (3.1-18), Peroratio (3.19).  
2 The Topics, too, differentiates between real and seeming persuasion, on the basis of whether or 
not the dialectician correctly identifies the audience’s endoxa.  
3 Rhetoric 1.2.4. 
4 See, for example, the excellent advice offered at 2.20.9 about the use of paradigms. Kennedy 
renders the dei clauses as “one should,” which is perhaps as impersonal an expression as English 
has to offer; a more literal rendering would be something like “it is necessary to…” or “what 
seems needful is that one might… .” 
5 Romeo and Juliet, edited by Barbara Mowat, et al. (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library), 
3.1.61-73. 
 


























19 3.1.8-9; 3.2.1, 4. 
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1 Here and in Appendix II, I rely on Robert C. Bartlett’s helpful index. Aristotle’s Art of 
Rhetoric, translated by Robert C. Bartlett (University of Chicago Press, 2020), 301-3. 
 
2 For a comprehensive list of such references, see Susan K. Allard-Nelson, “Virtue in Aristotle’s 
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